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Abstract
Industry reports indicate that the number of security incidents happened in healthcare
organisation is increasing. Lessons learned (i.e. the causes of a security incident and
the recommendations intended to avoid any reccurrence) from those security incidents
should ideally inform information security management systems (ISMS). The sharing
of the lessons learned is an essential activity in the “follow-up” phase of security inci-
dent response lifecycle, which has long been addressed but not given enough attention
in academic and industry.
This dissertation proposes a novel approach, the Generic Security Template (GST),
aiming to feed back the lessons learned from real world security incidents to the ISMS.
It adapts graphical Goal Structuring Notations (GSN), to present the lessons learned in
a structured manner through mapping them to the security requirements of the ISMS.
The suitability of the GST has been confirmed by demonstrating that instances of the
GST can be produced from real world security incidents of different countries based
on in-depth analysis of case studies.
The usability of the GST has been evaluated using a series of empirical studies.
The GST is empirically evaluated in terms of its given effectiveness in assisting the
communication of the lessons learned from security incidents as compared to the tra-
ditional text based approach alone. The results show that the GST can help to improve
the accuracy and reduce the mental efforts in assisting the identification of the lessons
learned from security incidents and the results are statistically significant. The GST is
further evaluated to determine whether users can apply the GST to structure insights
derived from a specific security incident. The results show that students with a com-
puter science background can create an instance of the GST.
The acceptability of the GST is assessed in a healthcare organisation. Strengths
and weaknesses are identified and the GST has been adjusted to fit into organisational
needs. The GST is then further tested to examine its capability to feed back the secu-
rity lessons to the ISMS. The results show that, by using the GST, lessons identified
from security incidents from one healthcare organisation in a specific country can be
transferred to another and can indeed inform the improvements of the ISMS.
In summary, the GST provides a unified way to feed back the lessons learned to
the ISMS. It fosters an environment where different stakeholders can speak the same
language while exchanging the lessons learned from the security incidents around the
world.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter introduces the research background and formulates the dissertation state-
ment and research questions. It is divided into three sections. Section 1.1 introduces
the current status on information security management, security incident handling and
information security incident learning. Section 1.2 defines the dissertation statement
and research questions. Section 3.3 introduces the structure of this dissertation and
provides an overview of each chapter.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Information security incident
“The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has issued NHS Surrey
with a monetary penalty of £200,000 after more than 3,000 patient records
were found on a second hand computer bought through an online auction
site. The sensitive information was inadvertently left on the computer and
sold by a data destruction company employed by NHS Surrey since March
2010 to wipe and destroy their old computer equipments.” [12].
Such an incident may result in financial losses and legal issues, and affect the or-
ganisations’ reputation and customer confidence [13]. Security incidents happened
in healthcare organisations across the world such as Veterans Affairs’ data leakage
incidents [14, 15] in North American and Shenzhen hospital’s data leakage incident
[16] in China. However, those incidents are just the tip of iceberg. Industry reports
indicate that the number of security incidents happened in healthcare organisation is
increasing. Symantec reports that the healthcare industry accounted for 36% of the
total security incident breaches in 2012 [17]. At 44%, the healthcare industry contin-
1
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ues to be the sector responsible for the largest percentage of disclosed data breaches
by industry in 2013 [18]. Symantec captured this data from more than 157 countries
through a variety of Symantec products and services such as the Symantec Probe Net-
work, Symantec.cloud, Norton consumer products, and other third-party data sources
[18].
A patient’s medical record is a collection of personal information including “iden-
tification, medication history, dietary habits, sexual preference, genetic information,
psychological profiles, employment history, income, and physicians’ subjective assess-
ments of personality and mental state among others” [19, 20]. Healthcare information
privacy and security have been a primary concern of the public [21–25]. Waegemann
claimed that the disclosure of a patient’s medical record could ruin or damage an indi-
vidual’s career, and result in dismissal from work, loss of health insurance and financial
loss [26].
Data leakage incidents can cause financial loss to healthcare organisations. Health-
care organisations will be fined if they fail to protect patients’ personal information.
For instance, the healthcare organisations in UK were fined hundreds of thousands
pounds following data breaches affecting thousands of patients and staff [27–29]. Al-
though it is a small amount comparing to the total budget of UK healthcare organisa-
tions which is over hundreds of billons pounds, this situation can become worse if no
actions taken to reduce such security incidents [30].
1.1.2 Legislative and government initiatives
The new European General Data Protection Regulation [31], extends the scope of the
Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) to all foreign organisations processing
data of European Union residents. It comes with a strict data protection compliance
regime that organisations can be fined up to 2% of worldwide turnover, for example, in
the case of severe data protection incidents and failure to report a personal data breach
to the supervisory authority. Organisations are under a legal obligation to strengthen
their security mechanisms to prevent incidents. There are also government initiatives to
enhance the sharing of security incidents. For example, the UK has launched the Cyber
Security Information Sharing Partnership (CISP) to help government and industry on
cyber security threats. The partnership includes the introduction of a secure virtual
“collaboration environment” where government and industry partners can exchange
information on threats and vulnerabilities in real time [32]. There is a need to promote
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incident knowledge exchanging by providing the ability to analyse and redistribute this
knowledge effectively [32].
1.1.3 Information Security Management Systems (ISMS)
Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) can be defined as management
systems used for establishing and maintaining a secure information environment [33].
The objective is to “implement the appropriate measures in order to eliminate or min-
imise the impact that various security related threats and vulnerabilities might have
on an organisation” [9]. Current research has provided security controls for prevent-
ing information security threats and vulnerabilities, including technical protection (e.g.
anti-virus software and firewalls) and management protection (e.g. security training,
security standards and guidelines). However, the main stream of those researches has
placed less emphasis on the lessons learned from the security incidents as a resource
to improve the implementation of security controls. The key learning notes are not
effectively fed back into management structure, security policies and procedures [5].
There is a need to effectively communicate learning from security incidents to inform
improvements in ISMS.
1.1.4 Security incident response
Security incident response is an important part of ISMS [34]. It can be defined as
“the process that aims to minimise the damage from security incidents and malfunc-
tions, and monitors and learns from such incidents” [1, 2]. There are well-documented
methodologies such as the SANS [3, 4] and NIST SP800-61 models [35, 36] that de-
vide this process into several distinct phases to handle and respond to an incident, in-
cluding preparation, identification, containment, eradication, recovery and follow-up
[2]. Incident response process prepares preventative measures, identifies an incident,
contains the incident, removes the incident, recovers the systems and then conducts a
post-incident review to document and disseminate key learning notes, which is usually
called a “feedback” or “follow-up” phase.
A “feedback” or “follow-up” phase is an indispensible stage of the security inci-
dent response process according to NIST [35, 36] and SANS [3, 4]. A key activity in
the incident response process is the capacity to learn from the errors or mistakes made
throughout the incident handling process, to learn about the effectiveness of security
policies, procedures, technical processes and to feed this knowledge back into the in-
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formation security management process [3, 36]. Current research has realised the im-
portance to learn from past security incidents [6, 37–40]. However, incident response
often focuses on solving the direct cause of the incident, rather than investigating the
in-depth cause which is often not a technical problem (e.g. firewall not properly con-
figured) but a management problem(e.g. not having a policy for configuring firewall)
[6]. This imbalanced focus has resulted in the loss of opportunities to investigate why a
potential incident is not adequately covered by the security requirements, that may lead
to further improvements of the security requirements and may prevent future incidents
[6]. Firesmith defines security requirements as “a quality requirement that specifies
a required amount of security in terms of a system-specific criterion and a minimum
level that is necessary to meet one or more security policies”[41]. For example, a secu-
rity requirement related to access control cited from ISO 27002 can be “Ensuring that
information is accessible only to those authorised to have access”[42].
1.1.5 Current methods in sharing the lessons learned
There have been several initiatives in supporting security incidents sharing and ex-
changing. For example, the European Network and Information Security Agency
(ENISA) requests member states to report security incidents to enable the exchange
of lessons from incidents. In the United States, the nation’s Healthcare and Public
Health Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (NH-ISAC), has provided a platform
for sharing and exchanging lessons learned from security incidents in healthcare or-
ganisations [43]. However, their work was not concerned with providing a mechanism
for conveying key details effectively.
Traditional ways to disseminate information about an incident include a series of
formal reports, emails, newsletters, meetings and presentations to management [3, 36].
Meetings are held and communicative notes are gathered to address responses, dis-
agreements, suggestions and additions to security requirements and the incident pro-
cedures [3]. Emails, newsletters, meetings and presentations to management contain
less information comparing to the formal post-incident reports. Post-incident reports
document information obtained throughout the security incident investigation process.
Example post-incident reports include the VA data leakage incidents [14, 15] from
the US, the NHS IT Asset disposal incident [44] from UK. They provide a reference
that can be used to assist in handling similar incidents [35, 36]. Contents include the
causes of the incident, the recommendations on remediation, the security requirements
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violated and improvements on procedures. Although this information is inter-related,
details can be scattered throughout a report (Appendix A.5). This makes it difficult
for readers to understand how the recommendations are brought together to support
different security requirements [45]. This problem has been compounded by usually
lengthy written security incident reports, which can be hundred of pages. There is a
need for the conversion of the textual information into a learning document, that can
easily communicate security lessons into the ISMS [6].
Traditional ways to disseminate lessons learned are based on text approach. The
linear format of a text can obscure relationships among concepts and discourage read-
ers from integrating information across ideas [46]. Graphical diagrams can serve this
purpose, as it can communicate both individual elements of information and relation-
ships between them.
In this dissertation, we propose a novel diagramming approach, the Generic Se-
curity Template, aiming to provide a mechanism to feed back the lessons learned to
the ISMS. Rather than developing another novel security notation with an uncertain
pedigree, we have extended the application of the existing Goal Structuring Notation
(GSN) [7] to support the exchange of lessons learned in the aftermath of data leakage.
The objective is to enhance existing techniques used to share lessons from security
incidents. Bloomfield claimed that GSN had become the dominant approach in the
UK defence sector [10], and it is increasingly being used in safety-critical industries
to improve the structure, rigor, and clarity of design requirements [47, 48]. The same
approach has more recently been extended to document security requirements [45, 49–
52]. We believe this approach can be adapted to effectively communicating security
lessons into the ISMS. It is important to note that this newly proposed approach is
not intended to replace any of the existing lessons learned dissemination methods. It
provides a new way to feed back the lessons learned from the security incidents to the
ISMS. Section 1.2 outlines the dissertation statement.
1.2 Dissertation statement
1.2.1 Hypothesis
The Goal Structuring Notations (GSN) can be used to depict the lessons learned from
security incidents and map them to the security requirements for an Information Secu-
rity Management System. We define the resulting graphical overview as the Generic
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Figure 1.1: An example instance of the Generic Security Template - VA 2007 Data
Leakage Incident
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Security Template (GST). We argue that the GST can assist users to identify the lessons
learned from security incidents and can be applied to structure the insights derived from
specific security incident. The GST is acceptable in a healthcare organisation and can
be used to feed back the lessons learned to an Information Security Management Sys-
tems in healthcare.
1.2.2 Definitions
A Generic Security Template (GST), can be defined as “a semi-structured body of
lessons identified from security incidents that can support identification of security re-
quirements of the Information Security Management Systems (ISMS)”. It presents the
lessons learned in a structured manner by mapping them to the security requirements
of the ISMS.
A security incident, is defined as “a violation or imminent threat of violation of
security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices” [53]. In this
dissertation hypothesis, we focus on security incidents that are publicly reported in
healthcare systems.
Lessons learned, are defined as the knowledge or understanding gained by experi-
ence [54]. In this dissertation, it refers to (1) security issues (the causes of a security
incident in confidentiality); and (2) security recommendations (intended to avoid any
recurrence).
Security requirements of an ISMS, are presented in the form of a common security
standard or guideline applied to the organisation where the security incident happened.
Generic, is defined as “characteristic of or relating to a class or group of things;
not specific”. In this thesis, Generic Security Templates are intended to be applica-
ble across different classes of organisation and not specifically to the place where an
incident occurred.
The GST is a theoretical model that maps the lessons learned to the security re-
quirements. The Generic Security Template that describes a specific security incident
is defined as a GST instance. Figure 1.1 provides an example instance of the GST.
It is based on a report into the data leakage of personal information about 250,000
veterans and over 1.3 million medical providers by the US Veterans Affairs Adminis-
tration (VA) [15]. The leaf nodes in this diagram are used to gather the lessons learned
that were intended to avoid future incidents. The internal nodes are used to show how
each of these findings supports higher level goals and sub-goals intended to ensure
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that systems meet an acceptable level of security, defined in terms of the US Govern-
ments Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM) [55], a security
guideline applied to the VA. More details will be elaborated in subsequent chapters.
1.2.3 Research questions
The following research questions are formulated to support the dissertation statement.
1. Can the GST be used to depict lessons learned from security incidents and map
them to the security requirements for an Information Security Management System?
2. Can the GST be used to better assist users to identify the lessons learned from
security incidents in comparison to traditional free-text approaches?
3. Can the GST be accepted and used to feed back the lessons learned to an Infor-
mation Security Management Systems in healthcare?
1.3 Dissertation structure
The objective of the dissertation is to propose an approach to feed back the security
lessons to the Information Security Management Systems in healthcare organisations.
Figure 1.2 presents an overview of the chapters and their relational structure.
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical framework on which the dissertation is based
through a comprehensive survey of relevant research and current literature. It includes
Information Security Management Systems (ISMS), security incident response lifecy-
cle, lessons learned from the security incidents and how the lessons learned are related
to the ISMS and security incident response lifecycle. The context of the research is
then outlined, where a focus is placed on feeding back the lessons learned from secu-
rity incidents to the ISMS.
Chapter 3 proposes the Generic Security Template. It introduces the basis of the
Generic Security Template, including assurance cases, the graphical Goal Structuring
Notations (GSN), and outlines the processes to create instances of the Generic Security
Template.
Chapter 4 answers research question 1 by conducting four security incidents case
studies from the US, UK and China. It tests the suitability of the Generic Security
Template by producing four instances of the Generic Security Template following the
creation process presented in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5 answers research question 2 by empirically evaluating the usability of the
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Generic Security Template in assisting the identification of the lessons learned from the
security incidents compared to the traditional pure free-text approach. In particular, its
usability is evaluated in terms of accuracy, efficiency and ease of use to identify the
lessons learned from security incidents. The results show that it can help improving
the accuracy and reducing the mental effort in identifying lessons learned from security
incident reports.
Chapter 6 answers research question 3 by evaluating the acceptability of the Generic
Security Template with people working in healthcare. The objective is to assess peo-
ple’s general attitude towards this approach. It identifies strengths and weaknesses of
the Generic Security Template, and appropriate scenarios in which the Generic Secu-
rity Template can be applied to fit the needs of the organisation.
Chapter 7 synthesis the feedback from Chapter 4, 5, 6 into the improvements of the
Generic Security Template and evaluates the improved Generic Security Template by
conducting an empirical study with university students with a computer science back-
ground. The results show that users with a computer science background can structure
the insights derived from a security incident using the Generic Security Template. This
further answers research question 1 that the Generic Security Templates can be used
for structuring the lessons learned from the security incidents.
Chapter 8 further answers research question 3 through several in-depth industrial
case studies to examine the Generic Security Template’s capability to feed back the
security lessons to the ISMS. In particular, we use the security incidents from different
countries to find out how lessons learned can be transferred to a representative health-
care organisation in China. The findings show that, by using the GST, lessons identified
from security incidents from one healthcare organisation in a specific country can be
transferred to another and can indeed inform improvements of the ISMS.
Chapter 9 summarises the conclusions, contributions, limitations and lays down
the foundation for future work.
Chapter 2
Review of Literature
This chapter presents the theoretical framework on which the dissertation is based
through a comprehensive survey of relevant research and current literature. It intro-
duces Information Security Management Systems (ISMS), security incident response
lifecycle, incident learning and how the incident learning is shared and exchanged us-
ing current dissemination methods. This chapter finally outlines the context of the
research, where a focus is placed on feeding back the lessons learned from security
incidents to ISMS. This chapter is divided into the following sections.
Section 2.1 introduces information security and the healthcare information secu-
rity. It includes concepts of information security, security threats, vulnerabilities, and
countermeasures. Section 2.2 introduces Information Security Management Systems
(ISMS). It includes the definition of ISMS, the ISMS framework and current initia-
tives of the ISMS including security standards, guidelines and best practices. Section
2.3 introduces information security incident response and handling related literatures,
which is a part of ISMS. It includes the definition of security incident and the security
incident response lifecycle. Section 2.4 introduces related work on incident learning
which is an important part of the incident response lifecycle, as well as industrial and
government initiatives in incident learning. Section 2.5 introduces current methods in
sharing lessons learned from the security incidents and identifies the problems with
current methods. Section 2.6 outlines the context of this research, where we identify
the theoretical and industrial requirements as the motivations of this dissertation.
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2.1 Information security
2.1.1 Definition of information security
Information Security refers to “the preservation of confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability (CIA) of information” [34]. This definition is consistent with the work by
Pfleeger [56], Denning [57] and Gollmann [58]. Availability is “the property being
accessible and usable upon demand by an authorised entity”C˙onfidentiality is “the
property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individu-
als, entities or processes”. Integrity is “the property of safeguarding the accuracy and
completeness of asset” [34]. However, Dhillon suggested that the CIA principles are
not enough to address information security [59]. There are extra principles, such as
responsibility, integrity, trust and ethicality (RITE). ISO 27001 also introduces authen-
ticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability. Organisations need to consider
all those aspects to ensure a secure environment for their information assets. How-
ever, achieving those objectives is non-trivial because security breaches stem from a
variety of sources and channels. These include but are not limited to careless or un-
aware employees, out-dated security controls, frauds, malware, espionage, phishing,
unauthorised access, spam, cyber-attacks and vulnerabilities [60].
2.1.2 Security threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures
A security threat is “any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact
organisational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organi-
sational assets, or individuals through an information system via unauthorised access,
destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service” [61].
Security threats are unexpected and have the potential to cause an unwanted incident
that can negatively impact a system or organisation.
A vulnerability refers to any weakness in computer software or hardware systems
that can be accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited [62]. Vulnerabilities open
the system to attacks that have the potential to violate the system’s intended secure
behaviour. Currently, the number of the security vulnerabilities is still increasing. For
example, the United States’ national vulnerability database [63] lists over 40.000 se-
curity problems at an increasing rate of 13 vulnerabilities per day.
A countermeasure refers to any security service that can reduce security threats and
vulnerabilities by minimising the harm it can cause. It is a procedure or mechanism
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that reduces the probability that a specific vulnerability will be exploited, or reduces
the damage that results from a specific exploitation. Examples of countermeasures
include both management means such as security policy, standards, guidelines, security
awareness training, and technical means such as built-in or add-on security products,
access control mechanisms, and encryption methods [62].
2.1.3 Information security in healthcare systems
Electronic medical records (EMR) are gradually replacing the traditional paper-based
record as it can provide many benefits such as reducing the cost and enhancing the
quality of healthcare service delivery [64–66]. The use of the EMR also faces great
challenges as it expands the volume of health information accessible by both autho-
rised and unauthorised users. The spread of electronic medical records raises privacy
concerns [64, 67].
Health information is considered to be more sensitive than other types of personal
information [68, 69]. Studies conducted in different countries reveal people’s concern
about health information security and privacy. For example, in the United States, indi-
viduals are required to execute millions of compelled authorisations for the disclosures
of health information each year for various purposes such as employment and insur-
ance. There are no restrictions on the scope of the released information [70]. In the
studies conducted in Denmark [71], New Zealand [24], Australia [72] and China [73],
individuals are also found to be concerned with the sharing of their health information.
The threats of the health information security can be external or internal [74]. Ex-
ternal threats include viruses and spyware attacks, hackers, and intruders in premises.
Internal threats include various types of employee behaviour such as ignorance, cu-
riosity, recklessness, inadequate behaviour, and abuse of password [75]. The United
States National Research Council classified the healthcare organisational threats into
five levels, according to increasing sophistication [67],
• Accidental disclosure, patient information is unintentionally disclosed to others
by careless healthcare personnel (e.g. e-mail message sent to wrong person);
• Insider curiosity, an insider with data-access privilege access a patient’s records
for personal interest and purpose, (e.g. concerns of well beings of their friends);
• Data breach by insider, insiders access and transmit the patient’s information to
outsiders for money or personal revenge, etc;
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• Data breach by outsider with physical intrusion, an outsider illegally intrudes the
physical facility and gains access to the system.
• Unauthorised access, an outsider intrudes into a healthcare organisation’s net-
work from the outside to gain access to patient information or attack the system.
Reviews of literature [20, 69, 76] show that security technologies applied in health-
care organisations are largely from cryptographic and distributed systems research, in-
cluding both technical means such as health data encryption [77, 78], access control
[79, 79, 80], secure data exchanging between organisations [81, 82] and management
means such as compliance of the security standards or policies [83, 84], audit logs
analysis [85, 86], security training [83, 87, 88] and so on. Those support five main
principals of healthcare information security [89, 90],
• Availability and integrity, ensure that the information is accurate and up-to-date
and available at appropriate places;
• Accountability, ensure that health care providers are accounted for their use of
information, based on documented needs and rights;
• Perimeter definition, control the boundaries of trusted access to the information
system, both physically and logically;
• Role/need-limited access, enable access for personnel only to information essen-
tial to the performance of their jobs, and limit any temptation to access informa-
tion beyond the needs;
• Comprehensibility and control, ensure the stakeholders of the medical record
including record owners, data stewards, and patients can understand and have
effective control over appropriate aspects of information security and access.
Effective countermeasures including both management and technical security con-
trols are required to prevent or eliminate threats, or vulnerabilities, and minimise the
harm they can cause. The objective of information security management is to “im-
plement appropriate measurements in order to eliminate or minimise the impact that
various security related threats and vulnerabilities might have on an organisation” [9].
The next section elaborates on the Information Security Management Systems (ISMS).
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2.2 Information Security Management Systems (ISMS)
2.2.1 Information Security Management Systems
There has not been a canonical definition of Information Security Management Sys-
tems (ISMS). The world was introduced to the formal concept of ISMS during the
1990s with the development and introduction of the British Standard BS-7799 [91],
which was incorporated in the ISO 27000 series. Eloff defines an Information Security
Management System as a management system used for establishing and maintaining
a secure information environment [33]. Information Security Management Systems
incorporate the typical “Plan-Do-Check-Act” (PDCA) cycle, proposed by Deming
[92, 93]. The main tasks in the “Plan” phase is to design the ISMS, assess infor-
mation security risks and select appropriate controls. The security controls are then
implemented in the “Do” phase. The “Check” phase reviews and evaluates the perfor-
mance (efficiency and effectiveness) of the ISMS. In the “Act” phase, remidial actions
are taken and security lessons are documented. This data can be put back into the risk
assessment process in the “Plan” phase, ultimately leading to the improvements of the
ISMS.
2.2.2 Information Security Management Systems framework
ENISA outlines the ISMS framework as shown in Figure 2.1. The development of an
ISMS framework includes six steps, definition of security policy, definition of ISMS
scope, risk assessment (as part of risk management), risk management, selection of
appropriate controls, and statement of applicability [9]. This is consistent with the
requirements in the ISO 27000 series [34, 42].
The definition of a security policy and the scope of the ISMS, are higher-level man-
agement strategies. In healthcare, regulations and policies have been proposed in dif-
ferent countries, such as Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
[94] in the US, the Data Protection Act [95] in the UK and the Personal Information
Protection Act [96] in China. Risk management is a process to “transform” the security
standards, guidelines of security policy, the targets, and objectives of ISMS into spe-
cific plans for the implementation of controls and mechanisms that aims to minimise
threats and vulnerabilities. Security risk management (SRM) is a continuous process
to prioritise information system security risk, implement and monitor security controls
(i.e., countermeasures, safeguards) [13, 36]. It synthesises the strategies, policies, ac-
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Figure 2.1: Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) Framework [9]
tivities, procedures, and people used to manage security risk, and is expected to result
in a system of controls that collectively protect information systems security [34, 42].
Appropriate controls are then selected and mapped to the identified risks. The sources
of the controls are mainly from existing sets of controls or mechanisms, included in
information security standards (e.g. ISO 27001) and guidelines, or a combination or
adaptation of proposed controls to the specific organisational requirements. Section
2.2.3 reviews these controls.
2.2.3 Security standards and guidelines
There have been a number of initiatives to contribute to the ISMS. Several private and
government organisations developed guidelines to ensure that an adequate level of se-
curity is achieved and best practices adopted in an organisation, such as ISO27001,
BS7799, CMMI [97], FISCAM [55], GB/T22239 [98], ITIL [99], Common Criteria
[100], SecUML [101] and COBIT [102]. Security standards provide a detailed level of
mandatory controls to support the enforcement of information security policies. Secu-
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rity guidelines consist of recommended controls and best practices to support security
standards or serve as a reference when no applicable standards are available. The fol-
lowing sections introduce some example standards or guidelines.
The Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM) provides best
practices on security control techniques and audit procedures [55]. It is consistent with
the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) [103] and has incorpo-
rated NIST Standards such as NIST SP 800-53 [104], NIST SP 800-100 [105]. FISMA
defines a framework for managing information security that must be followed for all
information systems operated by a U.S. federal government agency. The FISCAM can
be used as the basis for a FISMA evaluation and has provided different levels of secu-
rity requirements for evaluating general security controls. FISCAM includes general
controls categories such as security management, access controls, configuration man-
agement, segregation of duties and contingency planning. For each of those general
control areas, it identifies several critical elements that are essential security require-
ments for establishing adequate security controls.
In the Chinese standard, GB/T22239 (Information security technology - Baseline
for classified protection of information system), there are four classified security levels
to ensure information security [98]. Baseline security requirements are provided for
different levels,
• The first level requires the ISMS to protect the system from malicious attacks
from individual or small scale threats with few resources; to resist the general
natural disasters or other harms caused to critical resources; and to recover at
least part of the functions after the system is compromised or damaged.
• The second level requires the ISMS to protect the system from malicious attacks
from small organisations or small scale threats with few resources; to resist the
general natural disasters or other harms caused to critical resources; to detect
important security vulnerabilities and security events; and to recover at least part
of the functions after the system is compromised or damaged.
• The third level requires the ISMS to protect the system from malicious attacks
launched by organised groups or threats with abundant resources by following
unified security strategy; to resist severe natural disasters or other harms caused
to critical resources; to detect important security vulnerabilities and security
events; and to recover most of the functions after the system is compromised
or damaged.
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• The fourth level requires the ISMS to protect the system from malicious attacks
launched by state-level threats or from hostile organisations by following unified
security strategy; to resist severe natural disasters or other harms caused to crit-
ical resources; to detect important security vulnerabilities and security events;
and to recover almost all the functions after the system is compromised or dam-
aged.
Organisations are required to comply with the GB/T22239, by achieving a certain
security level. For example, the guidance of the health industry information security
level protection issued by the Ministry of Health of the People’s Republic of China
requires that, health information systems and related units should be self-examined in
accordance with GB/T22239. In particular, the tertiary (highest level) hospital needs
to achieve at least the third level of the GB/T22239 [106].
2.2.4 Strengths and weaknesses of security standards/guidelines
Organisations can potentially benefit from standards/guidelines in two ways [107, 108].
The first is to ensure the development of a strong, consistent and structured strategy
to protect information security. Security standard/guidelines provide best practice and
recommend security requirements that the organisation needs to meet and it is a good
starting point for shaping information security management strategy [107, 109]. The
second is to demonstrate to the staff, customers and trading partners that the organisa-
tion has taken security seriously by following international best practices. Gomes in-
troduced the ISO 27002 for implementing four security controls (Asset Management,
Physical and Environmental Security, Communications & Operations Management,
Access Control) in a data center infrastructure of Hospital S. Sebastiao in Portugal
[110]. The application of this framework was reported to be successful, justified by the
well accomplishment of those four security controls [110]. Wiander analysed the im-
plementation experiences of four organisations that have implemented ISO/IEC 17799
(2005). The results suggest that the standard served the needs of the enterprises and its
intended usage correlated well with organisations’ practice [111].
Siponen criticised the basis of the security standards/guidelines. He argues that
many are only based on personal observation and not universally valid [112]. The
standards/guidelines are validated by appealing to common practise and authority only,
which is not a sound basis for international use [113]. However, information security
standards/guidelines can serve as information security management library for prac-
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titioners [113]. Practitioners would benefit from in-depth practical experiences and
lessons learned on how the objectives of security standards/guidelines are met in or-
ganisations where they are applied [113].
2.2.5 Security requirement modelling
Security standards provide security requirements that are based on best practices. As is
mentioned, some organisations adopted security requirements from security standard
directly. As an alternative, organisations can model their own security requirements
by using security requirement modeling methods such as Common Criteria (CC) [114]
and SecUML [101, 115]. The Common Criteria (CC) is an international standard
(ISO/IEC 15408). It allows the security experts to elicit security requirements and
specify security attributes of their own products. The SecUML [101, 115] is a mod-
elling language that defines abstract syntax for annotating UML diagrams with infor-
mation relevant to access control. The meta-model consists data types like users, roles,
objects, operations and permissions and was found to be able to ease the expression of
access control requirements during analysis and design [101].
2.2.6 ISMS and incident learning
As mentioned, ISMS incorporate the typical “Plan-Do-Check-Act” (PDCA) cycle. In-
cident learning is viewed as a resource that can be used to improve procedures, policies,
and implementing new controls [5], which involves every step of the ISMS. However,
incident learning is not given much attention in the research literature [5]. An ex-
ploratory case study conducted in a large global financial services organisation shows
that the practice of incident response frequently do not result in the improvements of
strategic security processes such as policy development and risk assessment. The key
learning notes are not effectively fed back into security processes, management struc-
ture, policies, procedures and risk assessment [6]. There is a gap between the learning
of security incident and the ISMS, to translate the learning to inform improvements
of the ISMS. Sections 2.3 examines incident learning from the perspective of security
incident management lifecycle.
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2.3 Security incident management
2.3.1 Security incident
Krause defines a security incident as “any act or circumstance that involves classified
information that deviates from the requirements of governing security publications ”
[116]. An information security incident occurs when the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of an information asset are directly or indirectly attacked. Those attacks
include but are not limited to malicious software, the loss of sensitive information, the
loss of power and supporting utilities. Such incidents result in financial losses and
legal issues. They affect the organisations’ reputation and customer confidence [13].
2.3.2 Security incident response lifecycle
SANS [3, 4] and NIST SP800-61 [35, 36] have provided well-structured methods for
security incident response. The methods are similar in responding and handling se-
curity incidents that typically incorporate initial preparatory phases, the detection and
containment of incidents, recovery from incidents and a post-incident follow-up phase.
Specifically, the SANS method features six steps: preparation, identification, contain-
ment, eradication, recovery and lessons learned [3, 4]. The NIST 800-61 model defines
a security incident response and handling lifecycle including four steps: preparation,
detection and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery and post-incident activ-
ities [35, 36]. Figure 2.2 illustrates a synthesis of this incident response process. Table
2.1 describes each phase of the incident response process in further details.
Although standard incident response processes include a “post-incident” or “follow-
up” phase where lessons are to be learned, incident response has focused on technical
aspects over incident learning [5]. Reflection on incident response typically does not
leverage opportunities to learn about the effectiveness of security procedures, controls,
training and policies in order to improve the organisation’s security management capa-
bilities [37, 38]. Section 2.4 further discusses and elaborates on the “follow-up” phase,
where learning and incident dissemination occurs.
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Table 2.1: Description of incident response phases [1–6]
Phase Description
Preparation This phase prepares the resources and tools including inci-
dent communication facilities, incident analysis and miti-
gation tools to handle incidents. This phase also prevents
the incident for securing networks, systems, and applica-
tions. Main practices include risk assessment, user aware-
ness training, etc.
Identification This phase detects and analyses security incident. Main
practices include incident documentation, prioritisation and
notification.
Containment This phase contains the incident before it overwhelms re-
sources or increases damage. Main practices include choos-
ing a containment strategy, gathering evidence and identify-
ing attack hosts.
Eradication This phase remedies consequences of the incident based on
the information gathered on the incident. Main practices
include deleting malware and disabling breached user ac-
counts, as well as identifying and mitigating all vulnerabil-
ities that were exploited. In this phase, security engineers
focuse on technical aspects to mitigate security issues.
Recovery This phase restores systems to normal operation. Main
practices include confirming that the systems are function-
ing normally, and remediating vulnerabilities to prevent
similar incidents.
Follow up This phase allows the organisation to learn lessons and im-
prove their information security management process. Main
practices include the completion of incident reports, dis-
seminating of lessons learned to the stakeholders of this in-
cident as well as the improvements of information security
management and incident response process from manage-
rial perspectives.
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Figure 2.2: The Incident Response Process [1–5]
2.4 Incident learning
2.4.1 Post-incident activities
Incident learning is usually conducted through a series of formal reports, meetings and
presentations to management in follow-up phase [3, 36]. These lessons learned should
feed back relevant knowledge and changes into the security management process to
inform the creation of further reference material on how to respond to similar incidents
[36]. In particular, such activities feed information back to the preparedness phase to
determine if additional tools, increased security budgets, improved training programs
and alterations to the incident response procedures are required.
Some organisations have failed to learn the lessons from security incidents [37,
38, 117]. Muhren describes how “considerable opportunities remain unseized” [117].
Organisations are reluctant to conduct post-incident reviews, as they are costly, chal-
lenging and require great expertise to conduct [118]. However, the learning gath-
ered throughout incident handling will be lost unless at least some review activities
attempted. Existing work on cost-benefit trade off can help decide IT security invest-
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ments [119–122].
2.4.2 Imbalanced focus in security incident learning
There are incident response literatures stressing the importance on the post-incident
learning [35], however, compared to the level of details devoted to the technical as-
pects, few researches provide the details on how this activity should be conducted [6].
Tan et al. have found that many organisations are not prepared to gather and learn the
lessons from security incidents. They usually choose to resume service as their priority
[123]. More research is required to investigate how organisations can effectively learn
from the incident response process. There is a need for the organisations to document,
review, and present the lessons and integrate them back into the information security
management process for future improvements [5, 6]. However, it is not clear as to how
organisations can effectively learn and respond to this information [5]. Section 2.5
elaborates on recent initiatives to incident learning.
2.4.3 Current initiatives in incident learning
2.4.3.1 Legislative requirements
There are legislative requirements to report security incidents. In the US, federal law
requires federal agencies to report incidents to the United States Computer Emer-
gency Readiness Team (US-CERT) office within the Department of Homeland Se-
curity (DHS) [53]. In China, there are regulations that ask organisations or enterprises
to report incidents as they occur or when they are discovered. It is required that internet
platform provider and search engineers (such as, Yahoo!, Google, and Baidu), internet
database connector, and the China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC) and
its service institute should monitor and report incidents to the Bureau of Communica-
tion Security with copy to CNCERT/CC (Article 7). Article 63-65 of the Emergency
Response Law of the People’s Republic of China states that, an organisation that failed
to report or which makes a false report will suffer from administrative sanctions which
may include license suspension or revocation [124].
The European Commission, in collaboration with the EU Member States, has un-
dertaken a number of legislative initiatives aiming to further improve transparency
about incidents. For example, the new European General Data Protection Regulation
[31] comes with a strict data protection compliance regime that organisations can be
2.5. SHARING OF THE LESSONS LEARNED 24
fined up to 2% worldwide turnover if they failed to prevent a severe data incident or
failed to report a personal data breach to the supervisory authority. Another impor-
tant step is the proposed Cyber Security Strategy [125], which emphasizes incident
reporting and the importance of exchange across the EU about incidents.
2.4.3.2 Government initiatives
The UK government has also begun to support the sharing and exchanging of the
lessons from security incidents. For example, a Cyber Security Information Sharing
Partnership (CISP) program has been launched by the UK government. It aims to help
government and industry share information and intelligence on cyber security threats.
The partnership introduces a secure virtual “collaboration environment” where gov-
ernment and industry partners can exchange information on threats and vulnerabilities
in real time [32]. This is a need to promote incident knowledge exchanging by pro-
viding the ability to analyse and redistribute this knowledge effectively [32], that can
ultimately strengthen UK’s cyber security knowledge, skills and capability [126].
2.5 Sharing of the lessons learned
2.5.1 Lessons learned sharing through agent organisations
As is mentioned, there have been some initiatives in supporting security incident shar-
ing and exchanging. The ENISA requests the member states to report the security
incidents to enable exchange of security lessons. They have used a single set of secu-
rity measures and a common reporting template allowing for collection and analysis.
ENISA has published an analysis of the 51 severe incidents in September 2012 [127].
This report provides examples of incidents, the analysis of the impact per service and
per root causes, and then a detailed analysis of the root causes for sharing. According
to ENISA, incident sharing contributes to ensure: “access to a wide pool of expertise
about such breaches or losses; the analysis of threats and vulnerabilities; the identifi-
cation of good practice, based on lessons learned in the incident management process”
[128].
In the US, the nation’s Healthcare and Public Health Information Sharing and Anal-
ysis Centre (NH-ISAC), has provided a platform for sharing and exchanging lessons
learned from the security incidents happened in healthcare organisations [43]. They
collect the security incidents for the same purpose on sharing and exchanging the
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lessons learned. However, they have not provided a mechanism to feed back lessons to
improve the ISMS.
2.5.2 Lessons learned sharing through incident dissemination
2.5.2.1 Traditional lessons learned dissemination methods
Incident dissemination is enacted through a series of formal reports, informal meetings,
emails, newsletters, and presentations to management [3, 36]. Meetings are held and
communicative notes are gathered to address responses, disagreements, suggestions
and additions to security policies and the incident procedures [3]. Issues to document
include an estimation of the damage caused, actions taken during the incident, policies
and procedures that require an update and any electronic evidence that can be used
for pursuing those responsible [2]. Comparing to the formal incident report, emails,
newsletters, meetings and presentations to management contain less information than
the post-incident report. They are usually presented in a free-style way and less infor-
mation are provided to communicate the lessons learned to inform improvements of
the ISMS.
There is usually a formal post-incident report produced after the security incident
to document findings throughout the incident response process. Information contained
in the report is typically classified into business impact and remediation information
[3]. Business impact information involves how the incident is affecting the organi-
sation in terms of mission impact, financial impact, etc. For example, “The missing
external hard drive is believed to contain numerous research-related files containing
personally identifiable information and/or individually identifiable health information
for over 250,000 veterans, and information obtained from the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), on
over 1.3 million medical providers” [15]. Remediation information mainly refers to
the suggested actions, plans, procedures, and lessons learned that can mitigate the in-
cidents [3]. For example, “We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Information
and Technology revise VA Directive 6601 to require the use of encryption, or an oth-
erwise effective tool, to properly protect personally identifiable information and other
sensitive data stored on removable storage devices when used within VA” [15].
Many organisations do not want to share business impact information with outside
companies unless there is clear value proposition or formal reporting requirements.
When sharing information with peer and partner organisations, incident response teams
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should focus on exchanging remediation information [3]. The remediation information
describes (1) the security issues, e.g. “The position sensitivity level for the IT Spe-
cialist was inaccurately designated as moderate risk, which was inconsistent with his
programmer privileges and resulted in a less extensive background investigation” [15];
(2) the security requirements violated during this process, e.g. “Position Sensitivity
Level Assessments were Not Adequately Performed” [15]; and (3) the recommen-
dations, e.g.“We recommend that the Under Secretary for Health direct the Medical
Center Director to re-evaluate and correct position sensitivity levels and associated
background investigations for positions at the Birmingham VAMC” [15]. This infor-
mation is inter-related, however, it is scattered throughout a report (Appendix A.5).
This issue has been compounded in lengthy security incident reports [15]. Stakehold-
ers responsible for protecting patient data lack the time and the motivation to spend
the many hours needed to read and digest existing reports [45]. This creates significant
problems within the wider scope of security management systems. It can be difficult
to accurately assess the likelihood or consequences of future attacks when managers
are unaware of previous incidents.
2.5.2.2 Lessons learned dissemination methods using diagrams
Traditional ways to disseminate lessons learned are based on textual description. The
linear format of a text can discourage readers from obtaining comprehensive under-
standing of relationships among ideas across paragraphs due to working memory lim-
itations [129]. Graphical diagrams can serve this purpose, as it can communicate not
only individual elements of information but also relationships among those elements.
As Larkin and Simon explained in “Why a Diagram is (Sometimes) Worth Ten Thou-
sand Words”, diagram can be superior to a verbal description for solving problems for
three reasons [130],
• Diagrams can group together all relevant information, avoiding large amounts of
searching for the elements needed to make an inference.
• Diagrams use location to group information about a single element, avoiding the
need to match symbolic labels.
• Diagrams automatically support large scale perceptual inferences, making it ex-
tremely easy for humans to do.
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He continues to explain that, a diagram must be constructed to take advantage of
the above mentioned features. Failing to use these features is probably part of the
reason why some diagrams are ineffective to help readers [131].
The diagraming approach has been well studied since then. Purchase has con-
ducted comprehensive review on diagramming approaches and has classified them into
abstract and concrete diagrams [132]. Concrete diagram are iconic diagrams that have
a perceptual relationship to the objects that they represent, such as the heart and blood
circulation [133], seating arrangements [134] and images [135]. Abstract diagrams
are symbolic notations, which produce diagrams that have no perceptual relationship
to the concepts that they represent. Examples are trees [136], Venn diagrams [137],
Unified Modelling Language [138] and Goal Structuring Notations [7].
Empirical case studies [6, 45] have identified the difficulties when text was the only
medium available for communicating security lessons. Similar difficulties were iden-
tified in safety area, when text was the only approach for expressing complex safety
arguments [139]. The free-style text is considered to be unclear and not well struc-
tured, the meaning of the text, and therefore the structure of the safety argument, can
be ambiguous and unclear [7]. The use of free text makes is difficult to ensure that
all stakeholders share the same understanding of the argument [7]. The diagramming
approach GSN has been proposed in safety area to address this issue. In particular, it
links the evidence to show that particular requirements have been supported. GSN has
been found to improve the comprehension of safety arguments and allows lightweight
development of an argument [140]. The notation helps to focus the selection of evi-
dence upon satisfying the overall requirements of the systems or applications. GSN
has become the dominant approach in the UK defence sector [10], increasingly being
used in safety-critical industries to improve the structure, rigor, and clarity of design
requirements [7, 47, 48]. The same approach has more recently been extended to doc-
ument security requirements [45, 49–52]. We believe this approach can be adapted to
effectively communicate security lessons into the ISMS. Chapter 3 further expands the
work on the theoretical basis of the GSN and the rationale to apply this approach.
2.5.3 Lessons learned sharing in healthcare organisations
In Europe and North America, there are legislative requirements to report security inci-
dents. In the US, the security incidents are reported to Nation’s Healthcare and Public
Health Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (NH-ISAC) [43]. In the UK, the
2.6. CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH 28
NHS must report Serious Untoward Incidents that involve the unauthorised disclosure
of confidential patient information to the Caldicott Guardian [141], the Senior Informa-
tion Risk Owner (SIRO) and the relevant Information Asset Owner for consideration of
any actions [142]. A Serious Untoward Incident related to Personal Identifiable Data
is defined as: “The actual or potential loss of personal data and/or any information
that could lead to identity fraud or have other significant impact on individuals or the
organisation”. The key aim of serious incident reporting is to reduce the recurrence
both where the original incident occurred and elsewhere [142].
In China, there have not been legislative requirements found for healthcare organ-
isation to report security incidents and learn from lessons. Health information se-
curity has not attracted significant attention by the healthcare providers and govern-
ments [143, 144], although some attempts has been made to protect health information
[73, 145–147]. Gao suggests two main reasons for the lack of motivations: (1) the
Chinese traditional culture does not address the importance of personal privacy; and
(2) healthcare systems in China are still in their infancy and there has not been large-
scale health data exchange that can potentially trigger large amounts of serious privacy
violations [148]. However, the implementation of healthcare information systems can
hardly be successful if health information privacy cannot be ensured [149]. There is a
need for China to learn successful practices from international experience to improve
their healthcare information security management systems [148].
2.6 Context of the research
Based on the literature review and discussion of this chapter, we have identified the
theoretical and industrial motivations of this research:
• Information Security Management System (ISMS) frameworks such as FIS-
CAM, ISO 27001, and GB/T22239 can be used as a basis for developing se-
curity procedures and good practices within an organisation. However, these
frameworks have been criticised, as based on personal observations and common
practices. Improvements of those frameworks can benefit from lessons learned
on how the objectives of security standards are met in organisations where in-
formation security management standards are applied. Lessons learned from the
security incidents can be used to improve procedures, policies, risk assessment
and controls [5]. However, the key learning points are not effectively fed into
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security processes, management structure, policies, procedures and risk assess-
ment [6]. There is a need to translate the learning from security incidents to
inform improvements of the ISMS.
• Incident response is an important part of ISMS [34]. However, current literatures
show that incident response is typically limited to the technical process and does
not leverage opportunities to learn about the security lessons [37, 38]. The in-
cident response has focused on solving the direct cause of the incident, rather
than investigating the in-depth cause which is often not a technical problem (e.g.
firewall not properly configured) but a policy problem (e.g. there is not a se-
curity requirement on the configuration of the firewall). This imbalanced focus
has resulted in the loss of opportunities to investigate why a potential incident
is not adequately covered by the policy, that may lead to further improvements
of policy and may prevent future incidents which may not directly relate to this
incident.
• There are government programs and legislative initiatives pressing organisations
to report security incidents, which allows lessons learned to be shared and to
prevent the re-occurrence of security incidents. This has indicated the impor-
tance to share and exchange the lessons learned. Although it has not provided
a mechanism to feed back lessons to improve the information security manage-
ment systems. It fosters an environment where different stakeholders speak the
same language, when exchanging lessons learned from security incidents.
• Incident dissemination relies on formal reports, emails, newsletters, meetings
and presentations to management [3, 36]. Post-incident reports contain more
detailed information compared to the other means. A post-incident report is
a formal report generated to document information obtained during the security
incident investigation. It contains comprehensive information typically classified
into business impact and remediation information. When sharing information
with peer and partner organisations, incident response teams should focus on
exchanging remediation information [3]. These include the violated security
requirements, the security issues and their corresponding recommendations as
well as their inter-related relationships. However, this information is usually
scatted in the lengthy textual report, which can be hundred of pages. There is a
need of a method to bring together this information in a way that can be easily
understood and shared among people who need it.
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• Communicating security lessons is difficult when text was the only medium
available. Graphical diagrams can be adopted to address this problem, as it can
communicate not only individual elements of information but also relationships
among those elements of information. The diagramming approach GSN has
been proposed in safety area to address similar issues. In particular, it links
the evidence to show that particular requirements have been supported. We be-
lieve this approach has the potential to address our research problem and can be
adapted to effectively communicating security lessons into ISMS.
• Symantec has reported an increase of security incidents in healthcare [17]. These
incidents can have negative effects on an organisation’s reputation and individ-
ual’s confidence towards this organisation [26]. Healthcare organisations are un-
der increasing pressure from the legislative initiatives and obliged to report the
security incidents so as to improve information security management. Therefore,
it is imperative for the healthcare organisations to learn the lessons from those
security incidents to inform improvements of the ISMS.
Based on the analysis above, there is a need to propose a systematic method to
synthesis the lessons learned collected from the security incidents, and translate them
in a way that can be easily communicated with the ISMS. In particular, the diagraming
approach, Goal Structuring Notations, will be adapted to communicate security lessons
with the ISMS. The next chapter elaborates on the proposed approach.
Chapter 3
The Generic Security Template
In Chapter 2, we have identified the theoretical context of this research. This chapter
introduces a novel approach, the Generic Security Template, to feed back the lessons
learned from security incidents to the ISMS. We have chosen to base our work on an
existing approach, the Goal Structuring Notations (GSN). The host of public resources
describing how to apply this approach can help to reduce the costs of training staff. The
novelty of our approach lies instead in the use of GSN to construct Generic Security
Template that links aspects of a previous security breach to the more generic standards,
policies, procedures and technical innovations that are intended to avoid any recurrence
of an adverse event.
This chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 3.1 introduces the basis
of the Generic Security Template, including the concept of argumentation and assur-
ance case. Section 3.2 introduces the graphical notation, Goal Structuring Notations
(GSN) that we adopt to create the Generic Security Template. Section 3.3 defines the
Generic Security Template and outlines the processes on how to apply the Generic
Security Template to derive insights from security incidents. Section 3.4 presents the
Generic Security Template Pattern. Section 3.5 discusses about the evaluation aspects
of the Generic Security Template. Section 3.6 summarises this chapter.
3.1 Assurance cases
3.1.1 Arguments and assurance cases
An argument is “a reason or set of reasons given in support of an idea, action or theory”
[150]. An argument can be defined as a set of premise claims put forward for support-
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ing another claim, the conclusion. A premise is a supporting reason in an argument.
A conclusion is the claim that the premises are intended to support. In an argument,
evidence is provided to convince others that their claim is true. An argument defines
the relations that link evidence, premise claims with its supported claim, and can be
used for justifying how the sub-claims and evidences are organised together to support
a conclusion [151].
The concept of the assurance case has been derived from argument theory [151,
152]. It is defined as “a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and
valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are
adequately justified for a given application in a given environment” [152].
Assurance cases have been widely used within the safety area. A safety assur-
ance case is defined as “a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing
and valid argument that a system is adequately safe for a given application in a given
environment” [153]. Safety assurance case has been widely used in nuclear and de-
fence industries as well as rail and civil aviation [11], and is now a requirement of UK
Ministry of Defence Standard 00-56 [154]. Safety assurance case has been recently
introduced into healthcare as people start realising the misuse of health IT system can
deviate its intended operation and pose a risk to the patients. The use of the safety cases
aims to reduce risks or uncertainty of the risk to operate a health IT system [155].
A security assurance case could be defined as “a documented body of evidence
that provides a convincing and valid argument that a system is adequately secure for
a given application in a given environment”. ISO 15026 introduces the concept of a
security assurance case [156]. This has generalized the use of assurance cases beyond
the safety area. John Goodenough, Howard Lipson, and Chuck Weinstock present a
security assurance case. They claimed system security through addressing potential
deficiencies arising at different stages of the software development life cycle [157].
Vivas integrates assurance case creation with system development on mobile commu-
nities and community-supporting services, with special emphasis on privacy, trust, and
identity management [158]. However, security assurance cases have not been widely
used in system security management [159]. Although researchers have demonstrated
the practical benefits in performing a combined analysis and documenting a combined
argument for both safety and security [160], the industry adopted safety arguments
more broadly than security arguments.
Conformance argument [161] has extended the work of assurance cases, and has
been applied to evaluate software assurance standards [162]. It can be defined as “a
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structured, comprehensive, and defensible argument demonstrating that the evidence
is sufficient to show that an artefact adequately meets the standard’s requirements”.
Instead of arguing how evidence supports a system requirement in system safety, a
conformance argument justifies belief in conformance. According to the definition
of conformance argument, the first level of decomposition is over the standard’s re-
quirements. Claims are further decomposed until each sub-claim can be supported
by evidence. It illustrates the developers’ interpretation of the standard and defines
what evidence must be provided to demonstrate a specific system conforms to a given
standard.
The Generic Security Template proposed in this thesis builds on existing work into
security assurance. Instead of collecting evidence to argue that the design and opera-
tion of an existing application are acceptably secure, we have developed the Generic
Security Template to collect the insights that have been derived when a system has
proven NOT to be acceptably secure. We use the same syntactic components of the
GSN to document the lessons learned (i.e. information about the causes of a breach
and subsequent recommendations) from security incidents. Our initial work focuses
on developing the approach to support the security requirements of healthcare infor-
mation security management systems. This is justified by the large number of data
breaches within this area and also by the impact that such disclosures can have on
patients and their relatives. More details on the Generic Security Template will be
provided in section 3.3.
3.1.2 Graphical notations
Kelly has reviewed several approaches to present safety arguments, including free text,
tabular structure, claim structures, Bayesian belief networks [7]. He argues that, well
structured approaches to express safety arguments in text can be difficult to present
complex arguments and ensure that all parties share the same understanding. The sin-
gle table of the tabular structure can only present two steps in the decomposition of
the argument (i.e. claim → argument and argument → evidence). For complex argu-
ments, which may contain many levels of claim and sub-claim, the table will become
very complex or involve multi-tables, then the clarity or the flow of the argument will
be lost. The claim structures are built from a number of claims joint together by AND
and OR gates. It represents the cut down version of the GSN, which has no means
of expressing argument strategies. They do not graphically communicate rationale,
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context or the role of evidence. The traceability matrices indicate a relationship be-
tween statements. However, they can only present one layer at a time and provide
no means to justify the relationships between statements of different levels. Bayesian
belief networks [163] are graphical networks that communicate the probability causal
relationships between variables. However, the determination of the conditional proba-
bilities can be a hugely subjective exercise [7].
Other work includes Holloway’s five styles of text-based representations for safety
arguments [164]. It reports the same problems of textual based approaches. The re-
sulting text-based safety/security cases are usually cumbersome, or difficult to review
due to the massive relations between safety/security considerations. The logic of the
argument itself is often lost in large volumes of paper document.
Claims-Argument-Evidence (CAE) [10] is introduced by Bloomfield in 1998. Ac-
cording to Bloomfield’s definition, a claim is about a property of the system or subsys-
tem; evidence is used as the basis of the argument, which can be facts, assumptions, or
sub-claims, derived from a lower-level sub-argument; argument is used for linking the
evidence to the claim, which can be deterministic, probabilistic or qualitative; infer-
ence is the mechanism that provides the transformational rules for the argument [153].
The CAE argument structure is shown in Figure 3.1.
The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) was developed in the early 1990s and has
undergone significant development and refinement since then. Compared to CAE,
GSN has a richer range of symbols in expressing arguments. GSN is the dominant
approach in the UK defence sector. It is used in safety-critical industries to improve
the structure, rigor, and clarity of safety arguments. Within Europe, GSN has been
adopted by a growing number of companies within safety-critical industries (such as
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aerospace, railways and defence) for the presentation of safety arguments within safety
cases [11]. Moreover, GSN has been included in the software assurance standard ISO
15026 [156]. Given the broad acceptance of GSN, we adopted this approach in this
dissertation.
3.2 Goal structuring notations (GSN)
GSN can be used to present argument by creating a graphical structure between goals,
sub-goals, evidence/solutions, strategies and contexts [11]. GSN has been found to
improve the comprehension of safety arguments and allows lightweight development
of an argument [140]. The notation helps to focus the selection of evidence upon
satisfying the overall objectives (or requirements) of the systems or applications.
3.2.1 GSN elements and notations
Figure 3.2 presents the core symbols used in GSN: Goal, Strategy, Solution/Evidence
and Context, as well as Supported by and In context of. A Goal is a claim, the state-
ments that the goal structure is designed to support. Evidence exists to support the truth
of the claimed goal, which can be documented by providing a solution in GSN. Strat-
egy is inserted between goals at two levels of abstraction, to explain how the top-level
goal is addressed by the aggregation of the goals presented at the lower level. Context
is used to declare supplementary information and provide adequate understanding of
the context surrounding the claim/strategy. Usually it presents concept clarification
introduced in the claim/strategy [11].
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3.2.2 Goal decomposition methods
3.2.2.1 Developing goal structures top-down
A top down approach to goal development starts with top goal identification, followed
by context identification providing the basis on which the goals are stated. The strate-
gies are then identified for providing reasons why the claimed goal is true. Contextual
information of the strategy is also required to understand the argument approach. The
goal structure continues to be developed in this way until it is clear that no further
decomposition is needed and the goal can be directly supported by evidence artefacts
(e.g. test results). Below are the steps of a top down approach to goal development
[11],
Step 1: Identify the goals to be supported (Identify the top goal(s) of the structure).
Step 2: Define the basis on which the goals are stated (Identify the context of the
goal).
Step 3: Identify the strategy used to support the goals (Substantiate the goal). What
reasons are there for saying that the goal is true? What statements would convince the
reader that the goal is true?
Step 4: Define the basis on which the strategy is stated. Identify the contextual
information required to understand the argument approach.
Step 5: Elaborate the strategy (Elaborating a strategy involves defining new goals).
The goal structure continues to be developed in this way until it is clear that no further
decomposition into sub-goals is necessary and the goal can be directly supported by
appeal to some evidence artefact.
Step 6: Identify the basic solution/evidence.
3.2.2.2 Developing goal structures bottom-up
The following process can be used to develop a goal structure bottom-up [11],
Step 1: Identify evidence to present as solutions.
Step 2: Infer “evidence assertion” goals to be directly supported by these solutions.
Step 3: Derive higher-level sub-goals that are supported by the evidence asser-
tions.
Step 4: Describe how each layer of sub-goals to satisfy their parent goal i.e. strat-
egy.
Step 5: Check that any necessary contextual information is included.
Step 6: Check back down the structure for completeness.
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Step 7: Join the resulting goal structure to known top goal or set of sub-goals.
The bottom-up approach is rarely used in isolation to form a complete goal struc-
ture. It usually joins to a desired higher-level goal that is already understood to be a
requirement of an assurance case [11].
3.2.3 Safety arguments and the GSN
Safety arguments are typically communicated in safety cases through free text and the
GSN [7]. Kelly cited the following textual descriptions from a real industrial safety
case to explain the problems experienced when text is the only medium available for
expressing complex arguments.
“For hazards associated with warnings, the assumptions of Section 3.4 associated
with the requirements to present a warning when no equipment failure has occurred
are carried forward. In particular, with respect to hazard 17 in section 5.7 that for test
operation, operating limits will need to be introduced to protect against the hazard,
whilst further data is gathered to determine the extent of the problem.” [7].
Several communication concerns were identified with this paragraph. The free-
style text was found to be unclear and not well structured. The meaning of the text,
and the structure of the safety argument, can be ambiguous and unclear. This problem
became compounded by the frequently used cross-references in a safety case as an
integrator of evidence. Multiple cross-references can disrupt the flow of the main
arguments. The use of free text makes it difficult to ensure that all stakeholders share
the same understanding of the argument, which resulted in inefficient and ineffective
safety case management [7]. Johnson has identified the same difficulty in analysing
accident reports. It is difficult to draw particular conclusions from the many hundreds
of pages of evidence from those reports, as the logic can easily get lost across the
paragraphs of contextual details [139].
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) clearly represents the individual elements of the
safety argument (requirements, claims, evidence and context). An example safety case
is provided in Figure 3.3, taken from [11]. In this diagram, the top goal is “C/S (Con-
trol System) Logic is fault free”, the statements that the goal structure is designed to
support. The structure is broken down into sub-goals, either directly or, as in this case,
or indirectly through a strategy. The two argument strategies put forward as a means of
addressing the top level goal are “Argument by satisfaction of all C/S (Control System)
safety requirements”, and, “Argument by omission of all identified software hazards”.
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These strategies are then elaborated by five sub-goals. The goal structure continues
to be decomposed this way until it can be supported by evidence. For example, the
goal “Unintended Closing of press after PoNR (Point of No Return) can only occur as
a result of component failure”, is supported by reference to the solutions, “Fault tree
cutsets” and “Hazard Directed Testing Results”.
3.2.4 Security arguments and the GSN
The formal post-incident report and notes collected from incident dissemination meth-
ods contains valuable information presenting an informed security argument on how
the causes of an incident is addressed by the remedial recommendations. As we have
identified in the literature review, they contain valuable information such as (1) the
security issues; (2) the security requirements violated during this process; and (3) the
recommendations. However, these informal arguments are usually based on lengthy
textual descriptions. We aim to apply the GSN to present security arguments on how
the issues and their corresponding remedial recommendations are gathered together to
address different levels of security requirements violated in the security incidents.
We have conducted several preliminary case studies [45] into the use of GSN with
real world security incidents in healthcare organisations in the US and China. The aim
was to find out whether GSN can be used to feed back the security lessons to the ISMS.
We analysed the security incident reports of the Veterans Affairs data leakage incident
happened in 2006 [14] and 2007 [15] in the US. The security lessons were written
using free text in documents, which are over 100 pages. We were able to identify the
security lessons and map them to the higher-level security requirements that are defined
in FISCAM. We also analysed a news clip about an incident happened in the Shenzhen
hospital in China. Since there was no official report, we were forced to rely on media
sources. We were also able to map the lessons to higher-level security requirements
defined in the Chinese security standard, GB/T22239. Those case studies established
the feasibility of structuring security lessons using GSN.
3.3 The Generic Security Template
Within safety area, generic safety arguments were developed to facilitate the initiation
and development of safety arguments. There are generic safety arguments developed
for IMA-based avionic systems [47], and the generic goal-based safety case for justi-
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Figure 3.3: An example instance of the Safety Case [11]
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cation and presentation of formal analysis to the certification authorities [48]. Within
security areas, less research work can be found in generic security arguments. Based
on the preliminary case studies into the use of GSN with real world security incidents
in healthcare organisations in the US and China [45], this section defines the Generic
Security Template and outlines the steps on how to apply the Generic Security Tem-
plate to derive insights from security incidents.
3.3.1 Definition of the Generic Security Template
We define a Generic Security Template as “a documented body of lessons learned
identified from a security incident that can support the Security Requirements of the
Information Security Management System (ISMS)”. A security incident, is defined as
“a violation or imminent threat of violation of security policies, acceptable use poli-
cies, or standard security practices” [53]. Lessons learned, are defined as the knowl-
edge or understanding gained by experience [54]. In this dissertation, it refers to (1)
security issues (the causes of a security incident in confidentiality); and (2) security
recommendations (intended to avoid any recurrence). Security Requirements of the
(ISMS), is presented in the form of a specific security standard or guideline applied to
the organisation where the security incident happened. The Generic Security Template
links the analysis of an incident to specific security standards or guidelines that help
to implement particular recommendations. Generic, is defined as “characteristic of or
relating to a class or group of things; not specific” [165]. In this thesis, Generic Se-
curity Templates are intended to be applicable across different classes of organisation
and not specifically to the place where an incident occurred.
Based on the definition, the principle GSN notations are customised as is shown
in Figure 3.4, the Evidence/Solution notation is replaced by Lessons learned. Within
the Lessons learned, for example, “Position Description” is the security issue, and
the recommendation is “Re-evaluate and correct position sensitivity levels”. We have
decided to alter the Evidence/Solution notation rather than adding a new one because
those lessons learned have been implemented by the organisation and can serve as
solutions to support security requirements, hence to formulate a security argument.
The strategies used to support these recommendations include reference to the policies,
standards and guidelines that are intended to prevent any recurrence of an incident. In
some cases, the recommendations in an incident may include changes to the guidance
within a particular industry or organisation. In such instances, the Generic Security
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Figure 3.4: Customised GSN Notations
Template will link the finding to a revised version of the security documentation so that
end users can identify the new procedures that are intended to prevent future breaches.
The Generic Security Template is a theoretical model that maps the lessons learned
obtained from the security incident to the security standard or guideline in a structured
manner. The Generic Security Template that describes a specific security incident is
defined as a GST instance. Figure 3.5 is an example instance of the Generic Secu-
rity Template (See Chapter 4 Section 4.2) created for Veterans Affairs Data Leakage
Incident 2007 [15] happened in United States. The steps to create an instance of the
Generic Security Template are provided in the following sections.
3.3.2 The Generic Security Template and assurance cases
The Generic Security Template builds on existing work into security assurance. In-
stead of collecting evidence to argue safety, it collects the security recommendations
to support different levels of security requirements of an information security manage-
ment system. The Generic Security Template will turn into an assurance case, if there
is evidence showing that those recommendations have been fulfilled. However, it is
organisation’s responsibility to decide whether they have accepted and fulfilled those
recommendations.
3.3.3 Creation of instances of the Generic Security Template
A GST instance provides a graphical overview of the mapping between the causes/
recommendations derived from security incidents and the guidelines/policies/standards
that are intended to prevent any recurrence of a data breach. We use the US Veterans
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Figure 3.5: An example instance of the GST - VA 2007 Data Leakage Incident
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Affairs (VA) Data Leakage Incident 2007 to illustrate the creation steps. Figure 3.5
presents the diagram created for this real world case study. As is mentioned, it is based
on a report into the disclosure of personal information about veterans and over medical
providers by the US Veterans Affairs Administration (VA) [15]. Below are the four
steps to create a GST instance.
3.3.3.1 Step 1: Prepare the goal structure
The top level goal is to ensure that a healthcare system is acceptably secure. We used
the word ”acceptably” as absolute security is unachievable. Within the GST, the se-
curity argument is there to convince someone that the system is secure enough when
compared against a specific security standard applied by the organisation. This high-
level goal is then decomposed into sub-goals that each reflects more detailed security
requirements within a security management system. The goal structure decomposi-
tion continues in this way until it reaches the level that can be directly supported by
appealing to the recommendations identified in an incident report.
In our approach, we have simplified the process of identifying sub-goals by us-
ing security requirements within the applicable standards and guidelines in particular
healthcare organisations. This helps to increase the genericity of our approach. The
goal structured is pre-created to help the users get started. For example, in the case
study of the VA 2007 Data Leakage Incident, we have used security requirements of
the general controls (i.e. security management, access controls, configuration manage-
ment, segregation of duties and contingency planning) in Federal Information Security
Control Audit Manual (FISCAM). As is introduced in Chapter 2, FISCAM includes
general controls categories such as security management, access controls, configura-
tion management, segregation of duties and contingency planning. For each of those
general control areas, it identifies several critical elements that are essential security
requirements for establishing adequate security controls.
In this step, we borrowed the experience of conformance argument in safety area,
where the goal structure has been used to represent safety standards. Instead of arguing
how evidence supports a system requirement in system safety, a conformance argument
justifies belief in conformance. The decomposition of sub-goals is over the safety
standard’s requirements.
3.3. THE GENERIC SECURITY TEMPLATE 44
3.3.3.2 Step 2: Identify the lessons learned from the security incident
Lessons learned are identified by searching incident reports for security issues and rec-
ommendations. A review of the existing incident reports [14–16, 44] show that the
security analysts are able to describe learning points using structured text. However,
there has not been a unified definition on an appropriate level of details that a lesson
learned should contain. The security analysts define their own level of details in the
security incident report according to individual business needs. However, too much
information will undermine the effectiveness of the graphical presentation, while too
little information will make it difficult to understand. In this step, the analyst has to
identify key learning points. These are then introduced into the Generic Security Tem-
plate using a structured textual format. For the security issue, we recommend to use
short <Noun-Phrase>, for example, “Sensitive Information”, as a short description of
a specific security issue. For the recommendation, we recommend the statement to be
in the form of <Verb-Phrase> <Noun-Phrase>. For example, “Use encryption or effec-
tive tool to protect personally identifiable information”. This is different from Kelly’s
work in using the <Noun-Phrase> as evidence/solution such as “test result” to support
the truth of the goals. The security issue and its corresponding recommendation will
become the Lessons learned part of the Generic Security Template.
3.3.3.3 Step 3: Map the Lessons learned to the Goal Structure
The lessons identified in Step 2, typically contain different levels of details, can be
mapped to different levels of the goal structure. This has achieved by using the bottom
up approach and the analyst has to identify the relationships between security sub-
goals, based on standards, guidelines and policies, and the lessons learned from a
previous security incident. For example, as is shown in Figure 3.5, the lessons learned
“Access Control: Avoid the abuse of programmer level access control”, was found to
be related and mapped to the goal “AC 3.1 User accounts are appropriately controlled”.
There are the cases when the lessons learned could not find a goal to map to. For
example, as is shown in Figure 3.5, the lessons learned “Position Description: Re-
evaluate and correct position sensitivity levels” and “Risk Analysis: Develop and is-
sue Government-wide risk analysis criteria”, could not find goals to map to. These
lessons learned are mapped to a newly created goal named “Standard non-existent”
and directly link to the top goal. This probably because the existing goals, based on
standards, guidelines or policies have missing requirements that are not covered those
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learning points. This may also due to the unsuitability to add those lessons into security
standards, guidelines or policies. For example, some recommendations may refer to
the process for managing a system, or the meta process of reporting incidents across or-
ganisations. However, these newly identified lessons need further assessment in terms
of whether they are suitable to be included in the existing security standards/guidelines.
A key benefit of our approach is that their subjective reasoning is documented in
the nodes of the Generic Security Template. A range of stakeholders can then check
the resulting diagrams to determine when key lessons have been omitted or if addi-
tional work is required to support the exchange of security lessons. They could check
the reasoning and experience can be borrowed from safety area on how to avoid and
detecting fallacious reasoning in the arguments [166]. The use of a graphical nota-
tion provides stakeholders with an overview of key issues before being forced to read
the hundreds of pages of detailed prose that increasingly documents the findings of
security investigations.
3.3.3.4 Step 4: Elaborate the Context and Strategy
Strategies are inserted between goals and sub-goals; they justify goal decomposition.
They typically refer to the goal decomposition methods, such as the use of security
standards, organisational guidelines or technical documentation. As before, we have
exploited a simplified sentence structure that is intended to improve the clarity of the
diagram as used in the safety arguments [7]; “argument by <approach>”, “argument
over <approach>”, “argument using <approach>”, “argument of <approach>”. For
example, “Argument over FISCAM”.
Recall step 3, there are some lessons learned that are not covered by the existing
goal structure, they are mapped to a newly create goal named “Standard non-existent”.
A new strategy named “Argument over all Missing Security Requirements” is created
and inserted between the top goal and the goal “standard-do-not-exist” to present such
argument.
The context notations need to be elaborated during this process by providing sup-
plementary information for a specific incident such as in Figure 3.5, “Federal Informa-
tion Security Controls Audit Manual”, this context information is used to explain the
concept “FISCAM” in the strategy.
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3.3.4 Pre-requisites to apply the Generic Security Template
The target users of the Generic Security Template will be the people responsible for
protecting customers’ personal private information within an organisation. For ex-
ample, in healthcare organisations, both healthcare professionals and IT professionals
have the responsibility to protect patients’ private information. However, the appli-
cation of the Generic Security Template resides on the expertise of the organisation’s
incident handling capacity. Organisations have to satisfy the following pre-requisites
to apply the Generic Security Template,
• Expertise of information security. The organisation should have an incident han-
dling team [35, 53] consists of security analysts with incident handling expertise.
They should be able to analyse an incident and justify actions taken to address
an incident.
• Incident reporting with useful recommendations. The organisation should have
incident reporting [35, 167] mechanism allowing for useful security lesson learned
in different forms (e.g. technical notes, security incident reports, etc.) generated
from the incident handling process.
• Security requirements elicitation. The organisation should have security require-
ments elicited [100] based on existing security standards, guidelines or proce-
dures.
3.4 The Generic Security Template Pattern
3.4.1 GSN Pattern
It is important to recognise that our development of Generic Security Templates is, in
part, motivated by previous work into design patterns. Alexander [159] describes how
patterns “describe a problem which occurs over and over again in our environment, and
then describes the core of the solution to that problem, in such a way that you can use
this solution a million times over, without ever doing it the same way twice”. The field
of design patterns has become well established since the publication of the book “De-
sign Patterns - Elements of Reusable Object-Orientated Software” [168] by Gamma,
Helm, Johnson and Vlissides (the “Gang of Four”). Kelly adapted the concept of pat-
terns to GSN safety arguments “A means of documenting and reusing successful safety
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argument structures” [7]. An interview study with 29 interviews including develop-
ers, consultants, managers, and assessors shows that patterns provide a good starting
point for safety argument construction and has estimated that the long-term benefits
of pattern-based safety case development more than outweigh the (initial) costs [169].
Table 3.1 lists the symbols used to support the pattern design, which is an extension of
GSN. Those are the Multiplicity Extensions and Entity Abstractions [7]. Explanation
of the symbols are provided in Table 3.1.
 
Type Notations Notation Description 
Multiplicity 
Extensions 
 
 
A solid ball is the symbol for many (meaning zero or more). 
The label next to the ball indicates the cardinality of the relationship 
 
A line without multiplicity symbols indicates a one to one relationship (as in 
conventional GSN) 
Entity 
Abstractions  
Uninstantiated Entity. This placeholder denotes that the attached entity remains to be 
instantiated i.e. at some later stage the ‘abstract’ entity needs to be replaced (instantiated) 
with a more concrete instance. 
 
 
n
Table 3.1: Extension of GSN Pattern Design Notations [7]
3.4.2 The Generic Security Template Pattern
Based on the steps in section 3.3.3, the Generic Security Template Pattern is created
as shown in Figure 3.6. Whereas Figure 3.5 presents an instance of a Generic Security
Template, Figure 3.6 provides a more generic overview which abstracts away from the
specifics of the VA case study to provide the general structure of our analysis. It is not
intended that this diagram will be visible to the end users of an incident report but that
it provides a template for the security professionals and risk managers who coordinate
the creation of a specific security template after each incident.
Within the pattern, G1 is the top level goal claiming that “System X is secure”
within the context of C1 “ISMS for System X”. It is then divided into sub-level goals
using the strategies that “argument over Security Standard X” and that “argument over
Missing Requirements”. Within Strategy S1, the concept “Security Standard” is ex-
plained in C2 “Security Standard for System X”. Under Strategy S1, we have used the
structured security requirements in the Security Standard as the goal structure; G3 ...
GN represent different level (1 ∼ n) of goals (security requirements) in the goal struc-
ture (security standards/guidelines). LL1 are the lessons learned deemed to be related
to a specific goal (security requirement). Under Strategy S2, the Missing Requirement
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G1: {System X} is 
acceptably secure
G3 {Index 1.X}
{Security Requirement 1.X} 
is addressed
S1: Argument over 
{Security Standard X}
C1: ISMS for 
{System X}
C2: Security Standard 
for {System X}
In the 
context of
S2: Argument over all 
Missing Security 
Recommendation
G2 (Standard non-existent): 
{Missing Recommendation 
Y} is addressed
GN {Index N.X}
{Security Requirement N.X} 
is addressed
LL1 {Security Issue N.X}
{Recommendation N.X}
LL2 {Missing Security Issue Y}
{Missing Recommendation Y}
(p = # security 
requirements of 
level 1)
(r = # security 
requirements of 
level n)
(q = # missing security 
recommendations )
r
p
q
In the 
context of
Figure 3.6: The Generic Security Template Pattern
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Y are identified and included in the goal structure. G2 represents a new goal (secu-
rity requirement) created for the Missing Requirement Y. LL2 are the lessons learned
deemed to be related to none of the goals (security requirements) in the goal structure
(security standards/guidelines). A new goal is created for LL2 and link to the top goal
through Strategy S2.
This is an abstract description of the Generic Security Template, which can be
refined by adding more information about a specific incident. Security profession-
als must instantiate the values associated with particular incidents to map the lessons
learned from a particular report into graphical overviews such as that shown for the VA
case study in in Figure 3.5. A detailed guidance on how to instantiate this pattern can
be found in section 3.3.3.
3.5 Evaluation of the Generic Security Template
We have proposed a new approach, the Generic Security Template, to present the
lessons learned from the security incidents. It is created using the Graphical Struc-
turing Notations (GSN). In particular, it maps the lessons identified from security in-
cidents to the security requirements of the ISMS. We have identified the following
aspects for evaluating this approach,
1. The Generic Security Template provides a new way to present lessons learned
from security incidents. The novel aspect is that it maps the lessons with dif-
ferent levels of details to different levels of the security requirements. It also
helps identify lessons that the security standards do not consider. However, the
suitability of the Generic Security Template needs to be tested by showing that it
can present lessons from real world security incidents. In chapter 4, we conduct
several case studies from North American, UK and China and produce several
instances of the Generic Security Template. Moreover, the Generic Security
Template also needs to be tested by others to show that someone else can create
an instance of the Generic Security Template. This will be addressed using an
empirical study introduced in Chapter 7.
2. The Generic Security Template is a diagramming presentation of security inci-
dents. As is similar to other diagramming approaches, there can be comprehen-
sion barriers due to the new way of presentation. It is worthwhile to conduct a
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preliminary study on the comprehension of the Generic Security Template be-
fore introducing it into industry. Studies in safety area show that safety cases
created using GSN can provide a better comprehension compared to text based
documents [140]. In this dissertation, we need to determine if people can better
identify the lessons learned from the security incidents by using the Generic Se-
curity Template than using the traditional text-based method alone. We conduct
an empirical study to test this hypothesis in Chapter 5.
3. The Generic Security Template provides a way to feed back the lessons learned
to the ISMS and we believe it can be applicable in healthcare industry. However,
the decision has to be made by those in healthcare organisations. In Chapter
6, we conduct an industrial evaluation with people who have experience deal-
ing with patient data to find out how this approach can feed back lessons from
security incidents to the ISMS and their acceptance of this approach. In Chap-
ter 8, we further investigate how the lessons learned from security incidents can
be transferred from one healthcare organisation to another in a very different
context.
3.6 Summary
This chapter introduces a new approach, the Generic Security Template, to present
the lessons learned from security incidents. The suitability of the Generic Security
Template needs to be tested by showing that it can present lessons learned from the
real world security incidents. In the next chapter, we conduct security incidents case
studies from US, UK and China and produce several instances of the Generic Security
Template by following the creation steps outlined in this chapter.
Chapter 4
Instances of the Generic Security
Template
Chapter 3 introduced an approach, the Generic Security Template, to present the lessons
learned from the security incidents. The suitability of the Generic Security Template
needs to be tested by showing that it can present lessons learned from the real world
security incidents. In this chapter, we conduct four security incidents case studies from
the US, UK and China and produce four instances of the Generic Security Template
from those case studies.
This chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 4.1 analyses the Veter-
ans Affairs data leakage incident happened from 2006. Section 4.2 analyses the Vet-
erans Affairs data leakage incident happened in 2007. Section 4.3 analyses Shenzhen
pregnant women’s data leakage incident from 2008. Section 4.4 analyses the NHS IT
asset data leakage incident. Section 4.5 summarises this chapter.
4.1 Veterans Affairs (VA) data leakage incident 2006
4.1.1 Case description
“On Wednesday, May 3, 2006, the home of a VA Information Technology Specialist
was burglarized resulting in the theft of a personally-owned laptop computer and an
external hard drive, which was reported to contain personal information on approxi-
mately 26 million veterans and United States military personnel. The employee imme-
diately notified Office of Policy, Planning, and Preparedness (OPP&P) management.
He also notified the VA Office of Security and Law Enforcement, which is part of the
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OPP&P organisation. The employee advised all of them that the stolen personal com-
puter equipment contained VA databases and other files containing veterans’ personal
identifiers such as name, social security number, military service number, claim num-
ber, date of birth, addresses and so on. On June 28, 2006, the stolen laptop computer
and external hard drive were recovered intact. Based on all the facts gathered thus far
during the investigation, as well as the results of computer forensics examinations, the
FBI and OIG are highly confident that the files on the external hard drive were not
compromised after the burglary.” [14]
4.1.2 Instance of the Generic Security Template
Step 1: Prepare the goal structure.
We have used the structured category of security requirements in FISCAM, specif-
ically the general control section, as the goal structure for this security incident. FIS-
CAM provides best practices on security control techniques and audit procedures.
General controls are designed to safeguard data, protect application programs, and
ensure continued computer operations in case of unexpected interruptions. It includes
security management, access controls, configuration management, segregation of du-
ties and contingency planning. For each of these general control areas, it identifies
several critical elements and best practices that are essential for establishing adequate
controls. These form the goal structure for the VA 2006 data leakage incident.
Step 2: Identify the lessons learned.
Lessons are identified by searching incident reports for security issues and recom-
mendations. The analyst needs to identify key learning points. These are then intro-
duced into the Generic Security Template using a structured textual format. For the
security issue, we recommended to use short <Noun-Phrase>, for example, “Sensitive
Information”, as a short description of the security issue. For the recommendation,
we recommended the statement to be in the form of <Verb-Phrase> <Noun-Phrase>.
For example, “Use encryption, or other effective tool, to protect personally identifiable
information stored on removable storage”. The identification of the rest of the security
issues and recommendations follows the same approach and can be found in Table 4.1,
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Table 4.1: Veterans Affairs (VA) data leakage incident 2006
Security Issues Security Recommendations
Sensitive Information Use encryption, or other effective tool, to protect per-
sonally identifiable information stored on removable
storage
Position Description Define the position sensitive level.
Security Training Provide linkage to all applicable laws and VA policy
as part of the security awareness training.
Incident Handling Enhance incident-response program for promptly
identification and thoroughly investigation of the in-
cidents.
Administrative Action Take appropriate administrative action against the
people involved in this incident for their inappropri-
ate actions.
Step 3: Map the lessons learned to the goal structure.
The lessons identified from the security incident are mapped to the goal structure
prepared in Step 1. In this case, those lessons are mapped to the security requirements
in FISCAM. As is mentioned in section 3.3.3, the lessons contain different levels of
details and can be mapped to different levels of the goal structure. The analyst has
to identify the relationship between security sub-goals, based on standards, guidelines
and policies, and the lessons learned from a previous security incident. For exam-
ple, the lesson learned “Incident Handling: Enhance incident-response program on
promptly identification and thoroughly investigation of the incidents” is found to be
exclusively related to bottom level goal “AC 5.1.1 An effective incident-response pro-
gram has been implemented”. Therefore, the lesson learned should be mapped to this
related goal. The rest of lessons learned are all found to be exclusively related to the
coresponding bottom level goals and the mapping follows a similar method, except for
the lesson learned “Position Description: Define the sensitivity level” which could not
be mapped to a FISCAM security requirement. This is probably because the existing
goals, based on standards, guidelines and policies do not cover all aspects of an inci-
dent.
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Step 4: Elaborate the Context and Strategy.
In the VA 2006 data leakage incident, as we have used the FISCAM as the basis for
the decomposition of the goal, the strategy is stated as “Argument over FISCAM”. In
this case, since there are some lessons learned that are not covered by the existing goal
structure, they are mapped to a newly created goal named “Standard non-existent”.
A new strategy named “Argument over all Missing Security Recommendations” is
created and inserted between the top goal and the goal “Standard non-existent”.
The context notation is to provide supplementary information for a specific secu-
rity incident. For example, we have explained the “FISCAM” in the strategy notation
and the context is stated as “Federal Information Security Controls Audit Manual”.
Based on the steps above, the instance of the Generic Security Template for VA
2006 data leakage incident is presented in Figure 4.1. Five main lessons learned are
derived from the VA 2006 data leakage incident report. Four of them were mapped to
different levels of security requirements of FISCAM. One of them cannot be mapped to
an appropriate security requirement, which indicates a probably missing aspect of the
security guideline. The instance of the Generic Security Template for VA 2006 data
leakage incident presents a security argument on how the security recommendations
are gathered together to address the violated security requirements of the organisation.
Compared to text-based incident reports, it may lose some details such as business
impact information. However, it highlights the causes and recommendations, and the
supportive relationships with the security requirements, which could help to improve
the prevention of similar security incidents in the future.
4.2 Veterans Affairs (VA) data leakage incident 2007
4.2.1 Case description
“On January 22, 2007, a Veterans Health Administration (VHA) Information Tech-
nology (IT) Specialist assigned to the Research Enhancement Award Program (Birm-
ingham REAP), VA Medical Centre (VAMC), Birmingham, AL, reported that a VA-
owned external hard drive was missing from the REAP office. The missing external
hard drive is believed to contain numerous research-related files containing personally
identifiable information and/or individually identifiable health information for over
250,000 veterans, and information obtained from the Centres for Medicare & Med-
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Figure 4.1: Instance of the Generic Security Template - VA 2006 data leakage incident
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icaid Services (CMS), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), on over 1.3
million medical providers. To date, the missing hard drive has not been recovered and
there is no indication that the data on the missing external hard drive has been further
compromised or used to commit Medicare fraud. Future investigation is conducted
to identify the problem and recommendations are provided by VA office of Inspector
General.” [15].
4.2.2 Instance of the Generic Security Template
Step 1: Prepare the goal structure.
Similar to VA 2006 data leakage incident, we have used the structured category of
security requirements in FISCAM, specifically the general control section, as the goal
structure for this security incident. Those goals form the goal structure for the VA 2007
data leakage incident.
Step 2: Identify the lessons learned.
The process of identification of the lessons learned (security issue and recommen-
dation ) is by looking for the learning points in the security incident report. The iden-
tified security issues and recommendations can be found in Table 4.5.
Table 4.2: Veterans Affairs (VA) data leakage incident 2007
Security Issues Security Recommendations
Access Control Avoid the abuse of programmer level access control.
Sensitive Information Use encryption, or other effective tool, to protect per-
sonally identifiable information stored on removable
storage
Security Policy Ensure that data security plans for research projects
comply with information security policies.
Security Policy Ensure human subjects in research, compliance with
information security requirements.
Security Policy Discontinue storing email on unauthorised system.
Position Description Re-evaluate and correct position sensitivity levels.
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Table 4.2: (continued)
Security Issues Security Recommendations
Management Structure Establish a functional description and performance
plan to clarify the line authority and reporting rela-
tionship.
Administrative Action Take appropriate administrative actions against the
people for their inappropriate actions.
Risk Analysis Develop and issue Government-wide risk analysis cri-
teria.
Step 3: Map the lessons learned to the goal structure.
The lessons learned identified are mapped to different levels of goals in the goal
structure as before. However, we identified some difficulties when mapping the lessons
to the security requirements in this security incident. We found that some lessons
are related to more than one security requirements. For example, the lesson learned
“Access Control: Avoid the abuse of programmer level access control” is found to be
related to the goal “AC-3.1.1. Resource owners have identified authorized users and the
access they are authorized to have” and “AC-3.1.2. Security administration personnel
set parameters of security software to provide access as authorized and restrict access
that has not been authorized. This includes access to data files, load and source code
libraries (if applicable), security files, and operating system files. Standard naming
conventions are established and used effectively as a basis for controlling access to
data, and programs. (Standard naming conventions are essential to ensure effective
configuration management identification and control of production files and programs
vs. test files and programs) ”. Reflecting all such relationships will make the diagram
complicated. To keep the diagram concise, we suggest further guidance for mapping
such lessons learned,
Starting from the bottom-level goals in the goal structure, if a lesson learned is
related exclusively to a bottom-level goal, it should be mapped to this bottom-level
goal. If a lesson learned is related to more than one bottom-level goals in the goal
structure, this lesson learned should be mapped to the nearest parent goal where those
bottom-level goals share the same parent goal.
According to this newly added guidance, this lesson learned should be mapped
to the nearest parent goal where those bottom-level goals share the same parent goal,
which is “AC-3.1. User accounts are appropriately controlled”. It indicates if this les-
4.3. SHENZHEN DATA LEAKAGE INCIDENT 2008 58
son learned is ignored, the goal AC-3.1 or its sub-goals would be affected.
Step 4: Elaborate the Context and Strategy.
Since this security incident happened in the VA, the strategies and context infor-
mation are the same, (i.e. the strategy is stated as “Argument over FISCAM”. The
context used to explain the “FISCAM” in the strategy notation is stated as “Federal In-
formation Security Controls Audit Manual”). Figure 4.2 presents the Generic Security
Template built for VA 2007 data leakage incident.
In the VA 2007 data leakage incident, we have found two lessons learned that are
similar to the VA 2006 data leakage incident with almost identical security issues and
recommendations, which are “Sensitive Information” and “Administrative Actions”. It
seems that VA has not effectively implemented the recommendations in VA 2006 data
leakage incident to prevent them from recurrence. One lesson “Position Description”
is found to have identical security issue but with different recommendations. It was
recognised as a newly added aspect of the FISCAM in both GST instances, which
indicates this lesson is probably a necessary aspect that is not covered by the security
guideline. There are also some extra lessons found in this incident, which are “Access
Control”, “Security Policy”, “Risk Analysis” and “Management Structure”. The same
type of security incident, information data leakage incident, can have different causal
issues behind it. As we could see, the use of the GST facilitates the comparison of
similar incidents from organisations that apply the same security guidelines/standards.
4.3 Shenzhen data leakage incident 2008
4.3.1 Case description
In 2008, the healthcare information of pregnant women was disclosed from the hos-
pital of Shenzhen, China. The criminals obtained up to 40, 000 items of medical
information including the pregnant women’s name, baby’s birth date, home address,
mobiles, etc. This information was updated monthly, adding up to 100, 000 items in
total. The information was sold to businesses who were aiming to seize the market
immediately after the new babies were born. These companies used the stolen data to
push their sales such as first milk, baby sitter service, pregnant women fitness service,
etc. through phone calls or messages. People were affected and felt offended by such
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Figure 4.2: Instance of the Generic Security Template - VA 2007 data leakage incident
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behaviours. The victims believed the data came from the profiles (names, mobiles, ad-
dress, estimated birth date, etc.) they provided for registration in the hospital. Anyone
accessible to the information can be suspicious in disclosing it to others and people
are increasingly concerned about the security of healthcare system. Hospitals had just
started the use of healthcare information system (HIS) in China. The managers were
focusing more on its business functionalities rather than system security [16].
4.3.2 Instance of the Generic Security Template
Step 1: Prepare the goal structure.
As we are moving to healthcare organisation in China, the security standard we
used is Information security technology - Baseline for classified protection of informa-
tion system (GB/T22239). As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is required by the Ministry of
Health of the People’s Republic of China. The health information systems and its re-
lated units should be self-examined in accordance with GB/T22239. In particular, the
tertiary (highest level) hospital needs to achieve at least the third level of the security
standard.
Step 2: Identify the lessons learned.
Similar to VA 2006 and VA 2007 data leakage incident, the process of identifica-
tion of the lessons learned (security issues and recommendations) is by looking for
the learning points in the security incident report. The identified security issues and
recommendations can be found in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Shenzhen data leakage incident 2008
Security Issues Security Recommendations
Network Security Network security needs to be ensured by following
the security standards.
Sensitive Information Define the information sensitive level according to the
security standards.
Security Policy Establish and enforce security policy according to the
security standards.
Security Audit Establish and conduct security audit plan according to
the security standards.
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Table 4.3: (continued)
Security Issues Security Recommendations
Security Training Establish and execute security training programs by
following the security standards.
Step 3: Map the lessons learned to the goal structure.
Similar to VA 2006 and VA 2007 data leakage incident, the lessons learned identi-
fied from the Shenzhen case can be mapped to different levels of security requirements
in the Chinese security standard GB/T22239.
Step 4: Elaborate the Context and Strategy.
As we are moving into the healthcare organisation in a different country, the strat-
egy and context used are different. The strategy we used for justifying the decompo-
sition is stated as “Argument over GB/T22239”. We have explained the “GB/T22239”
in the strategy notation and the context is stated as “Security Standard China”.
Figure 4.3 presents the instance of the Generic Security Template built for Shen-
zhen 2008 data leakage incident. Five main lessons learned are identified. We have
found three lessons learned are similar to the VA data leakage incidents, which are
the issues “Sensitive Information”, “Position Description”, “Security Training”, but
the recommendations are different. The recommendations in China seems more rigor-
ously relying on the security standards. This can be justified by the immaturity of the
healthcare information security management. The China healthcare organisation has
just stated using the electronic healthcare record since 2008 and is relatively immature
in information security management. Organisations tend to rely on the security stan-
dards as a starting point for shaping information security management strategy [59].
4.4 NHS Surrey IT Asset Disposal Incident 2013
4.4.1 Case description
“The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has issued NHS Surrey with a mone-
tary penalty of £200,000 after more than 3,000 patient records were found on a second
hand computer bought through an online auction site. The sensitive information was
inadvertently left on the computer and sold by a data destruction company employed
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Figure 4.3: Instance of the Generic Security Template - Shenzhen 2008 data leakage
incident
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by NHS Surrey since March 2010 to wipe and destroy their old computer equipment.
The company carried out the service for free, with an agreement that they could sell
any salvageable materials after the hard drives had been securely destroyed. The ICO’s
investigation found that NHS Surrey had no contract in place with their new provider,
which clearly explained the provider’s legal requirements under the Data Protection
Act, and failed to observe and monitor the data destruction process.” [12].
4.4.2 Instance of the Generic Security Template
Step 1: Prepare the goal structure.
The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has provided the guideline [170]
for IT asset disposal. This is part of a series of guidance, which goes into details than
the main provision of the Data Protection Act (DPA) in the guide to data protection.
It aims to help the data controller fully understand their obligations and promote good
practices. It explains to the data controller what they need to consider when disposing
of electronic equipment that may contain personal data. We have used this guideline
as the goal structure of this security incident.
Step 2: Identify the lessons learned.
Similar to VA 2006, VA 2007 and Shenzhen 2008 data leakage incident, the pro-
cess of identification of the lessons learned (security issue and recommendation) is by
looking for the learning points in the security incident report. The identified security
issues and recommendations can be found in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: NHS Surrey IT Asset Disposal Incident 2013
Security Issues Security Recommendations
Risk Management Carry out a risk assessment when using a data proces-
sor to dispose of the hard drives.
Personal Data Wipe medical information and confidential sensitive
data before recycling.
Contract Have a written contract with the company processing
the IT Asset.
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Table 4.4: (continued)
Security Issues Security Recommendations
Disposal Monitoring Monitor the destruction process and maintain audit
trails and inventory logs of hard drives destroyed by
the company based on the serial numbers in the de-
struction certificates for each individual drive.
Remedial Action Take remedial action which includes developing a
new policy framework to address the internal re-use
of information and appliances and disposal process
for redundant equipment.
Step 3: Map the lessons learned to the goal structure.
The lessons learned can have different levels of details to be mapped to different
levels of security requirements in the security guideline, as in the previous case studies.
Step 4: Elaborate the Context and Strategy.
As we are moving into the healthcare organisation in UK, the strategy and con-
text used are different. The strategy we used for justifying the decomposition is stated
as “Argument over IT Asset Disposal Guidance”. We have explained the “IT Asset
Disposal Guidance” in the strategy notation and the context is stated as “An IT Asset
Disposal guidance proposed by Information Commissioner’s Office according to Data
Protection Act”.
As is different from the previous cases happened in the US and China. This case
study focuses on the IT asset disposal in the UK. Figure 4.4 presents the instance of the
Generic Security Template built for NHS Surrey 2013 IT Asset Disposal Incident. Five
main lessons learned are identified, that are related to the issue “Risk Management”,
“Personal Data”, “Contract”, “Disposal Monitoring”, and “Remedial Action”. Among
them, “Remedial Action” can not be mapped to an appropriate security requirement,
which indicates a probably missing aspect of the the IT Asset Disposal guidance. The
rest of them were mapped to different levels of security requirements of the IT Asset
Disposal Guidance.
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Figure 4.4: Instance of the Generic Security Template - NHS Surrey IT Asset Disposing
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4.5 Discussion
4.5.1 Case selection
Security incidents happened in different industries such as telecommunication [171],
finance [172, 173], healthcare [15] and government [174]. Information about incidents
can be from a variety of data sources including security incident reports [14, 15], news
clips [12, 172, 173], money penalty report [44] and so on. This research focuses on
healthcare industry. The security incidents selected for case studies are representatives
of healthcare security incidents happened in different countries (i.e. United States, UK
and China).
In China, organisations are reluctant to release security incident reports. Infor-
mation about incidents is limited and can only be obtained from news clips. Among
13 security incidents collected in China (Appendix A.5), only one incident is related
to healthcare organisation, the Shenzhen data leakage incident [16]. Therefore, this
incident is selected. Incident description in the new clips is usually free style text.
In the United States, some organisations release detailed security incident reports.
For example, Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General has released
reports on the review of Veterans Affairs (VA) security incidents. Incident description
in the incident report is semi-structured text. Among 6 incident reports collected (Ap-
pendix A.5), two data leakage incidents are selected, VA data leakage incident 2006
[14] and 2007 [15]. It allows us to make comparisons with the Shenzhen leakage inci-
dent, which is of the same type. It also allows to make comparison between these two
incidents happened in the same organisations.
In UK, information about security incidents can be found from Information Com-
missioner’s Office (ICO). Among 14 incidents collected (Appendix A.5), five of them
are related to healthcare. We selected the NHS Surrey 2013 IT Asset Disposal Inci-
dent [44] because it has a detailed money penalty report that documents the causes,
recommendations and violated security requirements. Incident description in the inci-
dent report is semi-structured text. This allows us to model security incident from a
different resource rather than news clips and security incident reports.
4.5.2 Success criteria
As is mentioned, the data sources of our selected case studies are diversified such as
the official security incident reports used in the VA incidents, the news clip used in
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the Shenzhen incident, and the money penalty report used in the IT asset disposing
incident. The four case studies conducted in this chapter show that the GST can be
used to structure the security lessons identified from a variety of data sources. The
successfulness of this task is determined by the completion of each step to create the
instances of the GST.
• In step 1, security requirements can be elicited based on the existing security
standards applied by the organisation. There were no difficulties in completing
step 1 as the security standards/guidelines are readily available to elicit security
requirements.
• In step 2, lessons learned can be identified from different data source. Although
incident description are from different data sources, lessons learned can be iden-
tified through content analysis [175] for those four case studies.
• In step 3, lessons learned can be mapped to the security requirements. Difficul-
ties were found in step 3 while mapping the lessons learned with the security
requirements. We overcome them by suggesting and adding new guidance to
assist the creation process. However, the validity of the guidance needs to be
further evaluated in real practice.
• In step 4, context and strategies can be elaborated for those instances. Strategies
were elaborated and supplementary information can be extracted from incident
descriptions as context for those instances.
4.5.3 Time and efforts
The creation of the instances requires the expertise of the analyst. The author con-
ducted these case studies independently. The author has a computing science educa-
tion background and five years research experience in information security incident
management. Efforts can be measured in terms of time invested in each case study, as
is shown in Table 4.5.
The time invested in those case studies varied. VA 2006 Data leakage incident
consumes more time because the author needs to study the GSN and adjust it to fit
into the needs of this research context. It was a combined efforts of experimental
trials with GSN, security incident analysis, security guidance (i.e. FISCAM) review
and GST instance modelling. With the experience gained from the first case study,
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Security Incidents Time  Efforts 
VA 2006 Data Leakage 6 weeks (1) Learning GSN related techniques (a month) 
(2) Read FISCAM (a week) 
(3) Read Security Incident Report (a week) 
(4) Create GST instance from Executive Summary (2 days) 
VA 2007 Data Leakage 4 hours (1) Create GST instance from Executive Summary (4 hours) 
Shenzhen Data Leakage 3 days (1) Read GB/T22239 (3 days) 
(2) Read incident news clips (30 minutes) 
(3) Create GST instance (2 hour) 
NHS Surrey IT Asset 7 hours (1) Read IT Asset Disposal Guidelines (2 hours) 
(2) Read Security Incident Report (2 hours) 
(3) Create GST instance (3 hours) !
Table 4.5: Time and efforts to create the GST Instances
the author was able to complete the modelling of VA 2007 Data leakage incident very
quickly. For the third case study, the author spent some time studying the security
standard (i.e. GB/T22239) applied in Chinese healthcare organisation and was able to
complete within approximately three days time. By following the same procedure, the
author studied a fourth case study happened in the healthcare organisation in UK and
was able to complete the study within 7 hours’ time. An accurate measure of efforts
invested requires further studies involving more users and case studies.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented four security incidents case studies from Europe, North
America and China and produced four instances of the Generic Security Templates by
following the instance creation steps introduced in Chapter 3. The creation of those in-
stances has demonstrated the suitability of the Generic Security Template in presenting
the lessons learned from the real world security incidents. In the following chapters,
we evaluate the Generic Security Template by using those instances. In Chapters 5 and
7, we evaluate the usability of the Generic Security Template with university students.
In Chapter 6 and 8, we industrially evaluate the Generic Security Template with people
having experience dealing with patient data.
Chapter 5
Comparison of the Generic Security
Template with traditional Text-based
Approach - An Empirical Evaluation
Chapter 3 proposed the Generic Security Template; Chapter 4 tested the suitability
of the Generic Security Template using a number of case studies. Since the Generic
Security Template is created by using the graphical approach, the Goal Structuring
Notations (GSN), there might be comprehension problems due to the usage of unfa-
miliar symbols. This chapter uses one instance of the Generic Security Template to
empirically evaluate its usability in assisting the identification of lessons learned from
security incidents in comparison to traditional free text approach.
This chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 5.1 introduces related
work on the usability evaluation of graphical notations. Section 5.2 outlines the study
design including the hypothesis, tasks, materials, pilot test, and study execution. Sec-
tion 5.3 introduces the experiment procedures. Section 5.4 analyses the results quan-
titatively. Section 5.5 analyses the subjective feedback qualitatively. 5.6 discusses
external and internal threats to the validity of the experiment. Section 5.7 discusses the
findings, the contributions and limitations of the experiment. Section 5.8 summarises
this chapter.
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5.1 Related work
5.1.1 Graphical notation evaluation
Previous chapters argued that existing text-based reports can be supported through the
use of graphical notations that provide an overview of many dozens of pages of de-
tailed prose. Figure 5.1 uses the Goal Structuring Notation to summarise key findings
from an enquiry into a leakage of confidential patient data from the US Veterans’ Af-
fairs Administration [15]. The aim is to present the security lessons in a structured and
coherent manner. It is also hoped that this use of a semi-formal notation will encour-
age greater consistency and correctness [176, 177]. However, the notation introduces
unfamiliar syntax and semantics. There is a danger that our use of these techniques
can prevent stakeholders from understanding the arguments in security incident re-
ports [178, 179]. This chapter, therefore, presents a controlled experiment to evaluate
the utility of graphical representations for security incident reports.
There have been many previous studies into the utility and usability of graphical
notations. For example, Razali has conducted an experiment comparing the compre-
hensibility of an UML-based graphical formal specification versus a purely textual
specification [180]. Although graphical representations are often perceived as easier
to understand, it can be difficult for readers to interpret the meaning of abstract sym-
bols [181, 182]. Purely graphical representations are often less expressive than textual
representation; in other words some system properties cannot easily be specified using
diagrams alone [183]. It is for this reason that diagrams, such as that shown in Figure
5.1, resort to textual labels in addition to the graphical syntax. A combined graphical
representation with supporting textual representations can assist visualisation while
still achieving the full expressiveness and precision of a textual representation.
5.2 Experiment design
5.2.1 Experiment design and scope
A study was designed to evaluate whether the use of the Generic Security Template
can help assisting the communication of lessons learned and security arguments on the
supportive relationships between the lessons and the security requirements compared
to conventional text-based approaches. The aim was not to show that the Generic
Security Template could replace conventional reports; the focus was in the use of the
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Figure 5.1: An example instance of the GST - VA 2007 data leakage incident
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Generic Security Template to provide a map or overview of complex text-based reports.
Accuracy, efficiency and task load are compared quantitatively in this experiment and
the following hypotheses are proposed for the comparison.
H1 - Accuracy (Lessons Learned): Participants will be better able to identify the
lessons learned (security issues, security recommendations) in security incident report
with the help of the GST than using text-based documents alone;
H2 - Accuracy (Relationships between the lessons and the security requirements):
Participants will be better able to identify the security arguments on the supportive
relationships between the lessons and the security requirements with the help of the
GST than using text-based documents alone;
H3 - Efficency (Time): The time taken to complete the designed task will be less
using the GST than using the text-based documents alone;
H4 - Task Load (TLX): The task load will be lower using the GST than using the
text-based documents alone.
Ease of use is compared qualitatively based on the feedback obtained from partici-
pants.
5.2.2 Ethical approval
To conduct research involving human participants, this experiment adhered to the BPS
ethical guidelines, and has been approved by the FIMS ethics committee of the Uni-
versity of Glasgow (ref: CSE01098) (Appendix B.1)
5.2.3 Experiment variables
5.2.3.1 Independent variables
Generic Security Template (GST), we have used one instance of the Generic Security
Template, the VA 2007 data leakage incident, in this experiment as is shown in Figure
5.1.
Text-based approach, we developed an executive summary (reduced to four pages)
(Appendix B.2) and a simplified security guidelines (reduced to three pages) (Ap-
pendix B.3) from the FISCAM.
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5.2.3.2 Dependent variables
We were concerned to determine whether participants could use the graphical and tex-
tual versions of the report to identify the lessons learned and security arguments on the
supportive relationships between the lessons and the security requirements. In particu-
lar, we evaluate its usability [184] in terms of the accuracy, efficiency, ease-of-use and
task load compared to the conventional, text-based approach.
Accuracy, is measured by assessing the quality of the (1) lessons learned (security
causes, recommendations) and (2) relationships between the lessons and the security
requirements from the security incident.
Efficiency, is measured by the time it takes to complete the experiment task. Al-
though time may not be a significant issue for many security concerns. If it takes too
long to read and understand an incident report then it may dissuade some end users
from investing the time needed to learn from previous incidents.
Ease of use, is evaluated by the feedback obtained from the post-experiment ques-
tionnaire.
Task load, is measured by the application of NASA’s Task Load Index to assess
workload [185].
5.2.3.3 Controlled variables
Participants, the participants were post-graduate and undergraduate students from UK.
The use of the students is justified for pragmatic and also for ethical reasons. As part
of this research, we conducted interviews with exiting healthcare and IT professionals
in healthcare organisations (Chapter 6). This revealed that many lack formal training
in security incident reporting and analysis; they come from varied backgrounds. The
growing number of patient data breaches has also created enormous sensitivity; many
employers are extremely unwilling to participate in studies of this nature even when
anonymity is guaranteed.
Tasks, the experiment itself lasted for maximum one hour. Participants had to iden-
tify the lessons learned and the security arguments on the supportive relationships be-
tween the lessons and the security requirements using either a conventional text-based
document or using the graphical overview plus the report.
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5.2.3.4 Extraneous variables
Experience with GSN, is defined as an extraneous variable in this experiment. People
who have experience with GSN will have an obvious advantage in understanding the
security incident with the help of the GST. People having experience with GSN were
excluded from this experiment.
5.2.4 Experiment material
5.2.4.1 Security incident related text document
The technical context of the task focused on a data leakage incident involving the Vet-
erans Affairs’ Administration [15]. The original report was around 80 pages long and
hence we could not use it directly within the time available for the experiment. We
also felt that our more focused approach was more appropriate for an initial study that
could, in turn, inform future empirical work over a longer period of time and with a
larger number of participants. We, therefore, reduced the executive summary from the
VA report to four pages. As is mentioned, the security requirements to be supported
by lessons learned are presented in the form of a specific security standard or guideline
applied to the organisation where the security incident happened. Therefore, a sim-
plified version of security guidelines (reduced to three pages) cited from the FISCAM
that are relevant to this incident are also provided as a part of the security incident
report.
5.2.4.2 The Generic Security Template (GST)
The instance of the GST, as is shown in Figure 5.1, used in this experiment is created
from the above mentioned security incident related document only. It is an abstraction
and extraction of the desirable information and did not bring any information from
other sources that could potentially bias the results of the experiment.
5.2.4.3 The questionnaire
We developed separate tasks description for the two groups and a post-experiment
questionnaire, to provide subjective insights into perceived workload. A slightly dif-
ferent version of this post-experiment questionnaire was developed for the group using
the graphical overview of the security incident. They were asked to provide informa-
tion about the usability of the approach by completing the subjective questionnaire.
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5.2.5 Pilot study
Two security experts reviewed the design of the experiment pilot studies and helped
to identify issues that had not been identified during the preparation of the materials.
These included the clarity of the instruction, the validity and complexity of the tasks
and the practicality of the tasks required relative to the time available for the experi-
ment. In the first pilot study, participants had to identify security issues, recommenda-
tions and security arguments on the supportive relationships between the lessons and
the security requirements; writing them down using freestyle text. This was to sim-
ulate how security incident reports are analysed in practice, where people normally
have no tools assisting them throughout this process. The feedback from the partic-
ipants showed that the task was very mentally demanding and they were not able to
complete it within one hour. We corrected this problem by introducing a table that pro-
vided guidance on the security issues and recommendations. Table 5.1 is an exempt of
the table. Issue category and description are provided. The participants need to fill in
the blank about the recommendation description.
Issue Category Issue description Recommendations description 
Access Control Related  The IT Specialist was improperly given 
access to multiple data sources. 
 
 
Table 5.1: An exempt of the security issue and recommendation table
For the measurement of the relationships between the lessons learned and the se-
curity requirements, we used multi-choice questions as the measurement. Below is an
example,
What are the security recommendations for addressing the security requirement
“User Access Control”?
a. Develop and implement policies describing the conditions under which pro-
grammer level access may be granted for research purposes.
b. Effective procedures are implemented to determine compliance with authentica-
tion policies.
c. Attempts to log on with invalid passwords are limited. Use of easily guessed
passwords (such as names or words) is prohibited.
d. None of the above
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Although this significantly reduced the workload in our study, it illustrated the
more general problems that arise when individuals were asked to identify key findings
from existing security incident reports. Two more participants conducted a pilot test
of the new experiment design. They were able to finish the tasks and stated that the
level of mental effort was acceptable. Experiment materials including an Information
Sheet, Consent form, Task Sheets and the Post-experiment Questionnaires were also
reviewed to identify any missing or ambiguous questions and instructions.
5.2.6 Experiment task design
We were concerned to use an incident report that typifies some of the barriers that
dissuade security managers from reading existing recommendations. We, therefore,
extracted key sections from the VA mentioned earlier [15]. Even so, a pilot study
revealed that participants found it difficult to identify causes, recommendations, and
the relationships between the lessons learned and security requirements in the abridged
report about the pilot study also raised concerns about task load, fatigue and learning
effects; which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
In Group A, the experiment materials included the textual incident document (re-
duced executive summary and reduced security guidelines from FISCAM), the graphi-
cal GST and a task description. The pilot study had confirmed the arguments presented
in the opening sections of this chapter; that it can be difficult for readers to identify the
causes, recommendation and their relationships with the security requirements of pre-
vious security incidents from existing textual reports. We, therefore, created tasks that
guided the participants’ analysis:
Task 1: Identify security lessons from the security incident report with the help of
the GST. They had to complete missing information from a table that provided partial
information about the causes and recommendations, as is shown in Table 5.1.
Task 2: Answer multiple-choice questions about the security arguments on the sup-
portive relationships between the lessons and the security requirements. This removed
the additional contextual support of the tabular format used in task one and provided a
stepping stone towards the open-ended analysis of security incident reports that proved
problematic in the pilot studies.
In Group B, the experiment materials included the textual incident report without
the GST but participants had the same task descriptions as the first group.
The methods used in task 1 and task 2 raised numerous further questions. Task
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1 used open-ended questions. The scoring of open-ended responses is more difficult
and less clear-cut. One must establish criteria for the kinds of answers that will be
counted as correct; there is usually (if not always) at least some subjective judgment
of the correctness of participants’ responses. Dewar pointed out that the extra effort
is worthwhile in terms of information gained about the types of errors and confusions
people make and might assist in any subsequent redesign work [186]. Task 2 used
multiple-choice questions to examine the participants’ ability to identify the security
arguments on the supportive relationships between the lessons and the security re-
quirements. However, this approach raises concerns about the quality of the distracters
(wrong answers), which could greatly influence comprehension scores [186]. Using a
between group design with identical tasks enables an assessment of the support pro-
vided by the GST overview. However, the study also provided significant insights into
the methodological issues associated with work in this area. In particular, we employed
multiple independent security experts in the evaluation process, especially when par-
ticipants were free to complete the information requested in Task 1 using their own
terminology.
5.3 Experiment procedures
5.3.1 Experiment treatment
There was only one treatment in the experiment using a between groups (Group A and
B) design. The empirical comparisons are between one group using a conventional
text-based document and another using the graphical overview as well as the existing
report. We have not used cross-over trials [187] in the experiment, because (1) the task
was complex and time consuming that had taken approximately two hours, which was
confirmed from the pilot study. The participants can experience fatigue through cross-
over trial, as it doubles the task load. However, it is impossible to reduce the task load
to allow a cross-over test, because this experiment aims to reflect the security incident
comprehension process. Simplification of the experiment tasks will undermine the
significance of the study; (2) None of the participants have previous experience in
analysing security incidents. There can be a learning effect using the cross-over tests;
(3) In a cross-over trial, two security incidents with similar complexity were needed.
It was difficult to measure this complexity accurately. Therefore, we conduct one
treatment in the experiment.
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5.3.2 Participants
As mentioned, we were concerned to assess the participants’ ability to use textual and
graphical incident reports to identify lessons from previous data breaches. In conse-
quence, the tasks required about one hour to complete. This limited the number of par-
ticipants during our initial evaluation. Twenty-four subjects were randomly assigned
to either of the two experimental conditions using the textual report only or using both
the textual report and the graphical overview. Group A consists of one undergraduate
student and eleven postgraduate students, within which three of them have information
security experience; Group B has one undergraduate student and eleven postgraduate
students, within which three of them have information security experience. Each of
the group have three females and nine males.
5.3.3 Training of the participants
A pre-scripted familiarisation tutorial was provided before the experiment. Participants
from both Group A and B attended the same tutorial session. This was to ensure
that they received equal knowledge related to the handling of security incidents. The
participants were introduced to the GSN and GST.
5.3.4 Experiment execution
The experiment was conducted on a one-to-one mode to provide any support needed
during the whole process including the familiarisation tutorial session, the experiment
session and the post-experiment questionnaire session. During the familiarisation tu-
torial session, the participant had unlimited time to study the material and to have any
question clarified. The participants were allowed to refer to the tutorial document or
notes. The participants were instructed to inform the conductor if they had any trouble
in understanding the questions. After the post-experiment questionnaire session, an
informal interview was conducted to make sure their attitudes were consistent with the
answers they have provided. They were also requested to write down their subjective
feedback on the GST.
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5.3.5 Analysing the data
5.3.5.1 Scoring Scheme for the experiment tasks
To reduce the bias, sample answers for the experimental tasks were agreed on by the
research conductor and an independent security expert (Expert A).
5.3.5.2 Preparation for task 1 - open-ended questions
For Task 1, the answers were qualitative. The marking was based on the description of
security issues and recommendations expected from the sample answers. The answers
for each task were marked by two further independent experts (Rater A and B) using an
agreed scoring scheme. Both Rater A and B are the author’s colleagues from School
of Computing Science in University of Glasgow and they are from an information
security background. Rater A has over 20 years experience in information security and
Rater B has six years experience in information security.
The participants’ answers were classified into four categories, which are “Correct”,
“Incomplete”, “Wrong” and “Blank”. A correct answer completely described the rec-
ommendation to support the given issue; incomplete answers show that the participant
had a partial understanding of the recommendation, but lacked comprehension of an
important aspect of it. Wrong answers showed that the participant did not understand
a particular recommendation. Blank, no answer was provided at all. The following
paragraph provides an example from task one:
The report identifies the security concern: “The IT Specialist was improperly given
access to multiple data sources”. An answer is marked as, Correct, if the participant
states that the recommendation associated with this issue was to “Consider the con-
ditions under which programmer level access may be granted for research project”.
A correct answer completely describes the recommendation to support the given is-
sue; Incomplete, if the answer is stated as “Ensure the access control is appropriately
granted”. Incomplete answers showed that the participant had a partial understand-
ing of the recommendation, but lacked comprehension of an important aspect of it;
Wrong, if the answer provided is not relevant to a particular recommendation. Blank,
if no answer was provided at all.
Each participant was free to use his or her own words to describe the recommenda-
tions in this part of the study. The group identifiers were removed so that Rater A and
B marked the answers without knowing whether or not the participants had access to
the GST diagram.
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5.3.5.3 Preparation for Task 2 - multi-choice questions
Task 2 used multi-choice questions to examine the participant’s ability in understand-
ing the compliance with the security requirements. Less subjectivity was involved in
interpreting the answers. There can be more than one correct choice for each question
and participants were asked to select all of the responses they believe were relevant to
the questions. Below is an example,
What are the security recommendations for addressing the security requirement
“User Access Control”?
a. Develop and implement policies describing the conditions under which pro-
grammer level access may be granted for research purposes.
b. Effective procedures are implemented to determine compliance with authentica-
tion policies.
c. Attempts to log on with invalid passwords are limited. Use of easily guessed
passwords (such as names or words) is prohibited.
d. None of the above
Correct answer: a, b
The sample answers were prepared by the independent security expert A. Each
answer was classified as, Correct, Broad, Incomplete, Incomplete and broad, Wrong,
and Blank. A Correct answer contained and only contained all the acceptable choices
(e.g. a, b); Broad contained all the acceptable choices, but also incorrect choices (e.g.
a, b, c); Incomplete answers contained only some of the acceptable choices but not all
(e.g. a). Incomplete and broad answers contained some of the acceptable choices and
also other choices. (e.g. a, c); Wrong answers contained none of the acceptable choices
(e.g. c).There was only one blank answer out of 144 responses.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Results for accuracy (lessons learned)
Out of a total number of 168 answers to the seven questions in task 1 by 24 participants,
three were left blank with one in Group A and two in Group B. During the debrief, the
participants stated that, for the blank response, they could understand the questions
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but they are not really interested to find the answer for those questions. Therefore, we
ignore these blank answers in the subsequent analysis.
5.4.1.1 Comparing the performance of task 1
Since the results are categorical data, we use cross-tabulation analysis to analyse the
results. A data set with 168 rows was imported into SPSS. Within the cross-tabulation
analysis, groups were set as rows and task results were set as columns. Chi-square
statistics was selected to test the hypothesis. Recall that these open ended questions
were assessed by two independent raters. For Rater A, as is shown in Table 5.2, the
results from the cross-tabulation analysis show that 62.7% of the responses from Group
A were correct, which is 18.8% higher than Group B. This might seem a relatively
low level of accuracy. However, it is important to recall that our marking scheme
was careful to distinguish between complete, perfect responses and partially correct or
incomplete answers. The total percentage of incomplete and correct answer is 81.9% in
Group A, which is 16% higher than Group B. As is shown in Table 5.3, the Chi-Square
Test (P = 0.031 < 0.05) shows that these results are statistically significant. Therefore,
hypothesis H1 “Participants will be better able to identify the recommendations and
causes in security reports with the help of a graphical method than using text alone” is
supported based on Rater A’s judgement.
 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete Correct 
Group A Count 15 16 52 83 
% within Group 18.1% 19.3% 62.7% 100.0% 
Group B Count 28 18 36 82 
% within Group 34.1% 22.0% 43.9% 100.0% 
Total Count 43 34 88 165 
% within Group 26.1% 20.6% 53.3% 100.0% 
 
Table 5.2: The performance of Task 1 using Cross-tabulation by Rater A
For Rater B, as is shown in Table 5.4, the results from the cross-tabulation analysis
show that 65.1% of the responses from Group A were correct, which is 20% higher
than Group B. The total percentage of Incomplete and Correct answer is 83.1% in
Group A, which is 9.6% higher than Group B. As is shown in Table 5.5, the Chi-Square
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 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete Correct 
Group A Count 14 15 54 83 
% within Group 16.9% 18.1% 65.1% 100.0% 
Group B Count 28 17 37 82 
% within Group 34.1% 20.7% 45.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 42 32 91 165 
% within Group 25.5% 19.4% 55.2% 100.0% 
 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.951a 2 .031 
Likelihood Ratio 7.029 2 .030 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
6.909 1 .009 
N of Valid Cases 165   
 
Table 5.3: Chi-Square Tests performance of Task 1 using Cross-tabulation by Rater A
Test (P = 0.019 < 0.05) shows that these results are statistically significant. Therefore,
hypothesis H1 “Participants will be better able to identify the recommendations and
causes in security reports with the help of a graphical method than using text alone” is
again supported based on Rater B’s judgement.
 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete Correct 
Group A Count 14 15 54 83 
% within Group 16.9% 18.1% 65.1% 100.0% 
Group B Count 28 17 37 82 
% within Group 34.1% 20.7% 45.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 42 32 91 165 
% within Group 25.5% 19.4% 55.2% 100.0% 
 
Table 5.4: The performance of Task 1 using Cross-tabulation by Rater B
5.4.1.2 Inter-rater reliability
Since these open ended questions were assessed by two independent raters, inter-rater
reliability was checked for each question in Task 1. As is shown in Table 5.6 - 5.12,
the Kappa Agreement shows that the two raters have achieved agreements on judging
the accuracy of the lessons learned identified by the participants and the results are sta-
tistically significant (Approx.Sig. < 0.001). Landis and Koch proposed the benchmark
scale on how the extent of agreement among raters should be interpreted and how the
extent of agreement among raters should be interpreted, as is shown in Table 5.13 [8].
They have recommended this as useful guideline and Everitt also supported this bench-
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 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete Correct 
Group A Count 14 15 54 83 
% within Group 16.9% 18.1% 65.1% 100.0% 
Group B Count 28 17 37 82 
% within Group 34.1% 20.7% 45.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 42 32 91 165 
% within Group 25.5% 19.4% 55.2% 100.0% 
 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.962a 2 .019 
Likelihood Ratio 8.071 2 .018 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.911 1 .005 
N of Valid Cases 165   
 
Table 5.5: Chi-Square Tests performance of Task 1 using Cross-tabulation by Rater B
mark scale [188]. Questions 1, 2 have achieved “almost perfect agreement”; Questions
3, 4, 5, and 6 have achieved “substantial agreement”; Question 7 has achieved “Fair
agreement”.
 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete Correct 
Group A Count 14 15 54 83 
% within Group 16.9% 18.1% 65.1% 100.0% 
Group B Count 28 17 37 82 
% within Group 34.1% 20.7% 45.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 42 32 91 165 
% within Group 25.5% 19.4% 55.2% 100.0% 
 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.962a 2 .019 
Likelihood Ratio 8.071 2 .018 
Linear-by-Linear 
Asso i tion 
7.911 1 .005 
N of Valid Cases 165   
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Asymp.Std. Error a Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .706 .117 4.254 .000 
N of Valid Cases 24    
 
Table 5.6: Inter-rater reliability for Task1 Question 1 (Rater A and B)
 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete Correct 
Group A Count 14 15 54 83 
% within Group 16.9% 18.1% 65.1% 100.0% 
Group B Count 28 17 37 82 
% within Group 34.1% 20.7% 45.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 42 32 91 165 
% within Group 25.5% 19.4% 55.2% 100.0% 
 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.962a 2 .019 
Likelihood Ratio 8.071 2 .018 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.911 1 .005 
N of Valid Cases 165   
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Asymp.Std. Error a Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .801 .105 5.415 .000 
N of Valid Cases 23    
 
Table 5.7: Inter-rater reliability for Task1 Question 2 (Rater A and B)
5.4.2 Results for accuracy (security arguments)
As is shown in Table 5.14, the results from the cross-tabulation analysis show that
the participants from Group A achieved a 33.3% accuracy rate, which is 9.7% higher
than Group B. The total percentage of Correct, Broad, Incomplete, and Incomplete but
broad answer is 87.5%, which is 18.1% higher than Group B. As is shown in Table
5.15, the Chi-Square Test (P = 0.038 < 0.05) shows that these results are statistically
significant. Therefore, hypothesis H2 “Participants will be better able to identify the
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 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete Correct 
Group A Count 14 15 54 83 
% within Group 16.9% 18.1% 65.1% 100.0% 
Group B Count 28 17 37 82 
% within Group 34.1% 20.7% 45.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 42 32 91 165 
% within Group 25.5% 19.4% 55.2% 100.0% 
 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.962a 2 .019 
Likelihood Ratio 8.071 2 .018 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.911 1 .005 
N of Valid Cases 165   
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Asymp.Std. Error a Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .715 .127 4.786 .000 
N of Valid Cases 24    
 
Table 5.8: Inter-rater reliability for Task1 Question 3 (Rater A and B)
 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete Correct 
Group A Count 14 15 54 83 
% within Group 16.9% 18.1% 65.1% 100.0% 
Group B Count 28 17 37 82 
% within Group 34.1% 20.7% 45.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 42 32 91 165 
% within Group 25.5% 19.4% 55.2% 100.0% 
 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.962a 2 .019 
Likelihood Ratio 8.071 2 .018 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.911 1 .005 
N of Valid Cases 165   
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Asymp.Std. Error a Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .574 .128 3.962 .000 
N of Valid Cases 22    
 
Table 5.9: Inter-rater reliability for Task1 Question 4 (Rater A and B)
 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete Correct 
Group A Count 14 15 54 83 
% within Group 16.9% 18.1% 65.1% 100.0% 
Group B Count 28 17 37 82 
% within Group 34.1% 20.7% 45.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 42 32 91 165 
% within Group 25.5% 19.4% 55.2% 100.0% 
 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.962a 2 .019 
Likelihood Ratio 8.071 2 .018 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.911 1 .005 
N of Valid Cases 165   
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Asymp.Std. Error a Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .723 .120 4.796 .000 
N of Valid Cases 24    
 
Table 5.10: Inter-rater reliability for Task1 Question 5 (Rater A and B)
 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete Correct 
Group A Count 14 15 54 83 
% within Group 16.9% 18.1% 65.1% 100.0% 
Group B Count 28 17 37 82 
% within Group 34.1% 20.7% 45.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 42 32 91 165 
% within Group 25.5% 19.4% 55.2% 100.0% 
 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.962a 2 .019 
Likelihood Ratio 8.071 2 .018 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.911 1 .005 
N of Valid Cases 165   
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Asymp.Std. Error a Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .782 .104 5.325 .000 
N of Valid Cases 24    
 
Table 5.11: Inter-rater reliability for Task1 Question 6 (Rater A and B)
 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete Correct 
Group A Count 14 15 54 83 
% within Group 16.9% 18.1% 65.1% 100.0% 
Group B Count 28 17 37 82 
% within Group 34.1% 20.7% 45.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 42 32 91 165 
% within Group 25.5% 19.4% 55.2% 100.0% 
 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.962a 2 .019 
Likelihood Ratio 8.071 2 .018 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.911 1 .005 
N of Valid Cases 165   
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Asymp.Std. Error a Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .497 .154 3.251 .001 
N of Valid Cases 24    
 
Table 5.12: Inter-rater reliability for Task1 Question 7 (Rater A and B)
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Landis and Koch-Kappa’s Benchmark Scale 
Kappa Statistic Strength of Agreement 
< 0.0 Poor 
0.0 to 0.20 Slight 
0.21 to 0.40 Fair 
0.41 to 0.60 Moderate 
0.61 to 0.80 Substantial 
0.81 to 1.00 Almost Perfect 
Table 5.13: Landis and Koch-Kappa’s benchmark scale [8]
security arguments on the supportive relationships between the lessons and the secu-
rity requirements with the help of the GST than using text-based document alone;” is
supported in Task 2.
 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete Correct 
Group A Count 14 15 54 83 
% within Group 16.9% 18.1% 65.1% 100.0% 
Group B Count 28 17 37 82 
% within Group 34.1% 20.7% 45.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 42 32 91 165 
% within Group 25.5% 19.4% 55.2% 100.0% 
 
 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete 
and broad 
Incomplete Broad Correct 
Group A Count 9 11 19 9 24 83 
% within Group 12.5% 15.3% 26.4% 12.5% 33.3% 100.0% 
Group B Count 22 4 18 11 17 82 
% within Group 30.6% 5.6% 25.0% 15.3% 23.6% 100.0% 
Total Count 31 15 37 20 41 165 
% within Group 21.5% 10.4% 25.7% 13.9% 28.5% 100.0% 
 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.140a 4 .038 
Likelihood Ratio 10.449 4 .034 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.995 1 .084 
N of Valid Cases 144   
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Asymp.Std. Error a Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .497 .154 3.251 .001 
N of Valid Cases 24    
 
Table 5.14: The performance of Task 2 using Cross-tabulation
5.4.3 esults for efficiency (time)
The mean total time used by Group A was almost equal with that in Group B; 47.3
versus 47.8 minutes. The total time taken across all tasks is not statistically significant
(P = 0.932 > 0.05). Therefore, we can accept the null hypothesis that “the mean time
taken to complete our experimental tasks using a textual security incident report and a
textual report with a graphical overview are not significantly different”. Hypothesis H3
is not supported. One interpretation of these results is that significant time is required
to understand security incidents, irrespective of whether they are presented in graphical
or textual format. However, this would require further empirical support to determine
whether or not other graphical notations might lead to significant differences in the
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 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete Correct 
Group A Count 14 15 54 83 
% within Group 16.9% 18.1% 65.1% 100.0% 
Group B Count 28 17 37 82 
% within Group 34.1% 20.7% 45.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 42 32 91 165 
% within Group 25.5% 19.4% 55.2% 100.0% 
 
 Task  
Total  Wrong Incomplete 
and broad 
Incomplete Broad Correct 
Group A Count 9 11 19 9 24 83 
% within Group 12.5% 15.3% 26.4% 12.5% 33.3% 100.0% 
Group B Count 22 4 18 11 17 82 
% within Group 30.6% 5.6% 25.0% 15.3% 23.6% 100.0% 
Total Count 31 15 37 20 41 165 
% within Group 21.5% 10.4% 25.7% 13.9% 28.5% 100.0% 
 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.140a 4 .038 
Likelihood Ratio 10.449 4 .034 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.995 1 .084 
N of Valid Cases 144   
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Asymp.Std. Error a Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .497 .154 3.251 .001 
N of Valid Cases 24    
 
Table 5.15: Chi-Square Tests performance of Task 2 using Cross-tabulation
time taken to understand security incident reports. It i also important for further work
to consider the learning effects that might be expected through repeated use of the
Generic Security Template.
5.4.4 Results for task load index (TLX)
We used NASA’s Task Load Index [185] to assess workload using a post-evaluation
questionnaire. The t-test results show a significant difference (P = 0.047 < 0.05) in
the first dimension of the task load index regarding “how mentally demanding was
the whole task”. With a mean value of task load, 12.75 versus 15.50, participants
expressed a lower subjective level of workload in terms of “mentally demand” when
using the GST. An interpretation of this results might be the linkage of data within the
diagram has helped reduced the participants’ mental efforts. The results for the other
four dimensions of the Task Load Index are not significantly different. However, a
more sustained analysis is required to replicate these findings across a wider range of
workload measures and with a larger sample of potential users.
5.5 Subjective feedback
This section qualitatively analyses the subjective feedback from the experiment. As is
shown in Table 5.16, the questionnaire included six sections. Section 1 and Section
2 are designed for both Group A and Group B. Section 1 collects background infor-
mation about the participants. Section 2 collects participants’ feedback on task load.
Section 3 is designed for Group A for collecting subjective feedback regarding the
usability of the GST using Cognitive Dimensions of Notations Usability Framework
[189]. Section 4 is designed for Group A to collect subjective feedback on the overall
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experience of the GST. Section 5 is designed for Group B to collect subjective feed-
back on the overall experience of the Security Incident Report. Section 6 is designed
for Group B to collect subjective feedback on the GST.
Table 5.16: Questionnaire sections that belong to Group A and Group B
Questionnaire Group A Group B
Section 1: Demographic Information X X
Section 2: Task Load Index X X
Section 3: Cognitive Dimension X
Section 4: Feedback of the experiment with the Gene-
ric Security Template
X
Section 5: Feedback of the experiment with Text-bas-
ed approach
X
Section 6: Feedback of the Generic Security Template X
5.5.1 Evaluation using Cognitive Dimensions
Section 3 of the questionnaire was based on the analytical theoretical framework Cog-
nitive Dimensions of Notations Usability Framework [189]. This approach has been
assessed for validity and reliability by a number of other researchers [190–192]. There
are fourteen dimensions in the full framework. For our study, we did not ask about the
creation or modification of the notation.
Example:
(Visibility) It is easy to see or find the various parts of the Generic Security Tem-
plate while it is being used?
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
Explain what kind of things is difficult to see or find?
Questionnaire Section 3 provided preliminary results of the strengths and weak-
ness of the GST used under certain circumstance, for example, any strength that the
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user is in favour of, any weakness that affects usability, any opportunity for further
improvements.
CD-Visibility Dimension. Ten out of twelve of the participants agreed or strongly
agreed that “It is easy to see or find the various parts of the GST while it is being
used”. One participant disagreed and argued about the visibility of the goal structure.
The comment was “might be difficult to differentiate between goals and sub goals”.
The suggestions were “use of colour may help visual interpretation” and “introduction
of colours to identify the different levels/layers”.
CD-Diffuseness Dimension. Eleven out of twelve of the participants agreed or
strongly agreed that “the GST lets you say what you want reasonably brief”. There
was one participant against it and the reason was “too many words”. This issue is
related to the level of abstraction of the GST. Too much information will undermine
the effectiveness of the graphical presentation, while too little information will make it
difficult to understand. Since a large proportion of the participants were pleased with
the current design, we decided not to make any changes.
CD-Hard Mental Operation Dimension. Six out of twelve of the participants dis-
agreed that “There seem some things especially complex or difficult to understand in
your head while using the GST”. Two out of twelve of the participants agreed or
strongly agreed and stated this was caused by “too many words within one notation”.
They suggested to “separate recommendation into different or individual circles”. This
issue relates to the separation of the lessons learned notation. We have accepted this
recommendation by separating the notation that has more than one learning points.
For example, the “Security Policy: (1) Ensure that data security plans for research
projects comply with information security policies; (2) Ensure human subjects in re-
search, compliance with information security requirements; (3) Discontinue storing
email on unauthorised system” can be separated into three individual lessons which
are “Security Policy: Ensure that data security plans for research projects comply with
information security policies”, “Security Policy: Ensure human subjects in research,
compliance with information security requirements”, and “Security Policy: Discon-
tinue storing email on unauthorised system”.
CD-Closeness of Mapping Dimension. Nine out of twelve of the participants
agreed or strongly agreed that “the GST describes the problem accurately and com-
pletely for the security incident stated in the textual document”. There was one partici-
pant against it and the feedback was “the case is not generic enough”, this is consistent
with the comments on CD-Hard Mental Operation Dimension “with many words”.
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The participants also argue about separation of the recommendation notations, “it’s in
some cases hard to separate the individual solutions in one bottom node into separate
issues”, which had some overlap with the finding in the CD-Hard Mental Operation
Dimension. This issue relates to the separation of the lessons learned notation. As is
mentioned earlier, we have accepted this recommendation by separating the learning
points more carefully.
CD-Consistency Dimension. Seven out of twelve of the participants disagreed that
“There are places where some things ought to be similar, but the GST makes them
different”. Three out of twelve of the participants agreed or strongly agreed with it but
there were no comments or suggestion related to this usability dimension.
CD-Role Expressiveness Dimension. Seven out of twelve of the participants agreed
or strongly agreed that “while reading the GST, it is easy to tell what each part is for
in the overall scheme”. One participant disagreed with it. The feedback was “might be
hard to see whether the user wants to work on the high or low level of the hierarchy”.
They suggested that “could use multiple cases” for different target groups with interest
towards different level of information. This issue needs to be addressed in future in-
dustrial evaluation regarding multi-view to reflect the needs of different target groups
such as security managers, engineers and so on.
5.5.2 Overall experience
Figure 5.2 shows that in Group A, approximately half of the participants expressed
some difficulties in understanding the text based security incident report. Half of
the participants reported that they have no difficulties in identifying security lessons
learned from the security incident report with the help of the GST. Figure 5.3 shows
that Group B demonstrated a slightly higher level of understanding of the security inci-
dent report. However, more than half of the participants had difficulties in identifying
security lessons from the security incident report. These subjective findings are con-
sistent with the quantitative results in section 6.3 that the group with GST are better
able to identify the security lessons than the other.
The participants’ answers to the open questions regarding the overall experience
of using the graphical overviews suggested that a longer training session might have
helped them to better prepare for the tasks. Several participants mentioned that they
had experienced learning effects; their confidence in answering the questions increased
as they worked their way through the questions. This finding from Group A reveals
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Figure 5.2: Overall experience of the GST - Group A
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Figure 5.3: Overall experience of the GST - Group B
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generally positive feedback for the GST. Group B did not use the GST during the
experiment. They were, however, asked to review the GST after the experiment and
provide the feedback by completing Questionnaire Section 6 designed for Group B.
Almost all of them suggested that they would have no difficulties in understanding the
GST and agreed that the GST can help them better comprehend existing security inci-
dent reports. Two thirds of the participants reported their willingness to use the GST if
they are requested to do a similar task in the future. “It will help to understand termi-
nologies security lessons, less confusing, very structured and don’t have to waste time,
most importantly very easy to understand with less information”. In summary, the par-
ticipants’ overall experience with the GST is positive, however, questions remain about
the ability of people to apply the lessons from the report within their own organisation
rather than answering direct questions about the contents of a security report.
5.6 External and internal threats
Threats to validity [193] are factors other than the independent variables that can affect
the dependent variables.
5.6.1 Internal validity
Internal validity is concerned about the cause-effect relationships induced from the
study. Maturity effects, there is a threat that the participants would tend to be bored
and performed worse towards the end of the experiment session. However, we do
not think that maturity effects will have undermined the validity of our results. As
mentioned previously, several participants reported that their confidence in using the
different reporting formats increased as they progressed through the tasks. Learning ef-
fect, there was not a learning effect in this experiment as there was only one treatment.
Testing effects, all participants have studied the same material in the familiarisation
tutorial session. Very few students have experience with security incident analysis.
There was not any cheating because the experiment was on a one-to-one session. In-
strument effects, the participants were given the same type of tasks and the answers
were evaluated by the same marking scheme. Evaluator bias was addressed through
the use of two independent security experts during the assessment phase. Evaluators
are the colleagues of the author. However, as is mentioned, the group identifiers were
removed so that Rater A and B marked the answers without knowing whether or not
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the participants had access to the GST diagram. We do not think their relation with the
author can bias the results.
5.6.2 External validity
External validity is the possibility to generalise the results beyond the current experi-
ment. We addressed these concerns by selecting a broad cross section of participants
including individuals with diverse background to reflect the those of managers and
technical staff who must cooperate to implement the recommendations in security in-
cident reports. The participants were undergraduate and postgraduate students. Using
students in such experiment is common for practical reasons when the professionals
are less available and expensive. However, the generalisation of the results to different
target groups needs to be carefully considered. For this reason, Chapter 6 conducts
industrial evaluations with healthcare professionals.
It is important to stress that this was a preliminary study. The sample size was
relatively small. This was due to practical reasons: (1) the approach is new and people
have little experience with security incident analysis; (2) the tasks were complex; (3)
participation is voluntary. This also reflects a compromise between the need to study
an adequate population of potential end users and the need to conduct a prolonged and
detailed analysis of a real case study.
It is difficult to generalise the results to healthcare professionals. However the
findings from this experiment provide the basis for future study with industry. Our
work did yield important insights into the difficulties that engineers face when trying
to understand the implications that previous security incident reports have for their own
organisations.
5.7 Conclusions
5.7.1 Findings
An empirical study was conducted to evaluate the usability of the Generic Security
Template in terms of accuracy, efficiency, ease of use and task load in assisting the
identification of the lessons learned and the security argument on the supportive rela-
tionships between the lessons learned and security requirements. The results show that
participants will be better able to identify the security issues and recommendations and
reasoning about the supportive relationships between the lessons learned and security
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requirements with the help of the Generic Security Template than using text-based doc-
uments alone. The task load is lower while using both the template and text report than
using the text report alone. Moreover, the feedback of the experience with the Generic
Security Template shows that it tends to assist the identification of the lessons learned
from the security incidents, and make it easier to complete the tasks compared to the
text-based approach. People’s subjective feedback of the Generic Security Template is
positive, which is consistent with the results obtained from quantitative analysis.
A list of suggestion to improve the Generic Security Template had been identified
using the Cognitive Dimensions and from the subjective feedback. There are recom-
mendations regarding the visibility of the Generic Security Template, to add colour
to the Generic Security Template to improve the visualisation, and decomposition of
the lessons learned notation to decompose the complex lessons learned notation that
contains more than one learning points and the multi-view design for different target
users. We will consider those recommendations in the future design of the Generic
Security Template. In particular the use of students is a limitation, healthcare security
professionals need to be involved in future validation.
5.7.2 Contributions
A large amount of subjective information was collected in this experiment, including
participants’ free-text answers about security issues and recommendations, and their
subjective feedback on the advantages and disadvantages of the Generic Security Tem-
plate. The participant’s free-text answers enable the researcher to examine further the
extent to which the Generic Security Template can help to improve the comprehension
of security incidents. This was measured by examining their answers using indepen-
dent experts. This achieved a higher level of accuracy in measuring the comprehension
of graphical models. Moreover, the participants’ subjective feedback provided multi-
ple directions for further improvements of the model.
There have been numerous empirical studies to evaluate the utility and usability
of graphical notations, including Entity-Relationship diagrams [194], UML [180, 195]
etc. However, as far as we are aware, there have been no previous studies to assess
the strengths and weaknesses of graphical notations to help understand security in-
cident reports. In this chapter, we have presented the results derived from an initial
study into the use of Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to represent and reason about
the recommendations made in a report of a data confidentiality breach involving the
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US Veterans’ Affairs Administration. We were able to show significant benefits from
the use of a graphical technique as well as a textual report in answering a number of
questions when compared to the more conventional use of text-based incident reports
along. However, we could not demonstrate any significant benefits in terms of the time
taken to complete our experimental tasks.
5.8 Summary
This chapter uses one instance of the Generic Security Template to empirically evaluate
its usability in assisting the identification of the lessons learned from a security incident
in comparison to the traditional freestyle text-based approach. In the next chapter
we conduct a study with people working in a healthcare organisation to investigate
the organisational context where this approach can be applied and assess industry’s
acceptance towards this approach.
Chapter 6
Investigation on the Acceptance of the
Generic Security Template in
Healthcare Systems - An Industrial
Evaluation
The Generic Security Template (GST) aims to provide a way to feed back lessons
from security incidents to the ISMS. Chapter 5 has evaluated the usability of a GST in
assisting the identification of the lessons with university students. The results provide
insights into the difficulties that the healthcare professionals have in real practice. In
this chapter, we conduct a case study with people working in a Chinese healthcare
organisation and assess their acceptance of this approach.
This chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 6.1 introduces the study.
Section 6.2 outlines the evaluation plan, including the objectives of the study, target
organisation, participants, study materials and pilot test. Section 6.3 introduces the
study process. Section 6.4 analyses the results. Section 6.4 discusses the conclusions
and contributions. Section 6.5 summarises this chapter.
6.1 Study initiatives
The GST proposed in this thesis has adapted the GSN approach to capture lessons
from information security incidents. Since this is the first time to introduce the GST
into healthcare organisation, we aim to gain understanding of healthcare professionals’
general attitudes towards this new approach to guide further investigation.
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A five months internship was accepted in 2013, with a Chinese healthcare organisa-
tion, the redacted central hospital, on a newly initiated Security Strengthening Program
(SSP). The redacted central hospital started using an electronic healthcare system from
2008 and were looking for recommendations to improve their security system. The
internship examined the organisation’s information security management system and
provided recommendations on improvements. This internship provided the opportu-
nity to obtain more knowledge about information security management in healthcare
organisations in China and their support enabled us to evaluate the GST in an organi-
sational context.
6.2 Study design
Pragmatic constraints and ethical concerns over the use of real world case studies lim-
ited our ability to conduct large-scale quantitative studies. Security experts within hos-
pitals and medical centres face an increasing array of demands and requests that leaves
little opportunity to participate in these studies [74]. We are, therefore, extremely
grateful for their participation in the qualitative feedback sessions that are documented
in this chapter. There is little previous literature and research on the information se-
curity management in Chinese healthcare organisations. This case study allows us to
explore an unfamiliar context as the basis for further research [196].
6.2.1 Study objectives
This study aims to find out the general views of GST, from participants with experi-
ence of dealing with patient data in hospital. This study involves different occupational
communities including physicians, nurses and technicians, as different occupational
communities can have different perspectives toward the use of information security
technologies in healthcare [74]. Since this is the first time to introduce the GST into
a healthcare setting, it is worthwhile to study general attitudes towards this new ap-
proach, which forms the basis for future evaluation. The study objectives are to,
• Study current information security management in the host healthcare organisa-
tion;
• Study the current mechanisms to feed back lessons from security incidents to
ISMS in the host healthcare organisation;
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• Study the healthcare and IT professionals’ attitudes towards the Generic Security
Template.
6.2.2 Target organisation
The research objectives were approached by analysing qualitative data from interview
studies of participants from the redacted central hospital in China. The redacted cen-
tral hospital is a tertiary level hospital in China and has the highest level of maturity
in terms of healthcare information systems. They currently use the security standard
GB/T22239 (Information security technology - Baseline for classified protection of in-
formation system) for information security management. The guidance uses a five level
information security classification system. Organisations are required to comply with
the GB/T22239, by achieving an appropriate level. For example, the guidance of the
health industry information security level protection issued by the Ministry of Health
of the Peoples Republic of China requires that health information systems and related
units should be self-examined in accordance with GB/T22239 [98]. In particular, the
tertiary level hospital needs to achieve at least the third security level characterised in
GB/T22239 [106].
6.2.3 Participants
Information sheets were disseminated to each department of the redacted central hos-
pital. The participants attended this study voluntarily. Fifteen were recruited including
ten healthcare professionals and five IT professionals working in this hospital. Since
the aim of the study is to explore users’ experiences of the evaluated approach, rather
than generalizing the results, we focused on a small number of participants. This pro-
vided suitable coverage of a range of stakeholders across the organisation. The sample
was also limited by our desire to conduct detailed and focussed interviews with key
individuals in healthcare organisations building on our previous work of an empirical
experiment with students.
6.2.4 The study material and pilot test
The study materials include a background questionnaire, interview questions, GST
related materials and a post-interview questionnaire (technology acceptance question-
naire). The study design was reviewed by one security expert and one psychology
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expert. They helped revise the interview design to make sure the questions addressed
the objectives of the study. This study was also pre-tested with two people, one IT pro-
fessional and one healthcare professional from the redacted central hospital. This is to
make sure they can understand the study materials. An important issue identified in the
pilot study was to avoid asking sensitive probe questions due to culture issues [197].
Therefore we have to avoid the questions such as “what are the weaknesses of your
existing way to learn from security incidents?” The study materials were originally
created in English. Prior to being conducted in China, the materials were translated
into Chinese. The study conductor is a Chinese native speaker. The translation was re-
viewed by a second person with a TEM 8 certificate (Test for English Majors Band 8),
which is the highest level for English major students [198] to ensure that the translation
was precise.
6.3 The study process
6.3.1 The consent form
This experiment adhered to the BPS ethical guidelines, and has been approved by the
FIMS ethics committee of the University of Glasgow (ref: CSE01243) (Appendix C.1).
The participants completed the consent form before starting the study.
6.3.2 The background questionnaire
Participants were invited to fill in the background questionnaire. This collects the
demographic information including job position, gender, education background, years
of working experience and experience with security incident handling.
6.3.3 The interview
We conducted semi-structured interviews in this study. The objectives (see section
6.2.1) were transformed into the interview questions (Appendix C.4). There were three
main themes within this interview,
The current information security management in the host healthcare organisation.
The participants were asked to describe general security management in the redacted
central hospital. We have developed several probe questions as sub-themes for explo-
ration, attached in Appendix C.4. Those sub-themes are based on the existing literature
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on management support [199], security culture [200], security awareness [201, 202],
and security effectiveness [203]. The information collected under this theme provides
a general understanding of the current information security management within the
host organisation.
The current mechanisms to feed back lessons from security incidents to ISMS in the
host healthcare organisation. The participants were asked to describe their incident
handling process, the dissemination of lessons learned and how they feed back the
lessons to information security management.
Participants’ attitudes towards the Generic Security Template. The participants
were presented with a GST as is shown in Figure 6.1, based on the Veterans Affairs
incident in the US and the related text based document including an extract of text-
based report and the security guidelines FISCAM that are related to this incident. We
explained how the GST is created from the text based document. The participants were
then invited to comment on whether the GST is useful to feedback the lessons learned
to ISMS comparing to the existing methods.
We were not allowed to record the conversation due to the sensitivity of the re-
search themes. Therefore, we took field notes during the interview. After the study,
a summary based on the field notes was generated and sent to the informants for con-
firmation and acceptance within one hour. This is to validate that the information is
accurate and complete. All confirmations were returned by the participants.
6.3.4 Post-interview questionnaire
A number of models had been developed to evaluate the acceptance of technologies.
Those models originated from different theoretical disciplines such as psychology, so-
ciology and information systems. These technology acceptance models include theory
of reasoned action (TRA) [204], technology acceptance model (TAM) [205], moti-
vational model [206], theory of planned behaviour (TPB) [207], combined theory of
planned behaviour/technology acceptance model [208], model of personal computer
(PC) utilisation [209], innovation diffusion theory[210], and social cognitive theory
[211]. Venkatesh proposed a new IT acceptance and use model, the unified theory of
acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) [212], which aimed to unify eight promi-
nent competing IT acceptance and use models [212]. The authors contend that the new
model successfully integrates all constructs in previous models and can explain vari-
ance in IT behavioural intention and use better than the previous models. It was able to
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Figure 6.1: An example instance of the Generic Security Template - VA 2007 data
leakage incident
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explain 69% of intention to use IT (technology acceptance) while other previous mod-
els explained approximately 40% of technology acceptance [212]. In this dissertation
we adapt the UTAUT model to explore participants’ attitude toward our approach. The
finalised questionnaire is attached in Appendix C.5.
6.4 Results of the study
This section presents the major themes in the data. The findings are grouped according
to the research objectives. The data was further cross-referenced with the collected
document for triangulation [213].
6.4.1 Background questionnaire
The healthcare professionals who participated in this study, includied four doctors
(males) and six nurses (females). Five IT professionals participated in this study, four
of them are IT engineers (one female and three males) and one of them is an IT man-
ager (male). The educational background ranges from honoured bachelors to masters.
All of the IT engineers have experience with security incident handling. Among the
healthcare professional, two nurses and one doctor have been involved in the secu-
rity incident handling process, the rest of them have no experience with information
security incident. Their background information is summarised in Appendix C.6.
6.4.2 Information security management
The participants were asked to describe the general security management system in
terms of management support, security culture, security awareness, and security effec-
tiveness. The information collected was to gain a general understanding of information
security management within the host organisation.
Management support. Management support is a critical information security com-
ponent to protect information assets [214]. In general, the management team sup-
ports information security practices within the organisation. They have designed the
employee entrance security training program. The organisation has also initiated the
security improvement program and on-going Security Strengthening Program (SSP).
However, it does not seem to be a priority of the management. As is stated by one
of the healthcare professionals, “the management rarely talks about security unless
serious incidents happen” and “they seem to care less about security, unless there is
6.4. RESULTS OF THE STUDY 103
something starting to affect the business function”. One of the IT professions said
“the management focuses more on the business function of the healthcare information
systems, compared to security”.
Security awareness. User awareness, education, and training are critical informa-
tion security components [214, 215]. Timeliness and consistency of security infor-
mation are the key factors of a security awareness program as the security risks pro-
files are changing all the time [216]. The organisation provides security training to
new employees, but there is no on-going training to refresh their information security
knowledge. Employees are not provided with accessible information security material
to update their knowledge probably because information security is not a priority for
healthcare professionals [74]. However, the healthcare professionals do demonstrate
some basic understanding of information security. For example, an IT professional
stated “we were warned of the consequences caused by accessing unauthorised pa-
tient records”, “We are not allowed to reveal patients’ information outside the working
place or to irrelevant people”. The organisation is said to have other ways to increase
staff awareness by informing them of ways to avoid recent security incidents by phone
calls or through informal meetings. Comparing to the healthcare professionals, the
IT professionals are provided with more comprehensive training on security related
techniques and they are encouraged to get professional qualifications.
Security culture. Winkel defines security culture as the system of collective moral
concepts, mindsets and behaviour patterns anchored in the self-conception of a social
unit and instructing its members in dealing with security threats [217, 218]. Appro-
priate and effective information security management implementation requires a com-
bination of favorable organisational culture traits such as involvement, consistency,
adaptability, and sense of mission [219, 220]. The organisation values the importance
of security and their management and colleagues were said to be concerned with se-
curity. The management has initiated the security improvement program and on-going
Security Strengthening Program (SSP). The organisation has a stated aim of achieving
a secure operation by following the security standards [98]. In addition, employees
violating the security standards will be punished. However, they arguably do not have
activities to promote good security practices such as reward staff for good security
behaviour [221, 222].
Security effectiveness. Security effectiveness refers to the ability of IS security
measures to protect against the unauthorised and deliberate misuse of assets of the
local organisational information system by individuals, including violations against
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hardware, programs, data, and computer service [223]. Previous researches show that
it is affected positively by management support and security culture [217, 220]. The
IT manager stated that the organisation had achieved most of their security goals as
the system is maintained strictly by following the security standards. The healthcare
professionals also found their security management effective, as they stated “the organ-
isation has taken security controls such as firewalls and anti-virus software to protect
the system, and they regularly updates system patches”.
6.4.3 Security incident learning
As opposed to separated responsibilities [6, 36] in handing security incidents and gen-
eral incidents, the redacted organisation has only one team, the IT department, respon-
sible for handling all incidents. The IT department treats security incidents equally as
general incidents. When a security incident happen, it is logged through phone calls
to the security team. The severity level of the security incident is then decided ac-
cording to the severity level defined by the organisation. The hospital does not have
an electronic incident logging system to manage incidents, and the work is all paper
based. Low level security incidents refer to those that affect only a small part of in-
ternal systems, and do not have a direct impact on patients, e.g. if there is only one
end user computer down. A security engineer was then assigned to the incident till the
incident is solved or mitigated. High severity incidents refer to those that are critical
to the systems’ ability to function, with high level of risk, and impacts on patients,
such as the crashing of a critical business function. The incident response team will
be formed including the IT manager and all the other IT professionals and the people
involved in this incident. A post-incident review will then follow. Informal meetings
will be held to disseminate the learning from incidents to different stakeholders. As
we can see, although they do not have an electronic incident management system, they
have a relatively complete process to deal with incidents including preparation, in-
cident investigation, incident mitigation, post-incident learning, an incident response
team [36] as well as clear rules of incident response according to the severity level.
This demonstrates a level of maturity for incident management. However, we have
identified the following problems of the security incident handling process, especially
in the communication of lessons learned to the ISMS of the host organisation.
Incident response and knowledge gathering. The handling of low level security
incidents focuses more on technical aspects to recover business functions, and places
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less emphasis on knowledge gathering of the lessons learned from those incidents.
The IT manager stated “the business function is the most important, everyone must
prioritise it, to turn the system back to normal”. At the same time the team gathered
security knowledge to solve the issues throughout the incident handling process, which
are crucial for future learning. However, this information was either not documented
or partly documented, which makes it difficult to share with others. The handling of
high severity incidents is more comprehensive. A security incident team is formed to
investigate the incident. Lessons are documented and there is a post-incident report
generated after the incident, including business impact, in-depth causal analysis and
remedial actions. These are similar to the existing publicised data incident reports
[14, 15]. However, the hospital’s post-incident reports are for administrative purposes
to show that the incident has been dealt with. Those report were rarely viewed by
others, resulting in limited knowledge to be shared from the incident handling process.
Information dissemination. For low severity incidents, the knowledge obtained
from the incident handling process was either not documented or documented in pieces.
There has not been a systematic way to document and manage learning, hence created
difficulties in disseminating this knowledge. For high severity incidents, there is in-
formation disseminated through phone calls and informal meetings, however, people
outside the incident response team complained about the lack of incident knowledge
being distributed. A more detailed post-incident report is produced for high severity
incidents, however, it is hardly accessible by people outside the incident management
team. Even though the post-incident reports can be made available, employees who
have seen the reports find it difficult to digest as it contains comprehensive inter-related
information. As is stated by a healthcare professional who had involved in the inci-
dent handling process, “the document is so difficult to read, and everything is mixed
together”. This is probabaly because the post-incident report is writen for an adminis-
trative purpose rather than an engineering purpose [45]. This finding is consistent with
Ahmad’s study with a financial organisation [6]. There is a need for the conversion of
the post-incident report into a learning document, that is easily understood by many in
the organisation.
Lessons learned to feed into the ISMS. For low severity incidents, the focus is
on solving the direct causes. For example, the IT professionals stated “we focus on
solving the problem directly and until it is back to normal”. However, the aim of
the incident analysis is to identify root causes, which is often a security management
issue (e.g. not having a policy for configuring firewalls) rather than a technical prob-
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lem (e.g. firewall not properly configured) [5, 6]. An IT professional’s feedback well
supported this opinion, “the real causes might be in the security procedure itself, that
a procedure makes people to cause error”. For high severity incidents, the detailed
post-incident reports were generated. However, when examining the contents of the
report, we found that they have not stated clearly whether the incident is caused by
inapropriate implementation of policies/guidelines/standards, or the lack of relevant
policies/guidelines/standards, or whether the lessons learned had led to the revision of
policies/guidelines/standards. However, the whole incident handling process seems to
lack of a mechanism to communicate learning of lessons within the security informa-
tion management procedures. There is a need to investigate why a potential incident
is not adequately covered by the policies/guidelines/standards, that may lead to further
improvement of policies/guidelines/standards and may prevent future incidents.
6.4.4 Attitude towards the Generic Security Template
The participants were presented with a GST instance as shown in Figure 6.1. We ex-
plained how the GST instance was created from text-based security incident reports.
The participants were then invited to comment on the GST. The IT professionals and
healthcare professionals have demonstrated different perspectives towards the use of
the GST. According to Orlikowski and Gash [218], various organisational stakehold-
ers interpreted technology differently. An understanding of people’s interpretations
of a technology is critical to understand their acceptance towards it. They proposed
the technological frames to analyse different stakeholder’s interpretations towards a
technology [218],
• Nature of Technology, refers to people’s images of the technology and their un-
derstanding of its capabilities and functionalities.
• Technology Strategy, refers to people’s views of why their organisation acquired
and implemented the technology. It includes their understanding of the motiva-
tion or vision behind the adoption decision, and its likely value to the organisa-
tion.
• Technology-in-Use, refers to people’s understanding of how the technology will
be used on a day-to-day basis, and the likely or actual conditions and conse-
quences associated with such use.
We adopt Orlikowski and Gash’s technological frames to analyse the results.
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6.4.4.1 Healthcare professionals’ attitude
Nature of Technology
The healthcare professionals demonstrated a basic understanding of the GST. They
considered it to be “some way similar to the communication of security incidents in the
department meeting”. They have identified the benefits of the GST in communicating
the security incidents. A healthcare professional said, “it makes things clearer, break-
down issue into details”, “we can easily focus on a specific issue they (IT professional)
talk about ”.
Technology Strategy
The healthcare professional believed that the use of the GST is to formalise the
way to communicate the security incidents, as compared to their old way that uses free
style presentations in the meeting. As is stated by one of the healthcare professionals,
“previously, different IT professionals present security incidents using different ways
of their own, but I like this structured way, that makes everything easy to follow”.
However, there were also concerns raised about the necessity to adopt the GST.
As is stated by a healthcare professional, “I am not sure if it is necessary to make the
changes, as we rarely communicate incidents unless after a severe security incident”.
Technology-in-Use
The healthcare professional have some difficulties in understanding some technical
terms in this GST instance. As is stated by a healthcare professional, “if you don’t
explain the concept ‘access control’, I could not understand it by myself”. They suggest
either a document providing definition for technical terms or the IT professionals’
assistance is needed to help them. They also complained about the “lack of multi-
view design” of the GST. As is stated by a healthcare professional, “‘access control’
seems to be IT professionals’ responsibility”.
6.4.4.2 IT professionals’ attitude
Nature of Technology
Similar to the healthcare professionals, the IT professionals also find the GST to
be effective in communicating security incidents. An IT professional stated that, “this
will be especially helpful to discuss security issues; easier to navigate between different
notations”. The IT manager stated “it brings together everything that involves different
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stakeholders; it can facilitate decision making and balance the interests of different
stakeholders in a discussion”.
Compared to the healthcare professionals, the IT professionals demonstrated a
deeper understanding of the GST in terms of its capabilities and functionalities. They
believe that it is a good way to inform the implementation of security standards. An IT
professional stated “it provides a process to track what goes wrong at which level in
the security standards that causes the incident”. “It can let us know how well we have
implemented the security standards and which part needs to be improved”. Moreover,
they have found the lessons which cannot be mapped to any security requirements es-
pecially helpful. One IT professional said, “this will help us identify a new security
requirement that was not considered by the standard or organisation ”.
However, they raised concerns about the GST on the ambiguity of the relation-
ships between the lessons learned and the security standards. As is commented by
one of the IT professionals, the GST does not suggest clearly about the relationships
between lessons learned and the security requirements of the security standards, and
there are no formal rules to guide the mapping. An IT professional said “it will be good
to have some general rules to follow for the mapping”. This is due to the subjective
nature of the GSN, which the GST is based upon, that leaves the security arguments
open for review [7]. The IT manager gave additional comments on the lessons learned
that do not map to any security requirement. He suggested that those lessons should
be aligned with the existing security standards, rather than being grouped as “Stan-
dard non-existent”. He suggested to move the lessons “Risk Analysis: Develop and
issue Government-wide risk analysis criteria” to be under the security requirement
“SM2.1: Risk assessments and supporting activities are systematically conducted”,
and the “Position Description: re-evaluate and correct position sensitivity levels” to
be under the security requirement “SM1.3: Information security responsibilities are
clearly assigned”, as is shown in Figure 6.2, indicating those lessons might be the
missing aspects of existing security requirements. He justified this change as a step
forward to “track which security requirement requires an update as are informed by
those lessons”.
Technology Strategy
The IT professionals believe that, the use of the GST tends to change the way to re-
port and communicate the security incidents. They mentioned that, presenting lessons
from security incidents in this way “forces us to identify the root causes, which is al-
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Figure 6.2: Customised instance of the Generic Security Template - VA 2007 data
leakage incident
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ways inappropriate implementation of a standard, rather than simply dealing with the
direct causes in the incident handling process”. This is consistent with our previous
finding that their current security incident handling focuses on solving the direct causes
rather than look into the procedure that makes people to cause error. They also iden-
tified the GST’s role as “bringing together pieces of notes generated in the security
incident handling process, and easier to track previous lessons”.
Technology-in-Use
To use the GST, the IT professionals are required to learn a new technique to report
the security incidents. One of the IT professionals complained “I cannot predict how
effective it will be, and how worth the effort is”. From a long term perspective, the IT
professionals tend to agree that “the benefits might outweigh the efforts once everyone
starts getting used to this new technique”. This is consistent with the findings in safety
area, where GSN has been widely adopted. The proponents of GSN argue that its
expressive power is well worth the extra learning time and there is positive indication
that the use of the GSN is cost effective [169].
They were also concerned about scalability issue of the GST with the expansion in
everyday use, “the template could become unmanageable if it documents a complex
incident or it is an integration of many tiny incidents”. This issue can be addressed by
borrowing the experience from the use of GSN in safety area, to break the template into
sub-cases. For even more complex cases, experience on GSN modular development
can be borrowed from safety area [47]. The experience in safety area has been proved
to be sucessful in solving similar issues [47]. However, whether it can be effective in
our scenerio requires further examination.
As we could see that IT professionals and healthcare professionals have different
interpretation of the GST. They have made the judgments based on their own knowl-
edge, experience and work style. To the healthcare professionals, the GST serves as
a tool to communicate security incidents, however, they do not see this tool as a must
that the organisation has to implement, as they do not frequently use it in their every-
day work, and they doubt about the efforts to learn and adopt such a new technique.
In comparison, the IT professionals identified the advantage in utilizing the security
lessons to inform the implementation of the security standards. Although the engi-
neers have to learn a new technique, they still think the long term benefits gained is
worthwhile the effort.
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6.4.5 Strengths and weaknesses
Based on the analysis above, the strengths and weaknesses are summarised in Table
6.1 and 6.2,
Table 6.1: The strengths of the Generic Security Template
The Strengths Healthcare Professionals IT Professionals
An effective way
to communicate
lessons learned
... especially helpful to dis-
cuss security issues; ... easier
to navigate between different
notations; ... brings together
everything that involves dif-
ferent stakeholders; ... facil-
itate the decision making and
balance the interests of differ-
ent stakeholders in a discus-
sion.
... this will be especially
helpful to discuss security is-
sues; ... easier to navigate be-
tween different notations; ...
it brings together everything
that involves different stake-
holders; ... it can facilitate
the decision making and bal-
ance the interests of different
stakeholders in a discussion.
A formalised way
to communicate
lessons learned
... previously, different IT
professional presents security
incident using different ways
of their own, but I like this
structured way, that makes
everything easy to follow.
A way to inform
implementa-
tion of security
standard
... a process to track what
goes wrong at which level
in the security standards that
causes the incident; ... let us
know how well we have im-
plemented the security stan-
dards and which part needs to
be improved; ... this will help
us identify a new security re-
quirement that was not con-
sidered by the standard or or-
ganisation.
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Table 6.2: The weaknesses of the Generic Security Template
The Weaknesses Healthcare Professionals IT Professionals
Extra efforts to
learn a technique
... not sure if it is necessary
to make the changes, as we
rarely communicate incidents
unless after a severe security
incident.
... cannot predict how effec-
tive it will be, and how worth
the effort is.
Scalability issue
of the GST
... template could become un-
manageable if it documents a
complex incident or it is an
integration of many tiny inci-
dents.
Comprehension
of the GST
... if you don’t explain the
concept ‘access control’, I
could not understand it by
myself.
Ambiguity of
mapping between
lessons learned
and the security
standards
... it will be good to have
some general rules to follow
for the mapping; ... track
which security requirements
require an update as are in-
formed by those lessons.
Multi-view
design
... lack of multi-view design;
... ‘access control’ seems to
be IT professional’s responsi-
bility.
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6.4.6 Senarios identified to apply the Generic Security Template
Opinion was generated about the use of the GST. The healthcare professionals and IT
professionals who support the use of the GST help to identify the following scenarios
where it can be applied in,
Scenario: communicate security incidents in department meeting. The healthcare
professionals have found it useful in communicating lessons learned from security
incident, and suggest adopting this method for demonstrating security incidents in the
department meeting in future.
Scenario: inform the implementation of security standard. The IT professionals
have found it useful in informing the implementation of the security standards. This
identifies future work to focus on how the GST can be used to inform the implementa-
tion of standards.
6.4.7 Acceptability questionnaire results
6.4.7.1 Acceptability of the healthcare professionals
Figure 6.3 presents the healthcare professionals’ attitudes towards the acceptability of
the GST. In general, half of the healthcare professionals are satisfied with the GST.
Four out of ten of them are neutral and one disagreed with it. Eight of the health-
care professionals agreed that the GST can enhance the effectiveness to communicate
lessons learned. One healthcare professional provided very negative feedback. Over
half of the healthcare professionals agreed that the tool is easier to use and interaction
with the tool is clear and understandable. Two out of ten of the healthcare professionals
disagree. Around half of the healthcare professional expressed their willingness to use
it given the resources and tool available. Others who disagreed had concerns over the
technical terms that are difficult to understand. Only two of the healthcare profession-
als found it fit into their work style. This might be due to their resistance towards new
technology especially when they have little experience of information security, as well
as the lower frequencies that the GST is likely to be used in their everyday practice.
This result is consistent with the finding from the analysis in section 6.4.4.1.
6.4.7.2 Acceptability of the IT professionals
The IT professionals are generally satisfied with the overall experience of the GST.
A significant difference is, four out of five of the IT professionals find it fit into their
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Figure 6.3: Healthcare professionals’ attitude towards the acceptability of the GST
work style, compared to the healthcare professionals, that two out of ten of them find
it fit into their work style. This is probably because security is not the healthcare
professional’s priority in everyday work. In comparison, the IT professionals’ expe-
rience with information security, allows them to identify the potential benefits of the
GST, thus they demonstrated more interests toward the GST. One security expert felt
it would be hard to learn to use the tool. He raised a concern about the creation of the
GST as mentioned earlier “I cannot predict how effective it will be, and how worth the
effort is”. This result is consistent with the finding from the analysis in section 6.4.4.2.
6.5 Discussion
A case study with a representative healthcare organisation in China shows that security
management is important to the managers and they are willing to improve their current
situation through some initiatives such as the on-going Security Strengthening Pro-
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gram (SSP), however, it is not a priority compared to the systems business functions.
Their healthcare professionals have taken only the entrance security training, however
they demonstrated a basic understanding of information security. The IT professional
have a deeper understanding of security through obtaining professional trainings. The
organisation has a stated aim of achieving a secure operation by following the security
standards. According to the IT team, they have established security controls according
to the security standards and the staff found them to be effective.
Based on the analysis in previous sections, the organisation has a relatively ma-
ture incident handling procedure including the definition of different incident severity
levels and incident response teams. Learning from security incidents can help avoid
serious incidents [39] and should ideally improve information security procedures [6],
however, it is not effectively informing improvements of the ISMS in the redacted
healthcare organisation. We have identified weaknesses in the handling of both low-
level and high-level incidents: (1) for low-level incidents, they lack of a formal way
to generate knowledge. They mainly focus on solving issues to recover the system.
There is little in-depth analysis of the causal factor that may lead to a procedure issue
rather than a technical concern. (2) For high-level issues, they document the business
impact, and remedial recommendations, etc. However, the post-incident reports, are
for administration only and do not consider the improvements of security procedures.
Moreover, knowledge in the form of a post-incident report is usually presented as a
lengthy free-text report. Previous chapters and researches have argued text does not
alone facilitate the communication of security lessons. GST can be used to effectively
communication lessons learned to inform the improvement of security management
procedures.
IT professionals and healthcare professionals have demonstrated different attitudes
towards the acceptance of the GST. The healthcare professionals considered the GST
as a tool to communicate security incidents only and they do not see this tool as a must
as they do not think it fit into their work style [74]. In comparison, the IT professionals
identified the advantage in utilizing the security lessons to inform the implementation
of the security standards. The people who support the approach identified scenarios
for communicating security incidents and informing the implementation of security
management standards.
The IT professionals raised concerns about the GST on the ambiguity of the re-
lationships between the lessons learned and the security standards and suggested to
develop rules to guide the mapping. In particular, the IT manager suggested that the
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security lessons should be aligned with the existing security standards indicating they
might be some missing aspects of existing requirements. The IT manager customised
the example case as is shown in Figure 6.3 and justified the change as a step forward to
track which security requirement requires an update as are informed by those lessons.
This is not the first time the mapping was chanllenged in this research. Recall Chap-
ter 4, where we identified the difficulties when the lessons learned were found to be
related to more than one security requirements. We accepted this change because the
IT manager raised this request and he is the person who can make the final decision
whenever a new IT technology is introduced into the organisation. We have developed
new guidance for mapping, as is shown below, to overcome this problem in Chapter 4,
Starting from the bottom-level goals in the goal structure, if a lesson learned is re-
lated exclusively to a bottom-level goal, it should be mapped to this bottom-level goal.
If a lesson learned is related to more than one bottom-level goals in the goal structure,
this lesson learned should be mapped to the nearest parent goal where those bottom-
level goals share the same parent goal (Chapter 4).
By considering the suggestions from the IT manager, we improve the guidance
about the mapping between the lessons learned and the security standards. Depending
on their relationships with the goals, those lessons learned have been divided into four
types,
Starting from the bottom-level goals in the goal structure, (Type I) if a lesson
learned is related exclusively to a bottom-level goal, it is defined as Type I. Then this
lesson learned should be mapped to this bottom-level goal. (Type II) If a lesson learned
is related to more than one bottom-level goals in the goal structure, it is defined as Type
II. Then this lesson learned should be mapped to the nearest parent goal where those
bottom-level goals share the same parent goal. (Type III) If a lesson learned is related
to none of the bottom-level goal, go up to check other goals, check and decide whether
it is related to a higher level goal in the structure. If yes, it is defined as Type III,
this lesson learned should be mapped to this related goal. This indicates a probably
missing aspect of a higher level goal. (Type IV) If a lesson learned is related to none of
the goals in the goal structure, it is defined as Type IV, then a new goal named “(Stan-
dard non-existent)” should be created to link this lessons learned to the top goal. This
indicates a missing aspect of the whole security management guidelines or standards.
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The customised instance of the GST was used to examplify the application of the
new guidance. After adding the lessons learned types, Figure 6.2 changes to be Figure
6.4.
Type I
Lesson learned
Sensitive Information: Use encryption, or other effective tool, to protect personally
identifiable information stored on removable storage.
Security requirement bottom level
AC 4.1: Access to sensitive system resources is restricted and monitored.
Decision on lesson learned type
The lesson learned is found to be exclusively related to bottom level goal AC 4.1:,
therefore, it is a Type I lesson learned.
Type II
Lesson learned
Access Control: Avoid the abuse of programmer level access control.
Security requirement bottom level
AC-3.1.1. Resource owners have identified authorised users and the access they
are authorized to have.
AC-3.1.2. Security administration personnel set parameters of security software
to provide access as authorised and restrict access that has not been authorized. This
includes access to data files, load and source code libraries (if applicable), security
files, and operating system files. Standard naming conventions are established and used
effectively as a basis for controlling access to data, and programs. (Standard naming
conventions are essential to ensure effective configuration management identification
and control of production files and programs vs. test files and programs)
AC-3.1.3. Security managers review access authorizations and discuss any ques-
tionable authorizations with resource owners.
AC-3.1.4. All changes to security access authorizations are automatically logged
and periodically reviewed by management independent of the security function; un-
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Figure 6.4: Customised instance of the Generic Security Template with lessons learned
types - VA 2007 data leakage incident
6.5. DISCUSSION 119
usual activity is investigated.
......
Security requirement bottom level - 1
AC-3.1. User accounts are appropriately controlled.
Decision on lessons learned type
The lesson learned is found to be related to more than one bottom-level goals AC-
3.1.1 and AC-3.1.2, then it is a Type II lesson learned. This lesson learned should be
mapped to the nearest parent goal where those those bottom-level goal share the same
parent goal, which is AC-3.1.
Type III
Lesson learned
Position Description: Re-evaluate and correct position sensitivity levels.
Security requirement bottom level
......
SM-1.3.1. The security program documentation clearly identifies owners of computer-
related resources and those responsible for managing access to computer resources.
Security responsibilities and expected behaviours are clearly defined at the entity wide,
system, and application levels for (1) information resource owners and users, (2) in-
formation technology management and staff, (3) senior management, and (4) security
administrators. ......
Security requirement bottom level - 1
SM 1.3: Information security responsibilities are clearly assigned.
Decision on lessons learned type
The lesson learned was found to be related to none of the bottom-level goal, e.g.
SM 1.3.1......, but it is found to be related to a higher level goal SM 1.3 in the structure.
This lesson learned should be mapped to SM 1.3. Therefore, it is a Type III lesson
learned. It indicates this lesson is probabaly missing from the goal SM 1.3.
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6.6 Summary
This chapter conducted a healthcare evaluation to find out general views on GST from
people having experience dealing with patient data. They have provided valuable feed-
back on the improvements of the GST. In particular, we have accepted the IT profes-
sionals’ feedback and revise the guidance on mapping between the lessons learned and
security requirements. However, the validity of the improvement needs to be evaluated
in real practice. Chapter 7 further evaluates the GST with university students to study
whether they can use the improved Generic Security Template to structure the insights
derived from specific security incident.
The findings from this study are subjective impressions and may not provide direct
evidence to show that the organisation can adopt GST. However, the interviews with
healthcare professionals in China provided very important insights into the application
of our approach. This provides the directions for future work; to gather more direct
evidence about whether or not security lessons can be transferred using the Generic
Security Template between healthcare organisations in different countries. Moreover,
two application scenarios are identified, (1) communicating security incidents in team
meetings and (2) informing improvements of the security standard. (1) is similar to the
demonstration of the GST in this pre-interview tutorial. Future work needs to expand
on (2) by conducting an in-depth study to find out how the lessons learned can be
fed back to improve the implementation of the security standards using the GST. In
Chapter 8, we use security incidents in different countries, to discover how lessons
can be transferred to the redacted central hospital to inform improvements of security
management.
Chapter 7
Application of the Generic Security
Template to structure a GST Instance
from a Specific Security Incident - An
Empirical Evaluation
The Generic Security Template has been improved after a series of evaluations. This
chapter evaluates the improved Generic Security Template by investigating whether a
larger number of students with a computer science background can use the Generic
Security Template to structure the insights derived from specific security incident.
This chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 7.1 introduces the ob-
jectives of the study. Section 7.2 outlines the study design including the participants,
study material, and pilot test. Section 7.3 introduces the study execution. Section 7.4
analyses the results. Section 7.5 discusses the findings, and limitations of the experi-
ment. Section 7.6 summarises this chapter.
7.1 Study objectives
The Generic Security Template has been improved after a series of evaluations. This
study aims to find out whether users can apply the improved Generic Security Template
to structure the insights derived from specific security incident. In Chapter 4, we have
demonstrated that the Generic Security Template can be used to structure the security
lessons from real world security incidents happened in US, UK and China. This study
generalises the use of the GTS to a large user group. The study objectives are outlined
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below,
• Investigate whether users can apply the improved Generic Security Template to
structure the insights derived from specific security incident.
• Study whether there is any difference in the performance, efficiency, task load,
and ease of use to complete the task between the users with an information se-
curity background and users without an information security background.
7.2 Study design
7.2.1 Participants
The security diagrams that provide an overview of the lessons from specific incidents,
illustrated for the security incidents, are intended to be accessible to a wide range of
healthcare professionals. In contrast, the Generic Security Template is intended to
be used by security professionals to structure these specific security diagrams. Prag-
matic reasons motivate the use of computing science students in the initial pilot study.
We were also concerned to determine whether these techniques could support the ex-
change of lessons across national boundaries. This study focused on the use of Generic
Security Templates in China. We, therefore, recruited 81 participants in Guangzhou.
Information sheets were distributed in the computing science department in a univer-
sity in Guangzhou and 81 university students participated in this study voluntarily.
7.2.2 Study material
Training material. The participants were given a written instruction document (Ap-
pendix D.1). The instruction is self-descriptive and twelve A4 pages long. It is the
only resource for the participants to obtain training on the use of GST. This instruction
introduces, (1) The basic knowledge of GST notations, which includes goals, strate-
gies, context and lessons learned; (2) The steps on how to create the instance of the
GST. The creation steps have included the improvement suggestions from previous
chapters such as the guidance on deciding the relationships between lessons learned
and security requirements; and (3) A small, simplified case study to illustrate the four
steps to create an instance of the Generic Security Template.
Task related material. The participants were provided with, (1) a data breach doc-
ument stemming from the disposal of confidential information, and (2) a guidance on
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properly disposing confidential information. Their task was to create an instance of the
GST using (1) and (2) by following the instructions in the training material.
Post-study questionnaire. A post-study questionnaire is designed to collect the
participants’ background information, difficulties encountered in the study, task load
and the ease of use of this approach.
7.2.3 Pilot study
A pilot test was conducted with two security experts before the large scale study. The
aim was to clarify the training material, task related material and post-study question-
naire. We revised those materials based on the feedback from the first pilot study.
A second test was then conducted with two different participants to ensure that these
revisions had addressed the initial concerns with the experimental task.
7.3 Study execution
There is often a compromise to be made between controlling experimental variables
and ecological validity. Security incidents, typically, involve a number of technical,
human and organisational factors. They take time and effort to understand. For this
reason, we encourage the participants to take the materials (Appendix D.1) away and
only submit their findings when they are happy with the results. This creates the oppor-
tunity for collusion, however the analysis was not assessed and the participants were
asked to work independently.
7.4 Result analysis
7.4.1 Background questionnaire
Among the 81 participants, 41 of them had previous training in information security
and 40 of them had not. They have all attended a talk on the use of the Goal Structuring
Notations (GSN). They all have experience with at least one diagrammatic approach
such as Entity-Relationship diagram and Unified Modelling Language. Six of them
did not return their work. We have removed those incomplete results. Finally we got
75 valid responses, including 38 from the security group and 37 from the non-security
group. In the security group, there are 5 females versus 33 males, 4 undergraduate
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student versus 36 graduate student. In the non-security group, there are 8 females
verses 29 males, 11 undergraduate student verses 26 graduate student.
7.4.2 Measurement of the results
The participants followed the instruction to apply the Generic Security Template to
structure lessons learned from an incident. There are four steps and the results are
measured within different steps,
In Step 1, the participants are required to prepare the goal structure, which includes
the top goal and the rest of the goal structure. Recall Step 1 (Chapter 3 Section 3.3.3.1),
the process of identifying the goal structure uses security requirements within applica-
ble standards and guidelines. In this study, we have provided them with a structured
text description of guidelines. The aim of this step is to find out whether they can place
the structured text description of guidelines into the right syntactic shapes and the right
location in the diagram. More details can be found in the task description in Appendix
D.3. The participants are given a score for each correct goal. A correct goal must
satisfy the criteria (1) the right syntactic shape (squares for goals) (2) the right content,
and (3) the right location in the diagram. Figure 7.1 provides an example of the correct
goal structure. A score is not given for a goal that violates any of the above criteria.
Credit card disposing is 
acceptably Secure
1. Disable Magnetic Strip 
1.1 Disable Magnetic 
Strip by running a 
magnetic  across the strip 
1.2 Take scissors and 
score the strip to make it 
unreadable 
2.1 Smash the Smart Chips/
RFIDs with a hammer prior 
to destroying the card.
2. Destroy Smart Chips/
RFIDs
3. Destroy the Card 4. Dispose of the Card
3.2.1 Cut across the numbers 
and name information of the 
front of the card
3.2 Cut the card 
strategically into pieces
3.1 Burn the cards
4.1 Use separate trash cans 
to dispose of the card
3.2.2 Cut through the 
signature
Figure 7.1: Goal structure of the Credit Card Disposing Case
In Step 2, the participants are required to prepare lessons learned. Recall Step
2 (Chapter 3 Section 3.3.3.2), the process of identifying lessons learned required the
7.4. RESULT ANALYSIS 125
analyst to identify key learning points. We have simplified this process by provid-
ing a list of learning points in a structured manner. The aim of this step is to find
out whether they can place the structured text description of guidelines into the right
syntactic shapes. More details can be found in the experiment task description. The
participants are given a score for each correct lesson learned. A correct lesson learned
must satisfy (1) the right syntactic shape (circles for lessons learned) (2) the right con-
tent, and (3) be placed in an appropriate location in the diagram. Figure 7.2 provides
an example answer for the correct lessons learned identified. A score is not given for a
lesson learned that violates any of the above criteria.
Card Destroy: 
Make additional cuts 
between at least every four 
digits on the front of the 
card.
Magnetic Strip: 
Disable the Magnetic Strip.
Card Destroy: 
Review the pieces and make 
sure that no significant 
amount of information can be 
retrieved from any one piece.
Card Disposal: 
Throw out half of the cut 
pieces one week and the 
second half the following 
week.
Figure 7.2: Lessons learned of the Credit Card Disposing Case
In Step 3 (Chapter 3 Section 3.3.3.3), the participants are required to map the
lessons prepared in Step 2 to the goal structure prepared in Step 1. We have demon-
strated and exemplified the rules of mapping (Chapter 6 Section 6.5) in the instruction.
The participants are given a score for each correct mapping. A correct mapping must
satisfy (1) the right lesson learned type, (2) the right mapping. Figure 7.3 provides
an example answer for the correct mapping. A score is not given for a mapping that
violates any of the above criteria.
In Step 4 (Chapter 3 Section 3.3.3.4), the participants are required to prepare
the strategy and context. The participants are given a score for each correct strat-
egy/context. A correct strategy/context must satisfy (1) the right content, and (2) the
right syntactic shape (diamonds for strategies, eclipses for contexts), and (3) be placed
in an appropriate location within the diagram. Figure 7.4 provides an example an-
swer for the correct strategy and context identified. A score is not given for a strat-
egy/context that violates any of the above criteria.
7.4.3 Results for the creation of the instance
The results show that all of the 38 participants that have taken information security
courses can finish Step 1 and Step 2 achieving 100% accuracy using the criteria pro-
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Credit card disposing is 
acceptably Secure
1. Disable Magnetic Strip 3. Destroy the Card 4. Dispose of the Card
3.2 Cut the card 
strategically into pieces
4.1 Use separate trash cans 
to dispose of the card
(Type III)
Card Destroy: 
Make additional cuts 
between at least every four 
digits on the front of the 
card.
(Type II)
Magnetic Strip: 
Disable the Magnetic Strip.
(Type IV)
Card Destroy: 
Review the pieces and make 
sure that no significant 
amount of information can be 
retrieved from any one piece.
(Type I)
Card Disposal: 
Throw out half of the cut 
pieces one week and the 
second half the following 
week.
(standard non-existent)
Figure 7.3: Mapping lessons learned to the security requirements of the Credit Card
Disposing Case
vided by the security experts in the initial trial. In other words they were able to
identify appropriate security goals and lessons learned for the data breach case study.
In comparison, 36 out of 37 of participants who have not taken information security
related courses could finish Step 1 and Step 2 achieving 100% accuracy. The perfor-
mance in the third step was more mixed. The average accuracy rate is 2.22 out of 4
for security group, and 1.64 out of 4 for the non-security group. This arguable re-
veals an underlying problem in making quantitative judgments about the accuracy of
arguments in the aftermath of security incidents. Moreover, by using a t-test, we have
found statistically significance (p = 0.007 < 0.05) in Step 3 between the two groups,
which indicates the security group perform better in mapping the lessons learned than
the non-security group. In Step 4, the accuracy rate for identifying the strategies is
much higher, only one participant failed to identify the correct strategies. For the con-
text, four participants in the security group failed the identification, and one participant
in the non-security group failed. There is no statistical significance between the two
groups in this step.
Based on the analysis above, we have defined a measurement criteria for the over
results. The participants are considered to be successful in creating an instance of the
7.4. RESULT ANALYSIS 127
Argument over 
Credit card 
disposing 
guidelines
Credit card disposing is 
acceptably Secure
Position Description: 
Re-evaluate and correct 
position sensitivity 
levels
Goal Stratogy Lessons Learned Context
Argument over All 
Missing Security 
Recommendations
Alex's Credit Card 
1. Disable Magnetic Strip 3. Destroy the Card 4. Dispose of the Card
3.2 Cut the card 
strategically into pieces
4.1 Use separate trash cans 
to dispose of the card
(Type III)
Card Destroy: 
Make additional cuts 
between at least every four 
digits on the front of the 
card.
(Type II)
Magnetic Strip: 
Disable the Magnetic Strip.
(Type IV)
Card Destroy: 
Review the pieces and make 
sure that no significant 
amount of information can be 
retrieved from any one piece.
(Type I)
Card Disposal: 
Throw out half of the cut 
pieces one week and the 
second half the following 
week.
(standard non-existent)
Argument over All 
Missing Security 
Recommendations
Argument over 
Credit card 
disposing guidelines
Figure 7.4: Final Credit Card Disposing Instance
GST is he/she satisfies the following criteria.
• The participants can complete step 1 achieving a 100% accuracy rate.
• The participants can complete step 2 achieving a 100% accuracy rate.
• The participants has attempted step 3 by mapping all the lessons learned to the
security requirements.
• The participants can complete step 4 achieving a 100% accuracy rate.
The results show that 69 out of 75 participants (92%) can satisfy the above criteria
and are therefore successful in creat ng an instance of the GST.
7.4.4 Results for the post-task questionnaires
The post-task questionnaires were divided into four parts. The first part was intended
to collect background information. The second part collected participants’ subjective
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feedback on the creation of security arguments, structured using the Generic Secu-
rity Template. We have asked how easy it was for them to complete each step. We
have asked for their opinions by using the Five Likert Scales, 1-strongly disagree, 2-
disagree, 3-moderate, 4-agree, 5-strongly agree. Table 7.1 lists the average value for
each step for different groups. In general the participants complained about the diffi-
culties in Step 3 determining types of lessons learned. For example, one participant in
the security group stated, “Sometimes I cannot define what is exclusively related (to
a bottom level goal)”, another participant stated, “I don’t know how to determine the
types of the Lessons learned”. And they suggested, “Learning from more examples
would be helpful”.
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Table 7.1: Average score for different steps of different groups
The third part of the questionnaire provided feedback o workload, using NASA’s
Task Load Index (TLX). The model index value ranges from 0 to 20. Table 7.2 has
listed the mean value for each dimension for different groups. Statistical significance
was found for Task load Index 1 (p = 0.005 < 0.05) and Task load Index 2 (p = 0.043 <
0.05). This indicates that, the non-security group find it more mentally demanding.
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Table 7.2: Average score of different Task Load Index dimentions of different groups
The fourth part of the questionnaire collected more general feedback in terms of
ease of use, confidence, satisfaction. We asked questions such as “I am satisfied with
the overall experience of the tool”. Again, we have used the Five Likert Scales, to ask
for their opinions. Table 7.3 has listed the average value for each aspect for different
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groups. There was statistical significance for Ease of Use (p = 0.037 < 0.05). The
result is interesting that the non-security group find it easier to use than the security
group.
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Taskload Index 5 8.6842 9.8378 
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 Table 7.3: Average score for different evaluation aspects for different groups
In this part, we have also let the participants document the estimated time needed
to complete the whole tasks, for the security group, the time ranges from 30 minutes
to 240 minutes with a mean time of 103 minutes, in comparison, for the non-security
group, the time ranges from 30 minutes to 900 minutes with a mean time of 157 min-
utes however, there is no statistically difference found between the two groups.
7.5 External and internal threats
7.5.1 Internal validity
Internal validity is concerned about the cause-effect relationships induced from the
study. Maturity effects, the participants took away the task and performed at their own
pace. We do not think there is a threat that the participants would tend to be bored
and performed worse towards the end of this task. Learning effect, there was not a
learning effect in this experiment as there was only one treatment. Testing effects, all
participants have studied the same training material and all of them have attended the
same GSN training courses. There might be cheating because the students took away
the task. However, this task was not assessed and the participants were asked to work
independently. Instrument effects, the participants were given the same type of task and
the answers were evaluated by the same evaluator using the same marking scheme.
7.5.2 External validity
External validity is the possibility to generalise the results beyond the current experi-
ment. We addressed these concerns by selecting a good number (81) of students with
a computing science background. However, the security incident used in this study is
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much simpler than the real world security incidents [14–16, 44] in healthcare organisa-
tions. More efforts will be needed to structure lessons learned from complex security
incidents in real practice.
7.6 Discussion
We can conclude from this study that the participants with computer science back-
ground can achieve a high accuracy rate in preparing the goal structure, lessons learned
and strategies and context of the Generic Security Template in a customised evaluation.
Although they have demonstrated varied mapping of the lessons learned to the goals
in Step 3, the subjective feedback shows that the guidance on the mapping does help
them decide different types of the lessons learned. However, it is still difficult for them
to generate the same graphical overview even following the same rules. This is due to
the subjective nature of the GSN, that allows the template to be further reviewed and
discussed by others. Moreover, the subjective feedback from the participants shows
that they are generally satisfied with the experience of the creation process, although
they found some difficulties in completing Step 3 on mapping the lessons learned to
the goal structure.
7.7 Summary
This chapter evaluated the improved Generic Security Template and investigated whether
the use of this approach can be generalised to a large number of users with a computer
science background. The results of an empirical study with 81 university students
show that the students with a computer science background can create a Generic Se-
curity Template and they are generally satisfied with the experience of this approach.
However, the study with university students to structure simple security incident can
hardly reflect the use of the GST in real industry practice. Future work should focus
on the application of the GST in healthcare.
Chapter 8
Investigation on the Transferability of
Lessons using the Generic Security
Template in Healthcare Systems - An
Industrial Evaluation
The Generic Security Template provides a way to feed back lessons identified from
security incidents to the ISMS. Chapter 6 presented a preliminary industrial evalua-
tion of the Generic Security Template to identify its strengths and weakness through
interviews with Chinese healthcare professionals. Chapter 7 evaluated the improved
Generic Security Template with university students. This chapter expands the work and
investigate how lessons presented by the Generic Security Template can inform the im-
plementation of security standard. In particular, we investigate how lessons identified
from security incidents in different countries can be transferred to the redacted central
hospital to inform their implementation of security standards.
This chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 8.1 outlines the eval-
uation plan, including the objectives of the study and the target group. Section 8.2
introduces the study process which includes two main steps, transfer lessons from one
strategy (e.g. FISCAM) to another (e.g. GB/T22239) and determines acceptance of
lessons transferred from healthcare organisations in different countries. Section 8.3
analyses the results from the first step on the transferability of lessons learned. Section
8.4 analyses the results from the second step on the acceptance of the lessons learned.
Section 8.5 reports on further customisation requirements. Section 8.6 presented the
revised Generic Security Template Pattern. Section 8.7 discusses the implications for
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healthcare. Section 8.8 summarises this chapter.
8.1 Study design
8.1.1 Study objectives
The interviews with healthcare professionals in China (Chapter 6) provided initial in-
sights into the application of our approach. However, we were also anxious to look
beyond subjective impressions to provide more direct evidence about whether or not
security lessons can be transferred between healthcare organisations in different coun-
tries. In particular, we have used three instances of the Generic Security Template,
which are the VA 2006, VA 2007 and Shenzhen data leakage incident. The aim here
was to investigate whether Chinese healthcare professionals could transfer security
lessons learned from these incidents into their own working context. We, therefore,
conducted an in-depth study with Chinese participants to gather a range of views about
the utility of our approach. The objectives of this study are outlined below,
8.1.2 Target organisation
The redacted central hospital was used for a preliminary study in applying the Generic
Security Template (Chapter 6). They expressed their interest in the approach. This
allows us to continue this study using focus group in the redacted central hospital.
We conducted a group study that involves different stakeholders including health-
care professionals, and IT professionals who can make the final decision within their
ISMS. We have chosen focus group because,
(1) Nature of this practical task. The group was asked to identify lessons that might
be re-used to increase the protection of patient data. In the redacted central hospital,
whenever a decision in information security has to be made, different stakeholders in
the organisation are gathered together to discuss the issues. The final decision will
be made by the IT manager based on these different views. The relevant IT manager
within the hospital agreed to participate in the session.
(2) The difficulty of agreement on the mapping of lessons learned. In the pilot
industrial study, users identified many different ways of mapping lessons to policies,
standards and guidance. This reflects the subjective processes that affect the construc-
tion of our graphical maps. GSN structures can serve as a platform for communication
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and facilitate different parties in coming to agreement [7]; group work is suitable to
stimulate such activities.
(3) The exploratory nature of this study. Interaction among group participants often
reduces the amount of interaction needed between the moderator and the individual
members of the group. In this way, the dynamics within the focus group can reduce
the researchers’ influence on the interview process [224]. Focus groups can stimulate
thinking and verbal contributions.
This group consists of six people, three healthcare professionals, two IT experts
and one IT manager. They are different stakeholders in protecting patient data and the
potential target users of the Generic Security Template. The researcher played the role
of moderator. The moderator addresses a number of issues for discussion and assures
that the discussion remains on the subject of interest. Interference with the discussion is
kept to a minimum, which is motivated by the aim to create a communication situation
which bears close resemblance to “naturally occurring interaction” [225].
8.2 The study process
In the study, group participants were asked to identify lessons that they could apply
from our graph of those instances of the Generic Seurity Template. To avoid fatigue the
meeting was divided into two sessions. Each one lasted for approximately 1.5 hours.
In both sessions, an IT engineer from the IT department accompanied the researcher
and together they maintained field notes to document the group discussion.
8.2.1 Demonstration of the Generic Security Template
The participants were required to read the Instruction on the Creation of the Generic
Security Template (Appendix D.1) before this study. And then the research conductor
presented the three instances of the Generic Security Template to the participants. They
had the opportunities to ask questions before the group discussion.
8.2.2 Execution of the group study - first session
As the security management of the redacted central hospital has followed the Chinese
standard, GB/T22239. They decided to replace the goal structure of the VA 2006 and
VA 2007 data leakage incident, which was FISCAM, with GB/T22239. In the study,
group participants discussed how to map lessons learned in the instances of the Generic
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Security Templates for the VA 2006 and VA 2007 data leakage incident to different
levels of security requirements in GB/T 22239. This study lasted for 1.5 hour.
8.2.3 Execution of the group study - second session
In the second session, the study was conducted by traversing each of the lessons learned
in the instances of the Generic Security Templates produced in the first session. Par-
ticipants were asked to discuss and decide on the acceptance of lessons in the revised
Generic Security Template. The discussion lasted for 1.5 hour.
A set of group study guidelines (open-ended questions) was developed for the mod-
erator including probes designed to re-focus the discussion if necessary.
• Does your organisation have the (e.g. “Sensitive Information”) issue?
• Do you think this recommendation is helpful for your organisation?
• Would you be able to apply this recommendation?
• What are the barriers for you to apply this recommendation?
In both of the above two sessions, a security engineer was invited to accompany
the researcher in recording field notes of the group discussion. This is to ensure the
completeness of the information documented, as the research conductor has to play the
role of moderator and may miss some information during this process.
8.3 Execution of the group study - first session
8.3.1 Transfering the lessons learned
As mentioned, the Chinese group, chose to focus on the provisions within GB/T22239
that might help to avoid any similar incidents in their hospital. This process lasted over
an hour and included a detailed analysis of the clauses in GB/T22239 as well as the
VA incident.
During this process, they followed the steps to apply the Generic Security Template
(Chapter 3 Section 3.3.3) to structure the lessons learned. They have skipped “Step 1:
Prepare the goal structure of the Generic Security Template” and “Step 2: Identify
the lessons learned from the security incident”, because the goal structure and lessons
learned are readily available. By following “Step 3: Map the lessons learned to the
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goals (security requirements) in the goal structure (security standard)”, they decided
the mapping of lessons to different levels of the goals (security sequirements) in the
goal structure (security standard). By following “Step 4: Elaborate the Context and
Strategies”, they have set the strategy as “Argument over GB/T22239” and context as
“the redacted central hospital”. Previous empirical studies with students (Chapter 7)
have identified the difficulties in Step 3 about mapping the lessons to different levels
of the goals. Section 8.3.2 highlights this step and reports the findings.
8.3.2 Types of lessons learned and rules of mapping
Depending on their relation with the goals, the lessons learned have been divided into
different types. Recall the definition of four different types of the lessons learned and
the rules to decide the mapping that we have developed in Chapter 6,
Types of lessons learned and rules of mapping
Starting from the bottom-level goals in the goal structure, (Type I) if a lesson
learned is related exclusively to a bottom-level goal, it is defined as Type I. Then this
lesson learned should be mapped to this bottom-level goal. (Type II) If a lesson learned
is related to more than one bottom-level goals in the goal structure, it is defined as Type
II. Then this lesson learned should be mapped to the nearest parent goal where those
bottom-level goals share the same parent goal. (Type III) If a lesson learned is related
to none of the bottom-level goal, go up to check other goals, check and decide whether
it is related to a higher level goal in the structure. If yes, it is defined as Type III,
this lesson learned should be mapped to this related goal. This indicates a probably
missing aspect of a higher level goal. (Type IV) If a lesson learned is related to none of
the goals in the goal structure, it is defined as Type IV, then a new goal named “(Stan-
dard non-existent)” should be created to link this lessons learned to the top goal. This
indicates a missing aspect of the whole security management guidelines or standards.
Below are the examples of lessons learned Type I, II, III and IV that are cited from
the real world security incidents used in our industrial evaluation. In particular, exam-
ples of Type I, III and IV are cited from Figure 8.1; example of Type II is cited from
Figure 8.3. The goals (security requirements) for those cases are from the GB/T22239.
In the following examples, different types of lessons learned have been mapped to dif-
ferent levels of security requirements of GB/T22239.
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Type I
Lesson learned (Figure 8.1)
Sensitive Information: Use encryption, or other effective tool, to protect personally
identifiable information stored on removable storage.
Security Requirement bottom level(From GB/T22239)
......
8.1.5.2.a Use encryption or other protective measures for system data management,
information identification, and the transmit of critical business data.
8.1.5.2.b Use encryption or other protective measures for system data management,
information identification, and the storage of critical business data.
8.1.5.2.c Provide dedicated communication protocol or secure communications
protocol services for important communications channels. Avoid destruction of data
confidentiality from the general protocol-based attacks.
......
Decision on Mapping
The lesson learned is found to be exclusively related to bottom level security goal
8.1.5.2.b, therefore, it should map to 8.1.5.2.b. It indicates if this lesson learned is
ignored, the goal 8.1.5.2.b. would be affected.
Type II
Lesson learned (Figure 8.3)
Security Training: Establish and execute security training programs by following
the security standard.
Security Requirement bottom level - 1
8.2.3.4 Security awareness education and training.
Security Requirement bottom level
8.2.3.4.a Security awareness training, position related technical and security skills
needs to be educated to all staff.
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8.2.3.4.b Security responsibility and punitive measures need to be documented and
informed to the responsible staff. Disciplinary actions need to be taken to people vio-
lating security policies.
8.2.3.4.c Security education and training needs to be documented regularly. Train-
ing including basic security knowledge, position operational procedure needs to be
designed for different positions.
8.2.3.4.d Security education and training needs to be examined, and the results are
placed on file.
......
Decision on Mapping
The lesson learned is found to be related to all of the listed bottom-level goals,
therefore, it should map to their parent goal 8.2.3.4. It indicates if this lesson learned
is ignored, the goal 8.2.3.4 or its sub-goals would be affected.
Type III
Lesson learned (Figure 8.1)
Position Description: Re-evaluate and correct position sensitivity levels.
Security Requirement bottom level - 1
8.2.2.1 Position description (G4)
Security Requirement bottom level
8.2.2.1.a Establish functions management structure for information security man-
agement. Establish the job role for security officer, security management in charge of
all aspects of security management and define the responsibility of each position.
8.2.2.1.b Establish the job role for system administrators, network administrators,
security administrators and define the responsibility of each position.
8.2.2.1.c Established information security management committee or leadership
team, led by the highest leadership of the unit in charge of the appointment or grant.
8.2.2.1.d Develop clear institutional responsibilities of various departments and po-
sitions, division of labor and skill requirements.
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Decision on Mapping
The lesson is found to be related to none of the bottom-level goals, e.g. 8.2.2.1.a.......,
however it is related to a higher level goal 8.2.2.1. This lesson should be mapped to
8.2.2.1. It indicates this lesson is probably missing from the goal 8.2.2.1.
Type IV
Lesson learned (Figure 8.1)
Risk Analysis: Develop and issue Government-wide risk analysis criteria.
New Security Requirement
(Standard non-existent): Government-wide risk analysis criteria is addressed.
Decision on Mapping
The lesson learned is found to be related to none of the security requirements of
GB/T22239, a new goal, Standard non-existent, should be created addressing this rec-
ommendation. It indicates this lesson learned is probably missing from GB/T22239.
8.3.3 The customised GST instances
Figure 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 show the resulting instances of the Generic Security Template
for the incidents by following the rules in section 8.3.2.
The process of mapping between the US case study and the context in Chinese
healthcare yielded some significant insights. For instance, in the VA 2007 data leakage
incident, one of them which is “Risk Analysis”, has changed to be under the strategy
“Argument over All missing Recommendations”. It identifies a new security require-
ment that is probably missed by GB/T22239. Some of the lessons learned identified
from VA 2006/2007 data leakage incident can be mapped to a deeper level, which is
the bottom level of the GB/T22239. For example, the lessons learned “Sensitive In-
formation” from the VA 2006 data leakage incident is mapped to the goal (security
requirement) 8.1.5.2.b as is shown in Figure 8.2, however, a similar lessons learned in
the Shenzhen data leakage incident “Sensitive Data” is mapped to a higher level goal
(security requirement) 8.1.5.2. This to some extent indicates the different maturity
level of the healthcare system security management in the VA and in China.
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Figure 8.1: Instance of the Generic Security Template VA 2007 - customised by replac-
ing the security standard
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Figure 8.2: Instance of the Generic Security Template VA 2006 - customised by replac-
ing the security standard
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Figure 8.3: Instance of the Generic Security Template Shenzhen
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The participants expressed that they have experienced disagreements between dif-
ferent stakeholders while deciding the mapping of lessons learned to the goals, typi-
cally on deciding the level of the goals (security requirements) that the lessons should
map to. The use of the GSN has been proved to be successful in enabling debate and
agreement on the safety argument [7]. The group stated that this group work helped
them come to an agreement and better understand the reasoning between the lessons
learned and the goals.
8.4 Execution of the group study - second session
In the first session, the focus group related the findings from the VA case study to
the provisions in the Chinese standard GB/T22239. They were not asked to consider
whether they could be implemented within their own healthcare organisation. In con-
trast, the second session traversed the new diagram to identify any barriers to the ap-
plication of the lessons derived from the VA case study. These discussions lasted for a
further hour.
8.4.1 Acceptance of the lessons learned
The group followed an identifiable process in assessing the acceptability of lessons
within their own organisation. They began by assessing whether each issue that arose
for the VA was also a significant concern in their hospital. They would then decide
whether to accept the recommendation, or customise lessons learned to suit their own
context. The acceptance of the lessons are categorized into the following six types
reflected in Figure 8.4, 8.5, 8.6. We take the VA 2007 data leakage incident, shown
in 8.5 as an example to explain the organisation’s decision on the acceptance of the
lessons learned. More details on the acceptance of the lessons learned for the VA 2006
data leakage incident and Shenzhen data leakage incident are provided in Appendix E,
Implemented. Some of the lessons identified from the VA 2007 case study had
already been implemented within the host organisation. For example, the “Security
Policy” recommendation to “Ensure that data security plans for research projects com-
ply with information security policies”. In particular, an audit might be conducted to
confirm this finding.
Implemented with customisation. Some of the lessons identified within the VA
2007 case study had already been addressed by the organisation but with a slightly
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different emphasis or approach. For example, for the “Security Policy” recommen-
dation to “Ensure the handling of human subjects in research, complies with HIPAA
rules;” In the Chinese context, the hospital required that electronic records relating to
human subjects were held in compliance with the relevant national data protection act
“China Personal Information Protection Act” [226].
Implementable. Some of the issues identified in the VA 2007 incident had not yet
been addressed by the Chinese hospital, however, they accepted the need to consider
this finding. For example, the VA report recommended changes in the “Management
Structure” to “Establish an accurate functional description and performance plan to
clarify the line authority and reporting relationship”. The Chinese focus group felt that
it would be useful to review their existing practices using the insights derived from the
US case study data breach.
Implementable with customisation. Some of the security issues identified in the VA
case study had not been addressed by the organisation, however, the focus group felt
that they could not be implemented without considerable changes within their own or-
ganisation. For example, the VA report identified the need to “Re-evaluate and correct
position sensitivity levels”. This process had not been formalized with the Chinese
hospital, hence the focus group rephrased it as “Define position sensitive levels”.
Reserved for future use. The penultimate category describes findings that could be
re-applied in China but their implementation would take a considerable period of time,
for instance where the security management system was not sufficiently mature. For
example, the VA recommended that staff “Use encryption, or other effective tools, to
protect personally identifiable information stored on removable storage”. The Chinese
hospital forbids the use of removable media hence this recommendation is not imme-
diately applicable. However, the group could envisage a time when this requirement
might be relaxed. If removable media were to be permitted then the VA recommenda-
tion would be an essential requirement for future security.
Implementation unnecessary. Some of the US VA recommendations could not be
applied in the Chinese healthcare organisation. For example, the previous incident
report recommended action to “Develop and issue Government-wide risk analysis cri-
teria”. Currently, the redacted central hospital interacts with government wide systems,
including the Chinese national insurance system. However, they felt that this recom-
mendation could only be implemented at government level, hence it was not a subject
they felt was in their area of responsibility.
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8.4.2 The customised GST instances
The above acceptance types have been reflected in the revised Generic Security Tem-
plate as is shown in Figure 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6.
A comparison of the Generic Security Template of the VA 2006, VA 2007 and
Shenzhen security incident reveals that, the redacted central hospital is more likely to
accept recommendations from the Shenzhen security incident. The acceptance types
are implemented, implemented with customisation, and implementable. This might
be due to the similarity of the healthcare system settings within the same country.
On the other hand, the VA security incidents have some additional acceptance types,
which are reserved for future use and implementation unnecessary. For example, the
lessons learned “Sensitive Information: Use encryption, or other effective tool, to pro-
tect personally identifiable information stored on removable storage” is reserved for
future use because the organisation currently does not allow any kind of patient data
to be stored in removable storage. The lessons learned “Security Policy: Discontinue
storing email on unauthorized system” is reserved for future use because the organi-
sation currently does not use internal email systems, which indicates different system
settings between different countries. The lessons learned “Risk Analysis: Develop
and issue Government-wide risk analysis criteria” are implementation unnecessary
because the organisation believes it is the governments’ responsibility to develop and
issue government-wide risk analysis criteria.
As we have seen, the development of a specific security incident map from the
Generic Security Template helps organisations consider their own practices and to
assess whether applicable security standards address the concerns raised in previous
breaches. Again, in this process, participants stated the GST provides a platform for
discussion and helped them come to the final decision on acceptance of lessons learned.
8.5 Other customisation requirements - multi-view
The organisation identified some other customisation requirements of the Generic Se-
curity Template, such as multi-view approach, a requirement raised in Chapter 6. The
Generic Security Template is then further customised and those new features will be
considered in the future design of the Generic Security Template. Identifiers that doc-
ument the target groups are added to the Generic Security Template and the adjusted
Generic Security Templates are produced. The target groups were classified into three,
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Figure 8.4: Instance of the Generic Security Template Shenzhen 2008 - customised by
implementation types
8.5. OTHER CUSTOMISATION REQUIREMENTS - MULTI-VIEW 146
(T
yp
e 
II
I)
Po
si
tio
n 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n:
R
e-
ev
al
ua
te
 a
nd
 c
or
re
ct
 
po
si
tio
n 
se
ns
iti
ve
 le
ve
l.
(T
yp
e 
IV
)
R
is
k 
A
na
ly
si
s:
 
D
ev
el
op
 a
nd
 is
su
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t-w
id
e 
ris
k 
an
al
ys
is
 c
rit
er
ia
(T
yp
e 
II
I)
M
an
ag
em
en
t S
tr
uc
tu
re
: 
Es
ta
bl
is
h 
a 
fu
nc
tio
na
l 
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
an
d 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
pl
an
 to
 c
la
rif
y 
th
e 
lin
e 
au
th
or
ity
 a
nd
 re
po
rti
ng
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
(T
yp
e 
I)
A
cc
es
s C
on
tr
ol
: 
Av
oi
d 
th
e 
ab
us
e 
of
 
pr
og
ra
m
m
er
 le
ve
l a
cc
es
s 
co
nt
ro
l.
(T
yp
e 
I)
Se
ns
iti
ve
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n:
U
se
 e
nc
ry
pt
io
n,
 o
r o
th
er
 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
to
ol
, t
o 
pr
ot
ec
t 
pe
rs
on
al
ly
 id
en
tif
ia
bl
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
st
or
ed
 o
n 
re
m
ov
ab
le
 st
or
ag
e.
A
rg
um
en
t o
ve
r A
ll 
M
is
si
ng
 S
ec
ur
ity
 
R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
(S
ta
nd
ar
d 
no
n-
ex
is
te
nt
): 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t-w
id
e 
ris
k 
an
al
ys
is
 c
rit
er
ia
(T
yp
e 
II
I)
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
A
ct
io
n:
Ta
ke
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
ac
tio
n 
ag
ai
ns
t t
he
 p
eo
pl
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
is
 in
ci
de
nt
 fo
r 
th
ei
r i
na
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 a
ct
io
ns
.
8.
2:
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 a
re
 
ad
dr
es
se
dH
ea
lth
ca
re
 S
ys
te
m
 (H
S)
 is
 
ac
ce
pt
ab
ly
 S
ec
ur
e 
8.
1:
 T
ec
hn
ic
al
 
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 a
re
 
ad
dr
es
se
d
A
rg
um
en
t o
ve
r 
G
B
/T
22
23
9
H
ea
lth
ca
re
 S
ys
te
m
 o
f 
Sh
en
zh
en
 H
os
pi
ta
l
Se
cu
rit
y 
St
an
da
rd
 
C
hi
na
8.
1.
5.
2 
D
at
a 
co
nf
id
en
tia
lit
y 
(S
4)
 is
 
ad
dr
es
se
d 
8.
1.
5.
2.
b 
U
se
 e
nc
ry
pt
io
n 
or
 
ot
he
r p
ro
te
ct
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s f
or
 
sy
st
em
 d
at
a 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n,
 
an
d 
th
e 
st
or
ag
e 
of
 c
rit
ic
al
 
bu
si
ne
ss
 d
at
a 
  
8.
2.
2.
1 
Po
si
tio
n 
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
(G
4)
 is
 
ad
dr
es
se
d8.
2.
2 
Se
cu
rit
y 
M
an
ag
em
en
t S
tru
ct
ur
e 
is
 a
dd
re
ss
ed
8.
1.
4 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
Se
cu
rit
y 
is
 a
dd
re
ss
ed
8.
1.
4.
3.
d 
M
in
im
um
 
re
qu
ire
d 
pe
rm
is
si
on
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
gr
an
te
d 
to
 
di
ffe
re
nt
 a
cc
ou
nt
8.
2.
5.
12
 S
ec
ur
ity
 
In
ci
de
nt
 H
an
dl
in
g 
(G
4)
 
is
 a
dd
re
ss
ed
8.
2.
1.
1 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Po
lic
y 
(G
4)
 is
 
ad
dr
es
se
d
8.
2.
1 
Se
cu
rit
y 
M
an
ag
em
en
t P
ol
ic
y 
is
 
ad
dr
es
se
d
8.
1.
5 
D
at
a 
se
cu
rit
y 
an
d 
re
co
ve
ry
 a
re
 a
dd
re
ss
ed
8.
1.
4.
3 
A
cc
es
s C
on
tro
l 
(S
4)
 is
 a
dd
re
ss
ed
8.
2.
5 
Sy
st
em
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
an
d 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
re
 
ad
dr
es
se
d
$ 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
un
ne
ce
ss
ar
y
$ 
Im
pl
em
en
te
d 
w
ith
 
cu
st
om
iz
at
io
n
$ 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
bl
e
$ 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
bl
e 
w
ith
 c
us
to
m
iz
at
io
n
$ 
R
es
er
ve
d 
fo
r 
fu
tu
re
 u
se
$ 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
bl
e 
w
ith
 
cu
st
om
iz
at
io
n
(T
yp
e 
II
I)
Se
cu
ri
ty
 P
ol
ic
y:
 D
is
co
nt
in
ue
 s
to
rin
g 
 
em
ai
l o
n 
un
au
th
or
iz
ed
 
sy
st
em
 
(T
yp
e 
II
I)
Se
cu
ri
ty
 P
ol
ic
y:
E
ns
ur
e 
hu
m
an
 s
ub
je
ct
s 
in
 
re
se
ar
ch
, c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
se
cu
rit
y 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
(T
yp
e 
II
I)
Se
cu
ri
ty
 P
ol
ic
y:
En
su
re
 th
at
 d
at
a 
se
cu
rit
y 
pl
an
s 
fo
r r
es
ea
rc
h 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
se
cu
rit
y 
po
lic
ie
s
$ 
Im
pl
em
en
te
d
$ 
R
es
er
ve
d 
fo
r 
fu
tu
re
 u
se
$ 
Im
pl
em
en
te
d 
w
ith
 
cu
st
om
is
at
io
n
(T
yp
e 
I)
A
cc
es
s C
on
tr
ol
: 
W
ar
n 
th
e 
se
cu
rit
y 
en
gi
ne
er
s 
of
 th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 c
au
se
d 
by
 w
ro
ng
ly
 g
ra
nt
in
g 
ac
ce
ss
 
co
nt
ro
l t
hr
ou
gh
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t 
m
ee
tin
g.
 
(T
yp
e 
II
I)
Se
cu
ri
ty
 P
ol
ic
y:
E
ns
ur
e 
hu
m
an
 s
ub
je
ct
s 
in
 
re
se
ar
ch
, c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 “
C
hi
na
 P
er
so
na
l 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n 
A
ct
.”
(T
yp
e 
II
I)
Po
si
tio
n 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n:
D
ef
in
e 
th
e 
po
si
tio
n 
se
ns
iti
ve
 le
ve
l.
(T
yp
e 
II
I)
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
A
ct
io
n:
Ta
ke
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
ac
tio
n 
ag
ai
ns
t t
he
 p
eo
pl
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
is
 in
ci
de
nt
 fo
r 
th
ei
r i
na
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 a
ct
io
ns
 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
“C
hi
na
 
P
er
so
na
l I
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n 
A
ct
.”
Figure 8.5: Instance of the Generic Security Template VA 2007 - customised by imple-
mentation types
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Figure 8.6: Instance of the Generic Security Template VA 2006 - customised by imple-
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IT security management, IT security engineer and healthcare professionals. Those
changes are reflected in Figure 8.7. Similar requirement has been identified in safety
area and multi-view safety cases have been proposed to address it [227]. The objective
is to filter information of different stakeholders’ interest and reduce complexity of the
safety argument. However, future work needs to evaluating the concept of multi-view
using real world case studies and peers review [227].
8.6 The revised Generic Security Template Pattern
The Generic Security Template Pattern was revised to reflect the improvements of the
GST thoughout the previous evaluations and the customisation requirements. The ad-
justed Generic Security Template Pattern is shown in Figure 8.8. There are also some
identifiers attached to the lessons learned notation, including the Recommendation Ac-
ceptance Identifiers, shown in Figure 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 and the Multi-view Identifiers, shown
in Figure 8.7. However, they are not reflected in the revised Generic Security Template
Pattern. We suggest that future software support can simplify the display of the Generic
Security Template by making those identifiers properties of lessons learned. Users can
set those properties during customisation and use them as filters to display the desired
lessons.
There are usually more than one security standards/policies/guidelines within one
organisation. The organisational information security management were achieved through
a combined efforts of the enforcement of different management standards/policies/
guidelines [107, 228, 229]. The Generic Security Template Pattern can be applied to
map security lessons to individual standard/policie/guideline, producing different in-
stances of the Generic Security Template. An integration of those instances together
contributes to the information security management of the organisation.
8.7 Discussion
The evaluation can be considered on several different levels, (1) demonstrating the
acceptability of this approach in feeding back the lessons learned to the ISMS; (2)
demonstrating the benefits of this approach over others in feeding back the lessons
learned to the ISMS. Since success in (1) can provide the basis for future evaluation,
which is a precursor to success at (2), therefore the evaluation in this chapter is focused
on (1). This is identical to Kelly’s choices in evaluating the GSN (T. P. Kelly, 1999).
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Figure 8.7: Instance of the Generic Security Template Shenzhen - customised after
adding the multi-view identifiers
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Figure 8.8: The adjusted Generic Security Template Pattern after a series of customi-
sation
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Chapter 6 has identified the potential benifits for the healthcare organisation to apply
this approach over their existing mechanisms. This chapter extends the work and gets
more direct evidence about the application of the GST.
By using three instances of the Generic Security Template, we have found that
the lessons learned from incidents in other healthcare organisations both at home and
abroad can be transferred into the redacted central hospital. This study provides a
successful example of a practical case, that forms the foundational work to generalise
the use of this approach to other healthcare organisations. It has implications and
contributes to the sharing of the lessons learned from security incidents globally in
feeding back information to ISMS.
The transferability of the lessons learned from the Generic Security Template of
these cases demonstrates a number of key issues. For example, the VA 2006 included
lessons that could not be mapped to the co-responding security requirements in the
Chinese security standards. This has potential implications for enriching security stan-
dards in China. Moreover, we have noticed the differences in the acceptance of lessons
learned from security incidents at home and abroad. The redacted central hospital is
more likely to accept lessons from the Shenzhen data leakage incident. This might be
due to the similarity of the healthcare system settings. This finding has implications
for future research on the transferability of lessons learned from cross-country security
incidents.
Since we have performed the study within one healthcare organisation, the findings
may not reflect the results in other healthcare organisations around the globe. However,
the experience gained from this study provides the basis for future work in conducting
the same study in other healthcare organisations.
8.8 Summary
This chapter conducted an in-depth study to find out how lessons learned can be fed
back into improvements of security standards using the Generic Security Template. In
particular, we use security incidents from different countries to find out how lessons
learned can be transferred to the redacted central hospital to inform the implementation
of security standards. The findings show that learning in other healthcare organisation
both at home and abroad can be transferred. We also identified the process of trans-
ferability using the Generic Security Template. This has implication for the exchange
of security lessons globally. Moreover, other customisation requirements were raised
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and collected in this chapter such as the recommendation acceptance identifiers and the
multi-view identifiers. Those will be considered in the design of the Generic Security
Template in future.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
This dissertation proposes an approach, the Generic Security Template, to structure the
insights derived from security incidents in healthcare organisations. We have drawn in-
sights from empirical studies examining the usability of the Generic Security Template
and industrial case studies. The remainder of this section discusses the contributions
and conclusions of the dissertation.
9.1 Conclusions
The dissertation hypothesis is “The Goal Structuring Notations (GSN) can be used to
depict the lessons learned from security incidents and map them to the security re-
quirements for an Information Security Management System. We define the resulting
graphical overview as the Generic Security Template (GST). We argue that the GST
can assist users to identify the lessons learned from security incidents and can be ap-
plied to structure the insights derived from specific security incident. The GST is ac-
ceptable in a healthcare organisation and can be used to feed back the lessons learned
to Information Security Management Systems in healthcare.”
Based on industrial and academic motivations (Chapter 1, 2), the Generic Security
Template (Chapter 3) was proposed, aiming to feed back lessons identified from secu-
rity incidents to Information Security Management Systems (ISMS). In particular, it
adaped the Goal Structuring Notations (GSN) to depict the lessons learned from secu-
rity incidents and map them to the security requirements for an Information Security
Management System. The suitability has been tested and instances of the GST (Chap-
ter 4) have been produced based on the analysis of four security incidents in the US,
UK and China. This approach has been evaluated through empirical study (Chapter 5)
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by assessing its usability in assisting users to identify the lessons learned from security
incidents in terms of accuracy, efficiency and ease of use. An empirical study with a
group of 24 university students with diversified backgrounds found that the Generic Se-
curity Template can help improve the accuracy in identifying the lessons learned from
the security incident reports and reduce the mental effort in this process. Although this
study yields insights into difficulties that the stakeholders face when trying to under-
stand security incident reports, this evaluation does not reflect real practice. Therefore,
industrial evaluations (Chapter 6) of the Generic Security Template have been con-
ducted to test the acceptability with people experienced in dealing with patient data in
healthcare organisations. Strengths and weaknesses of the Generic Security Template
were discussed, and application scenarios were identified based on the requirements
of different stakeholders. The Generic Security Template has been improved after a
series of evaluations and the improved Generic Security Template has been evaluated
with a larger user group (81 students) (Chapter 7) to show that users with a computer
science background can apply the Generic Security Template to structure the insights
from the security incidents. The Generic Security Template was finally applied in a
healthcare organisation (Chapter 8) in China and the results show that lessons from
security incidents in the US and China can be transferred to a healthcare organisa-
tion in China using the Generic Security Template. The Generic Security Template has
been evaluated and improved throughout the above-mentioned empirical and industrial
evaluations. A detailed instruction on the finalised Generic Security Template can be
found in Appendix D.
9.1.1 Dissertation research question 1
The answer to research question 1 “Can the Generic Security Templates be created
for structuring the lessons learned from security incidents?” is yes. In Chapter 4, we
have studied four security incidents from around the global, including the VA data
leakage 2006, 2007, Shenzhen data leakage incident, and NHS Surray IT asset disposal
incident. The instances of the Generic Security Template have been created for each
security incident. After a series of healthcare (Chapter 6) and practical (Chapter 5)
evaluations and improvements, Chapter 7 had evaluated the improved Generic Security
Template with a larger user group that has 81 university students with a computer
science background, to find out whether university students with a computer science
background can use this approach to create a GST in a continued study. The results
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show that almost all of them can create a generic security template, although they have
difficulties in mapping lessons with different security requirements. This is due to
the subjective nature of the GSN, that allows the template to be further reviewed and
discussed by others. Chapter 8 uses a focus group study and the participants expressed
that the discussion process helped them come to an agreement and better understand
the reasoning between the lessons learned and the goals.
9.1.2 Dissertation research question 2
The answer to research question 2 “Can the Generic Security Template better assist
users to identify lessons from security incidents by comparing to the traditional pure
free text approach?” is yes. In Chapter 5, we have conducted an empirical study with
24 university students from a variety of education backgrounds to evaluate the utility
and usability of conventional text-based security incident reports with a graphical for-
malism based on the Goal Structuring Notation. The two methods were compared in
term of the users’ accuracy, efficiency to identify a number of lessons learned (causes
of the incident but also the participants’ ability to understand the reasons why particular
recommendations were proposed as ways of avoiding future violations) from investi-
gations into previous incidents involving the disclosure of healthcare records, as well
as reasoning on security arguments (i.e. the supportive relationships between lessons
learned and violated security requirements). Even using a relatively small sample, we
were able to obtain statistically significant differences in terms of their accuracy rate
in identifying lessons learned from the security incident. The group with the GST
perform better than the group with text alone. We are able to obtain statistically signif-
icant differences for identifying the relationships between the lessons learned and the
security requirements, and the group with template performs better. We are not able
to obtain efficiency (time) difference between the two groups. A reason could be it is
the first time they used the GST, they have spent sometime to read over through all the
text document and the template. However, their subjective feedback revealed they had
experienced learning effects. Their confidence in answering the questions increased as
they worked their way through the questions, and their overall feedback towards the
GST is positive.
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9.1.3 Dissertation research question 3
The answer to research question 3 “Can the Generic Security Template be used for
feeding back the lessons learned to information security management system (ISMS)
in healthcare industry?” is partially yes. In Chapter 6, we conducted a case study with
fifteen subjects (five security professionals, ten healthcare professional) working in a
Chinese healthcare organisation to study their current security management systems,
the incident handling processes, the feedback of the learning to the ISMS, as well as
their general attitude and acceptance towards the Generic Security Template. The re-
sults show that, lessons are not effectively fed back into the ISMS, which is consistent
with the findings in the literature review. In particular they demonstrated their interests
in investigating on how lessons identified from the security incidents happened in dif-
ferent countries can be transferred to their organisation to inform the improvements of
their Information Security Management Systems.
The above mentioned interviews study with healthcare professionals in China pro-
vided initial insights into the application of our approach. In Chapter 8, we look beyond
subjective impressions to provide more direct evidence about whether or not security
lessons can be transferred between healthcare organisations in different countries. In
particular, we used three instances of the Generic Security Template, which are the VA
2006, VA 2007 and Shenzhen data leakage incidents to investigate whether Chinese
healthcare professionals could transfer security lessons from those incidents in their
own context. The findings show that learning from security incidents in other health-
care organisations both at home and abroad can indeed be transferred into XXX central
hospital. We also identified a process for the transferability of lessons learned using
the Generic Security Template. This contributes to the sharing of the security incidents
and the exchange of security lessons globally. Moreover, other customisation require-
ments were raised and collected such as the recommendation acceptance identifier and
the multi-view identifier. Finally, the Generic Security Template has been customised
and improved, which guides the directions for future development.
9.2 Contributions
A novel approach to feed back the lessons learned identified from healthcare security
incidents to Information Security Management Systems (ISMS). The Generic Security
Template brings together lessons learned from security incidents and maps them to the
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security requirements of the ISMS. Those lessons are presented in a structured manner
and serve as an additional resource that can add to existing security controls (e.g. the
security standards, best practices). It also contributes to the ‘feedback’ or ‘follow-up’
phase of the security incident response lifecyle, as it provides a systematic way to deal
with the lessons from security incidents and share them in a structured manner. This
has implication in increasing the accessibility of the lessons learned identified from the
security incident.
An approach to improve the comprehension of Security Incidents Report. Through
an empirical study conducted in this research, we have found that the Generic Security
Template can help improving the accuracy and reducing the mental efforts in compre-
hending the security incident report, and the results are statistically significant. This
has implication and contributes to tackling the current frustration faced by the stake-
holders who do not have time to read the security incident report. It also enables the
security incident report to be more accessible and usable in real practice.
The potential in communicating lessons learned from the security incidents. Through
the first industrial evaluation, the Generic Security Template has been found to have
the potential to improve the effectiveness in communicating security incidents. Ap-
plication scenarios have been identified by the participants, to communicate security
incidents in team meetings. This finding shows that the Generic Security Template
has the potential to contribute to encourage people to speak the same language while
communicating security incidents.
Cross-country transfer of lessons learned in healthcare organisations. Through the
second healthcare evaluation of the Generic Security Template, we have demonstrated
that lessons learned from security incidents can be transferred using the Generic Secu-
rity Template. This finding shows that the Generic Security Template can contribute to
the exchange of security incidents in healthcare organisations from different countries.
During this process, the lessons learned from security incidents in different countries
are mapped to different levels of the security requirements of the security standard that
applies for a different organisation. In addition, the process on the exchange of the
lessons learned is also identified in this study, this provide guidance and pave the ways
for future work on transferring the lessons learned from the security incident across
different healthcare organisations. The transferability of lessons learned increases ex-
posure to the security incident report and create a greater audience, hence enhancing
current incident learning practices.
Implications for the Goal Structuring Notations (GSN). The GSN was traditionally
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used in presenting safety/ security assurance case. The Generic Security Template is
a new application of the GSN by adapting it to satisfy the design requirements of the
Generic Security Template. Our empirical work in evaluation of the Generic Security
Template also contributed to the evaluation of the GSN since there has not been similar
evaluation work found in the security area.
9.3 Limitations and directions for future work
This section discusses several limitations and directions for future work.
9.3.1 Subjective features
Throughout the evaluation of the Generic Security Template, users have identified dif-
ficulties due to subjective nature of the approach, especially on the rules to map lessons
learned to the goals (security requirements). The healthcare evaluations generated a set
of rules that help to decide the mapping in Chapter 6. According to feedback from an
empirical study in Chapter 7, it can hardly ensure that users following the rules can
have the same results. However, the translation from natural language statements into
structured graphical overview is not an automatic process [139]. It requires the ana-
lysts’ skill and judgement. This is consistent with the subjective nature of the GSN
approach itself, which allows people to reason about the arguments between lessons
and goals [7]. The industrial evaluation in Chapter 8 uses a focus group study and
the participants expressed that the discussion process helped them come to an agree-
ment and better understand the reasoning between the lessons learned and the goals.
Future study can focus on a more formalised way and experience can be borrowed
from the formalisation of other diagramming approaches such as the Unified Modified
Language (UML) [230–233].
The decision of the level of abstraction is a subjective process. The security an-
alysts define their own level of details in the security incident report according to in-
dividual business needs. Within this research, a majority of the participants did not
concern about the level of details nor suggested any changes to the evaluated cases.
However, too much information will undermine the effectiveness of the graphical pre-
sentation, while too little information will make it difficult to understand. There are
some existing works on model abstraction. For example, Polyvyanyy proposed an ab-
straction slider to allows user control of the model abstraction level [234]. Smirnov
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presented abstraction approach, addressing specic features of BPMN [235]. Future
work can focus on model abstraction as well as business intelligence [236–238] to
generate lessons learned with a desirable level of details.
9.3.2 Scalability
Based on the feedback from a series of evaluations, the participants raised scalability
concerns for the Generic Security Template. This is a common problem with graphical
notations. Experience in safety can be borrowed to address this issue. Using the GSN,
they break down safety cases into different sub-cases and then link them back to a
main case. There are commercial tools available for supporting the creation of the
safety cases [239, 240]. Future work can customise these tools to satisfy the needs of
the Generic Security Template.
9.3.3 Traceability
As is mentioned, the GST is not intended to replace any of the existing lessons learned
dissemination methods, but can serve as a ‘road-map’ over the existing incident report,
that removes the burden of communicating potentially complex dependencies within
the pure text report. The traceability linking the GST and the textual report can hardly
be maintained through manual co-relation. Future work can customised the commer-
cial tools [239, 240] to support the this feature.
9.3.4 Soundness
The soundness of the instances created by the Generic Security Template is also a focus
of future work. Within safety area, confidence argument has been proposed to answer
such question by providing details on completeness of the identified issues, quality,
strength and trustworthiness of the evidence, and quality of the development processes
[241]. There are also some existing work on applying formalisms to mechanically
check the logical soundness of cases [139, 242, 243]. Those will be the focus of future
works.
9.3.5 Industrial evaluation
This research has identified the potential benefits for the healthcare organisation to
apply this approach over their existing mechanisms through an explorative industrial
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case study. However, the results have not been empirically evaluated. Future work
should conduct comparative experiment studies to confirm this finding. We performed
the study within one healthcare organisation in China. The findings might hardly be
generalised into other healthcare organisations in other countries with a different con-
text. However, this provides the basis for future work in conducting the same study in
other healthcare organisations.
9.4 Closing remarks
In this dissertation we have proposed the Generic Security Template aiming to feed
back lessons learned from the security incidents to ISMS. The empirical study shows
that it can help to improve the comprehension of lessons. Healthcare evaluations show
that it might help to exchange the lessons learned from the healthcare organisation
around the globe to a healthcare organisation in China. During this exchange process,
the organisation has considered their own practices and assessed whether applicable
security standards within their Information Security Management Systems address the
concerns raised in previous breaches. The experience gained within the regime of
this PhD provides foundational work to generalise the use of this approach to other
industries.
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A.1 Veterans Affairs (VA) data leakage incident 2006
Table A.1: Veterans Affairs (VA) dataloss incident 2006
Security Issues Security Recommendations
Sensitive Information Use encryption, or other effective tool, to protect per-
sonally identifiable information stored on removable
storage
Position Description Define the position sensitive level.
Security Training Provide linkage to all applicable laws and VA policy
as part of the security awareness training.
Incident Handling Enhance incident-response program for promptly
identification and thoroughly investigation of the in-
cidents.
Administrative Action Take appropriate administrative action against the
people involved in this incident for their inappropri-
ate actions.
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A.2 Veterans Affairs (VA) data leakage incident 2007
Table A.2: Veterans Affairs (VA) dataloss incident 2007
Security Issues Security Recommendations
Access Control Avoid the abuse of programmer level access control.
Sensitive Information Use encryption, or other effective tool, to protect per-
sonally identifiable information stored on removable
storage
Security Policy Ensure that data security plans for research projects
comply with information security policies.
Security Policy Ensure human subjects in research, compliance with
information security requirements.
Security Policy Discontinue storing email on unauthorized system.
Position Description Re-evaluate and correct position sensitivity levels.
Management Structure Establish a functional description and performance
plan to clarify the line authority and reporting rela-
tionship.
Administrative Action Take appropriate administrative actions against the
people for their inappropriate actions.
Risk Analysis Develop and issue Government-wide risk analysis cri-
teria.
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A.3 Shenzhen data leakage incident 2008
Table A.3: Shenzhen dataloss incident 2008
Security Issues Security Recommendations
Network Security Network security needs to be ensured by following
the security standards.
Sensitive Information Define the information sensitive level according to the
security standards.
Security Policy Establish and enforce security policy according to the
security standards.
Security Audit Establish and conduct security audit plan according to
the security standards.
Security Training Establish and execute security training programs by
following the security standards.
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A.4 NHS Surrey IT Asset Disposal Incident 2013
Table A.4: NHS Surrey IT Asset Disposal Incident 2013
Security Issues Security Recommendations
Risk Management Carry out a risk assessment when using a data proces-
sor to dispose of the hard drives.
Personal Data Wipe medical information and confidential sensitive
data before recycling.
Contract Have a written contract with the company processing
the IT Asset.
Disposal Monitoring Monitor the destruction process and maintain audit
trails and inventory logs of hard drives destroyed by
the company based on the serial numbers in the de-
struction certificates for each individual drive.
Remedial Action Take remedial action which includes developing a
new policy framework to address the internal re-use
of information and appliances and disposal process
for redundant equipment.
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A.5 Security incidents in the US, China and UK
Security Incidents in the US 
 
1. Review of Issues Related to the Loss of VA Information Involving the Identity of 
Millions of Veterans 
http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-06-02238-163.pdf 
 
2. Administrative Investigation Loss of VA Information VA Medical Centre 
Birmingham, AL 
http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-07-01083-157.pdf 
 
3. Review of Alleged Unauthorized Access to VA Systems 
http://www.va.gov/oig/52/reports/2011/VAOIG-10-03516-229.pdf 
 
4. Review of Alleged Mismanagement of the Systems to Drive Performance Project 
http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-11-02467-87.pdf 
 
5. Review of Information Security Issues Impacting VA Teleradiology Contracts 
http://www.va.gov/oig/52/reports/2010/VAOIG-09-03122-198.pdf 
 
6. Review of Alleged Transmission of Sensitive VA Data Over Internet Connections 
http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-12-02802-111.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Security Incidents in China 
 
1. 深圳 10万孕产妇个人信息遭泄露 
http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2008-06-10/020715710408.shtml 
 
2. 黑客伪造WiFi热点盗取个人信息 
http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2012-02-25/04196767784.shtml 
 
3. 程序员入侵证券公司导致 40万条股民信息泄漏 
http://finance.ifeng.com/stock/tzgs/20120420/5968175.shtml 
 
4. 黑客攻破中电信网络盗取 900个内部管理账户 
http://tech.163.com/12/0604/14/835LP3N8000915BE.html 
 
5. 黑客入侵政府、大学网站添加虚假信息倒卖上万假证 
http://edu.ifeng.com/gaoxiao/detail_2012_07/26/16323038_0.shtml 
 
6. 因信号系统受干扰 深圳地铁发生暂停故障 
http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2012-11-16/01577802256.shtml 
 
7. 空调故障导致 12306网站三天内两次瘫痪 
http://sh.eastday.com/m/20121227/u1a7091836.html 
 
8. 上千万台计算机被盗取 QQ及 Q币 
http://it.sohu.com/20120515/n343205468.shtml 
 
9. 安全漏洞导致上千万银行卡客户信息泄露 
http://finance.ifeng.com/bank/yhk/20120401/5854381.shtml 
 
10. 黑客攻击 DNS操控电脑净赚 1400万美元 
http:// news.sina.com.cn/w/2012-04-23/174624316823.shtml 
 
11. 警方破获特大网银盗窃案 近百人被盗千万 
http://finance.ifeng.com/roll/20120808/6888882.shtml 
 
12. 亚马逊中国账户大规模被盗 涉及用户或超千人 
http://it.sohu.com/20120907/n352615210.shtml 
 
13. 超 10万个假冒、钓鱼网站被处理 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/2010-12/17/c_12889639.htm 
 
 
 
 
Security Incidents in UK 
 
1. Councils fined for serious data breaches 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2012/councils-fined-for-serious-data-breaches-130
22012 
 
2. British Pregnancy Advice Service fined £200,000 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2014/british-pregnancy-advice-service-fined-2000
00-07032014 
 
3. ICO fines Glasgow City Council £150K 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2013/Glasgow-city-council-fined-150000-0706201
3 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2013/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/
Notices/Glasgow-city-council-monetary-penalty-notice.ashx 
 
4. Council fined for serious email disclosure 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2012/council-fined-for-serious-email-disclosure-15
022012 
 
5. NHS Trust fined £325,000 following data breach affecting thousands of patients 
and staff 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2012/nhs-trust-fined-325000-following-data-breac
h-affecting-thousands-of-patients-and-staff-01062012 
 
6. Telford and Wrekin Council fined £90,000 following disclosure of vulnerable 
children’s data 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2012/telford-wrekin-council-fined-following-discl
osure-of-vulnerable-childrens-data-06062012 
 
7. Council fined £70,000 for losing highly sensitive data 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2012/council-fined-70000-for-losing-highly-sensiti
ve-data-16052012 
 
8. Repeated security failings lead to £180,000 fine for Ministry of Justice 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2014/repeated-security-failings-lead-to-180000-fin
e-for-moj-26082014 
 
9. ICO fines NHS Surrey for failing to check the destruction of old computers 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2013/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/
Notices/nhs-surrey-monetary-penalty-notice.pdf 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2013/ico-issues-nhs-surrey-monetary-penalty-of-2
00000 
 
10. Pay day loans company fined £175,000 over millions of spam texts 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2013/payday-loans-company-receives-175000-fine
-over-spam-texts 
 
11. London NHS Trust fined £90,000 for serious data breach 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2012/london-nhs-trust-fined-90000-for-serious-dat
a-breach-21052012 
 
12. Sony fined £250,000 after millions of UK gamers’ details compromised 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2013/ico-news-release-2013 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2013/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/
Notices/sony_monetary_penalty_notice.ashx 
 
13. Belfast Trust fined £225,000 after leaving thousands of patient records in disused 
hospital 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2012/belfast-trust-fined-225000-after-leaving-thou
sands-of-patient-records-in-disused-hospital-19062012 
 
14. Sensitive details of NHS staff published by Trust in Devon 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2012/sensitive-details-of-nhs-staff-published-by-de
von-trust-06082012 
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B.1 Participant Consent Form: Usability of GST
The objective of the experiment is to assess the usability of “Generic Security Tem-
plate” in terms of the Accuracy and Efficiency to assist comprehending security inci-
dents and its Ease of use by comparing to the Text-based approach.
INFORMATION
The experiment was a paper-based exercise, which was conducted in a one hour slot.
The steps include: (1) Familiarisation with Generic Security Template by a Tutorial
Session; (2) Completion of experiment tasks, which is to comprehend security incident
report with/without the help of Generic Security Template and answer a few questions
related to the given security incident sample. (3) Filling-out of a post-experiment ques-
tionnaire.
RISKS
The risks associated in this experiment might be slightly strains as it is a bit mentally
demanded.
CONFIDENTIALITY
The information of this experiment including participant’s response record, experiment
data will be kept confidential and can only be accessed by this research conductor. No
reference will be made in any report, which may link the participants to the study.
PARTICIPATION
Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you decide to participate, you may
withdraw at any time without penalty.
CONTACT
If you have questions about the study, please contact:
Miss Ying He, Email: yingh@dcs.gla.ac.uk
Prof Chris Johnson, Email: Christopher.Johnson@glasgow.ac.uk
School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow
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DECLARATION
“I confirm that I have read and understand the information above. I agree to participate
in this study with the understanding that I may withdraw at any time.”
Signed
Date
Contact Information
This study adheres to the BPS ethical guidelines, and has been approved by the FIMS
ethics committee of The University of Glasgow (ref: CSE01098).
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B.2 VA Data Leakage Incident 2007
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VA’s Data Loss Incident 2007 
 
On January 22, 2007, a Veterans Health Administration (VHA) Information Technology (IT) Specialist assigned 
to the Research Enhancement Award Program (Birmingham REAP), VA Medical Centre (VAMC), 
Birmingham, AL, reported that a VA-owned external hard drive was missing from the REAP office. The 
missing external hard drive was believed to contain numerous research-related files containing personally 
identifiable information and/or individually identifiable health information for over 250,000 veterans, and 
information obtained from the Centres for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), on over 1.3 million medical providers. Investigation conducted to identify the problem 
and recommendations were provided by VA office of Inspector General.  
Problem Identified 
Issue 1: Circumstances Surrounding How the Data Went Missing, the Extent and Magnitude of the Data 
Loss, and Whether VA Appropriately Responded to the Incident.  
Notifications of data loss to VAMC Information Security Officer (ISO), VA Management and Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) were both Timely and appropriate. A criminal investigation is opened immediately in 
determining how data went missing. The Initial Notification of Magnitude of the Dataloss was Inaccurate 
because the IT Specialist encrypted and/or deleted multiple files from his computer shortly after he reported the 
data missing in an attempt to hide the extent, magnitude, and impact of the missing data.  
VA began sending notification letters informing each recipient that one of the files on the portable hard drive 
may have contained the recipients’ name, SSN, DOB, and health information, offering them the option of 1 year 
of free credit monitoring services. This data loss comes from more than one Federal Agencies and it raises 
concerns over the need for Government-wide Criteria for Assessing Risk Associated with Data Loss on what 
constitutes high risk data for identity theft.  
Issue 2 Whether There Were Policies, Procedures, and Controls in Place to Properly Store and Safeguard the 
Missing Data.  
Birmingham REAP Managers Did Not Ensure Proper Information Security Controls to Safeguard Data Stored 
on External Hard Drives. There was no VA policy in effect at the time the external hard drive went missing that 
addressed the need to protect sensitive data on removable computer storage devices, unless those devices were 
carried outside a VA facility. Although VISN 7 policy required encryption on these devices, the Birmingham 
REAP Director did not request encryption software.  
Position Sensitivity Level Assessments were Not Adequately Performed. The position sensitivity level for the 
IT Specialist was inaccurately designated as moderate risk, which was inconsistent with his programmer 
privileges and resulted in a less extensive background investigation.  
Issue 3 Whether the IT Specialist was Appropriately Authorized Access to Large Amounts of Protected 
Information.  
The IT Specialist was improperly given access to multiple data sources, allowing him to accumulate and store 
vast amounts of individually identifiable health information that was beyond the scope of the projects. Three 
research projects involved in this dataloss were evaluated and here are the findings. 
VISN 7 officials improperly gave the IT Specialist access to data from the VISN Data Warehouse that contained 
scrambled SSNs (known as SCRSSNS), which are considered to be personally identifiable information. The IT 
Specialist was also given programmer level access to VistA (Veterans Health Information Systems and 
Technology Architecture) at Birmingham without sufficient authorization. 
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The Birmingham REAP Data Security Plan did not comply with the VISN 7 policy or VIReC guidance, the 
approval by the IRB committee, the R&D Committee, and the Medical Center Director’s Office was 
inappropriate and resulted in VIReC’s release of the data even though the REAP did not have adequate 
procedures to protect the security of the data. 
The IT Specialist was essentially given unfettered access to several files maintained by the VA Austin 
Automation Center (AAC), Austin, TX, even though the requests were not appropriately authorized. The IT 
Specialist’s access to these files did not comply with VHA policy or the Privacy Act.  
Issue 4 Whether the IT Specialist Complied with Research Project Protocols to Properly Safeguard Protected 
Information.  
The IT Specialist violated the terms and conditions under which the IRB granted HIPAA waivers for the 
involved protocols. In doing so, the IT Specialist failed to properly safeguard individually identifiable health 
information, thereby placing vast amounts of HIPAA and Privacy Act protected information at risk.  
Issue 5 Whether the Birmingham REAP Director Was Adequately Supervised, and Whether the REAP’s 
Director and Associate Director Adequately Managed and Supervised the Operations and Staff of the REAP.  
The REAP Director and her subordinate managers frequently were not physically present at the REAP to 
supervise and manage daily operations. She had her official VA e-mail automatically forwarded to her account 
at the University of Alabama, in violation of VA policy. The REAP Director’s supervisor of record, the ACOS 
for Acute and Specialty Care, in fact, was the supervisor in name only and provided no supervision. The 
Associate Chief of Staff for Research, though responsible for all research programs at the Birmingham VAMC, 
has no line authority over the REAP and did not supervise the REAP Director. While the Medical Centre 
Director is ultimately responsible for position management at the facility, he also did not ensure adequate 
supervision over REAP operations.  
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Recommendations  
Issue 1:  
Recommendation (1): We recommend that the Under Secretary for Health ensure that appropriate 
administrative action is taken against the IT Specialist for his inappropriate actions during the course of the 
investigation and for failing to properly safeguard personally identifiable information on his missing external 
hard drive.  
Recommendation (2): We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Information and Technology coordinate 
with the Office of Management and Budget and the President’s Identity Theft Task Force to develop and issue 
Government-wide risk analysis criteria to determine under what conditions potential identity theft victims 
should be notified and offered free credit monitoring. In the interim, the Assistant Secretary for Information and 
Technology should re-evaluate VA policy to determine whether the loss of a solo personal identifier, such as a 
social security number only, would constitute a risk for identity theft for purposes of offering free credit 
monitoring.  
Issue 2:  
Recommendation (3): We recommend that the Under Secretary for Health ensure that appropriate 
administrative action is taken against the Birmingham REAP Director and Associate Director for failing to take 
adequate security measures to protect personally identifiable information.  
Recommendation (4): We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Information and Technology revise VA 
Directive 6601 to require the use of encryption, or an otherwise effective tool, to properly protect personally 
identifiable information and other sensitive data stored on removable storage devices when used within VA. 
Recommendation (5): We recommend that the Under Secretary for Health direct the Medical Center Director 
to re-evaluate and correct position sensitivity levels and associated background investigations for positions at 
the Birmingham VAMC.  
 
Issue 3:  
Recommendation (6): We recommend that the Under Secretary for Health develop, disseminate, and ensure 
compliance with policies regarding the release of individually identifiable health information from VISN data 
warehouses for research purposes to include IRB approval requirements and stress, in VHA’s mandatory annual 
privacy training, that scrambled SSNs do not constitute de-identified data.  
Recommendation (7): We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Information and Technology develop 
and implement policies describing the conditions under which VistA programmer level access may be granted 
for research purposes, including whether that access is project specific or for the term of employment, and take 
appropriate action to remove programmer access from individuals who do not meet those conditions.  
Recommendation (8): We recommend that the Under Secretary for Health ensure that appropriate 
administrative action is taken against the MAC and VIReC Directors for inappropriately retaining and releasing 
the MPIER file.  
Recommendation (9): We recommend that the Under Secretary for Health develop a mechanism to ensure that 
data security plans for research projects comply with applicable information security policies and privacy 
policies prior to approval by the IRB.  
Recommendation (10): We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Information and Technology 
disseminate and enforce the existing Standard Operating Procedure for access to Austin Automation Center’s 
nationwide SSN file, and issue policies and procedures regarding authorization to access all other Austin 
Automation Center data for research purposes. 
Issue 4:  
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Recommendation (11): We recommend that the Under Secretary for Health ensure that appropriate 
administrative action is taken against the IT Specialist for inappropriately accessing and utilizing individually 
identifiable health information.  
Recommendation (12): We recommend that the Under Secretary for Health require facility IRB compliance 
program audits to assess the privacy and confidentiality protections for human subjects in research, including 
whether the use of research data complies with information security requirements specified in HIPAA waivers 
or waivers of informed consent. 
Issue 5:  
Recommendation (13): We recommend that the Under Secretary for Health ensure that the Birmingham REAP 
Director and Associate Director discontinue the practice of receiving their official VA e-mail at the University 
of Birmingham, in violation of VA policy prohibiting storage of VA information on a non-VA system, resulting 
in potential Privacy Act or HIPAA violations.  
Recommendation (14): We recommend that the Under Secretary for Health assess the alignment of 
Birmingham REAP management positions at the Birmingham VAMC, and take action to correct the 
dysfunctional management structure that led to an overall breakdown of management oversight, controls, and 
accountability of the Birmingham REAP. This should include:  
• Correction of the Birmingham REAP Director’s reporting relationship from the ACOS for Acute and 
Specialty Care, which was in name only and resulted in the lack of actual supervision over the REAP 
Director’s activities, to the ACOS for Research who currently has facility-wide responsibility for 
research programs but no line authority over REAP managers or involvement in their activities.  
• Establishment of an accurate functional description and performance plan to clarify Birmingham REAP 
managers’ responsibilities and to hold them accountable for proper administration of REAP resources, 
to include equipment purchases, acquisition of server space, protection of sensitive information stored 
on VA systems and portable devices, office space security, and compliance with applicable VA 
policies and procedures.  
• Clarification of the Medical Center Director and ACOS for Research’s responsibility and line authority 
over all research programs at the facility, including the Birmingham REAP.  
 
Recommendation (15): We recommend that the Under Secretary for Health ensure that appropriate 
administrative action is taken against the Birmingham Medical Center Director for not ensuring appropriate 
management and administration of the Birmingham REAP and protection of the privacy and confidentiality of 
research subjects.  
Recommendation (16): We recommend that the Under Secretary for Health ensure that appropriate 
administrative action is taken against the ACOS for Research for not ensuring appropriate management and 
administration of the Birmingham REAP. 
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B.3 Security Standards
SM: Security management is controlled 
SM 1.  Security management program is established. 
SM 1.1. The security management program is 
adequately documented, approved, and 
up-to-date. 
SM 1.1.1. An agency/entity-wide security management program has been 
developed, documented, and implemented. 
SM-1.1.2. The agency/entity-wide security management program is updated 
to reflect current conditions. 
SM 1.2: A security management structure has 
been established. 
SM 1.2.1. Senior management establishes a security management structure 
for entity-wide, system, and application levels that have adequate 
independence, authority, expertise, and resources.  
SM 1.2.2. An information systems security manager has been appointed at 
an agency/entity level and at appropriate subordinate (i.e., system and 
application) levels and given appropriate authority.  
SM-1.3. Information security responsibilities are 
clearly assigned. 
SM-1.3.1. The security program documentation clearly identifies owners of 
computer-related resources and those responsible for managing access to 
computer resources. Security responsibilities and expected behaviors are 
clearly defined at the entity-wide, system, and application levels.  
SM-1.4. Subordinate security plans are 
documented, approved, and kept up-to-date. 
 
SM-1.4.1. System and application security plans have been documented and 
implemented 
SM-1.4.2. The subordinate security plans is updated annually or whenever 
there are significant changes to the agency/entity policies, organization, IT 
systems, facilities, applications, weaknesses identified, or other conditions 
that may affect security. 
SM-1.5. An inventory of systems is developed, 
documented, and kept up-to-date. 
SM-1.5.1. A complete, accurate, and up-to-date inventory exists for all 
major systems that includes the identification of all system interfaces. 
 
SM 2.  Periodically assess and validate risks 
SM-2.1. Risk assessments and supporting 
activities are systematically conducted. 
SM-2.1.1. Appropriate risk assessment policies and procedures are 
documented and based on security categorizations. 
SM-2.1.2. Information systems are categorized based on the potential impact 
that the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability would have on 
operations, assets, or individuals. 
SM-2.1.3. Risks are reassessed for the entity-wide, system, and application 
levels on a periodic basis or whenever systems, applications, facilities, or 
other conditions change. 
SM-2.1.4. Risk assessments and validations, and related management 
approvals are documented and maintained on file. Such documentation 
includes security plans, risk assessments, security test and evaluation results, 
and appropriate management approvals. 
SM-2.1.5. Changes to systems, facilities, or other conditions and identified 
security vulnerabilities are analysed to determine their impact on risk and 
the risk assessment is performed or revised as necessary based on OMB 
criteria. 
 
 
SM 3. Security control policies and procedures are documented and implemented. 
SM-3.1 Security control policies and procedures 
are documented, approved by management and 
implemented.  
SM-3.1.1. Security control policies and procedures at all levels， 
• are documented, 
• appropriately consider risk, 
• address purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, and compliance, 
• ensure that users can be held accountable for their actions, 
• appropriately consider general and application controls, 
• are approved by management, and 
• are periodically reviewed and updated. 
 
AC: User access control is addressed 
AC 3. Effective authorization controls are implemented 
AC 3.1. User accounts are appropriately 
controlled. 
 
AC 3.1.1. Resource owners have identified authorized users and the access 
they are authorized to have. 
AC 3.1.2. Security administration personnel set parameters of security 
software to provide access as authorized and restrict access that has not been 
authorized. This includes access to data files, load and source code libraries 
(if applicable), security files, and operating system files. Standard naming 
conventions are established and used effectively as a basis for controlling 
access to data, and programs.  
AC 3.2. Processes and services are adequately 
controlled. 
 
AC 3.2.1. Available processes and services are minimized, such as through,  
• installing only required processes and services based on least functionality,  
• Restricting the number of individuals with access to such services based on 
least privilege,  
• monitoring the use of such services, and   
• maintaining current service versions. 
AC-3.2.2. The function and purpose of processes and services are 
documented and approved by management. 
 
AC 4: Sensitive system resources are adequately protected. 
AC 4.1: Access to sensitive system resources is 
restricted and monitored. 
 
AC 4.1.1. Access to sensitive/privileged accounts is restricted to individuals 
or processes having a legitimate need for the purposes of accomplishing a 
valid business purpose. 
AC 4.1.2. Use of sensitive/privileged accounts is adequately monitored. 
 
AC 5: An effective audit and monitoring capabilities is implemented. 
AC-5.1. An effective incident response program 
is documented and approved. 
AC-5.1.1. An effective incident-response program has been implemented 
and include 
• documented policies, procedures, and plans; 
• documented testing of the incident response plan and follow-up on 
findings; 
• a means of prompt centralized reporting; 
• active monitoring of alerts/advisories; 
• response team members with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities; 
• training on roles and responsibilities and periodic refresher training; 
• links to other relevant groups; 
• protection against denial-of-service attacks (see http://icat.nist.gov); 
• appropriate incident-response assistance; and 
• consideration of computer forensics. 
AC-5.2. Incidents are effectively identified and 
logged. 
AC-5.2.1. An effective intrusion detection system has been implemented, 
including appropriate placement of intrusion-detection sensors and incident 
thresholds. 
AC-5.2.2. An effective process has been established based on a risk 
assessment, to identify auditable events that will be logged. 
AC-5.2.3. All auditable events, including access to and modifications of 
sensitive or critical system resources, are logged. 
AC-5.2.4. Audit records contain appropriate information for effective review 
including sufficient information to establish what events occurred, when the 
events occurred (for example, time stamps), the source of the events, and the 
outcome of the events. 
AC 5.3. Incidents are properly analysed and 
appropriate actions taken. 
AC 5.3.1. Security violations and activities, including failed logon attempts, 
other failed access attempts, and sensitive activity, are reported and 
investigated. 
AC 5.3.2. Security managers investigate security violations and suspicious 
activities and report results to appropriate supervisory and management 
personnel. 
AC 5.3.3. Appropriate disciplinary actions are taken. 
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B.4 Experiment Description
Experiment Material
1. Security Incident Report (Textual Description)
VA 2007 Data Loss Incident Report - Appendix B.2, and B.3
2. Instance of the Generic Security Template (Diagram Description)
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Figure B.1: Generic Security Template - VA data leakage 2007
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B.5 Experiment Tasks
Task 1 Security Lessons Identification
Identify the Security Issues and Recommendations from the given text based report
with the help of the “Generic Security Template”and fill in the table below,
Table B.1: Experiment task 1
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Table B.2: Experiment task 1 (continued)
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Task 2 - Relationships Identification.
There are one or more options that are correct for the questions. Circle the options
of the correct answers.
1. The Security Recommendations of the Security Incident are to address the following
security objectives.
a. Access Control
b. Security Control Policy and Procedure
c. Security Management Program
d. Sensitive Information Management
e. Security Management Structure and Procedure
f. Security Awareness Training
g. System Configuration
h. Change Management
i. Security Incident Handling Process
j. None of the above
2. The recommendations on “Security Structure Management”are
a. Security Incidents needs to be responded timely.
b. The establishment of an accurate functional description and performance plan
to clarify managers’ responsibilities,
c. The clarification of reporting relationship and line authority over all research
programs.
d. None of the above
3. What are the security recommendations for addressing the security objective “User
Access Control”
a. Develop and implement policies describing the conditions under which pro-
grammer level access may be granted for research purposes
b. Effective procedures are implemented to determine compliance with authentica-
tion policies.
c. Attempts to log on with invalid passwords are limited. Use of easily guessed
passwords (such as names or words) is prohibited.
d. None of the above
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4. What are the security recommendations for addressing the security objective “Sys-
tem Configuration”
a. System Configuration policies, plans and procedures have been developed, doc-
umented, and implemented
b. Configuration changes are authorised by management. Configuration manage-
ment actions are recorded in sufficient detail so that the content and status of each
configuration item is known and previous versions can be recovered.
c. Relevant stakeholders have access to and knowledge of the configuration status
of the configuration items.
d. None of the above
5. The recommendation “The use of encryption or an otherwise effective tool to prop-
erly protect personal identifiable information”are provided to support the security ob-
jectives
a. Risk assessments and supporting activities are systematically conducted.
b. Access to sensitive system resources is restricted and monitored.
c. User Access Control is sufficiently addressed
d. None of the above
6. The recommendation “the establishment of an accurate functional description and
performance plan to clarify manager’s responsibility”are provided to support the secu-
rity objectives
a. Security control policies and procedures are documented, approved by manage-
ment and implemented
b. Security management program is successfully established
c. Security management structure has been established
d. None of the above
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B.6 Post-Experiment Questionnaire
Section A: Background Information
1. Highest level of degree
2. Major subject
3. Gender ◻ Male ◻ Female
4. Have you taken information security related courses?◻ Yes ◻ No
5. Experience with diagramming technique?◻ Goal Structuring Notations (GSN)◻ Entity-Relationship (ER)◻ Unified Modeling Language (UML)◻ Others, please specify
Section B: Task Load Index
Place an “X”along each scale at the point that best indicates your experience
1. How mentally demanding was the task?
Low ◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻ High
2. How hurried or rushed was the pace of the task?
Low ◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻ High
3. How discouraged, stressed, and annoyed did you feel when doing the tasks?
Low ◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻ High
4. How successful do you feel in accomplishing the task?
Low ◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻ High
5. How hard did you have to work to complete the task?
Low ◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻ High
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Section C: Usability Evaluation Framework Cognitive Dimensions(CD) of Generic
Security Template
6. (Visibility) It is easy to see or find the various parts of the Generic Security Template
while it is being used?
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
Explain what kind of things is difficult to see or find.
7. (Diffuseness) The Generic Security Template let you say what you want reasonably
brief?
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
Explain what sorts of things take more space to describe.
8. (Hard Mental Operations) There seem some things especially complex or difficult
to understand in your head while using the Generic Security Template?
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
Explain what are the things.
9. (Closeness of Mapping) The Generic Security Template describes the problem ac-
curately and completely on the security incident stated in Textual Document?
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
Explain which parts seem to be a particularly strange way of describing something.
Why?
10. (Consistency) There are places where some things ought to be similar, but the
Generic Security Template makes them different?
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
11. (Role Expressiveness) While reading the Generic Security Template, it is easy to
tell what each part is for in the overall scheme?
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
Explain which are the things you really don’t know what they mean. What are
they?
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Section D: Participants’ experience with the Generic Security Template
12. I have no difficulty in understanding the Security Incident Report (Textual De-
scription).
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
13. I have no difficulty in understanding the Generic Security Template.
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
14. I have no difficulty in identifying Security Lessons (Filling in the table in Task 1)
with the help of the Generic Security Template.
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
15. I have no difficulty in identifying Relationships (Answering the multi-choice ques-
tions in Task 2) with the help of the Generic Security Template.
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
16. The Generic Security Template helped me better comprehend the security incident
by identifying security issues and solutions faster and with less effort than the provided
Security Incident Report.
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
17. I find it necessary to have the Generic Security Template complimented with cor-
respondent Security Incident Report for better understanding.
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
18. I am confident that I can use the Generic Security Template adroitly if I am asked
to use it again.
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
19. I am satisfied with the overall experience with the Generic Security Template.
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
20. (Open Question) After completing this questionnaire, can you think of obvious
ways that the design of the Generic Security Template could be improved? What are
they?
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B.7 Sample Answer
Task 1 Security Lessons Identification
Identify the Security Issues and Recommendations from the given text based report
with the help of the “Generic Security Template”and fill in the table below,
Table B.3: Experiment task 1 answer
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Table B.4: Experiment task 1 answer (continued)
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Task 2 - Relationships (Security Recommendation and Higher Level Objectives)
Identification.
There are one or more options that are correct for the questions. Circle the options
of the correct answers.
1. The Security Recommendations of the Security Incident are to address the following
security objectives.
a. Access Control
b. Security Control Policy and Procedure
c. Security Management Program
d. Sensitive Information Management
e. Security Management Structure and Procedure
f. Security Awareness Training
g. System Configuration
h. Change Management
i. Security Incident Handling Process
j. None of the above
2. The recommendations on “Security Structure Management”are
a. Security Incidents needs to be responded timely.
b. The establishment of an accurate functional description and performance
plan to clarify managers’ responsibilities
c. The clarification of reporting relationship and line authority over all research
programs.
d. None of the above
3. What are the security recommendations for addressing the security objective “User
Access Control”
a. Develop and implement policies describing the conditions under which pro-
grammer level access may be granted for research purposes.
b. Effective procedures are implemented to determine compliance with au-
thentication policies.
c. Attempts to log on with invalid passwords are limited. Use of easily guessed
passwords (such as names or words) is prohibited.
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d. None of the above
4. What are the security recommendations for addressing the security objective “Sys-
tem Configuration”
a. System Configuration policies, plans and procedures have been developed, doc-
umented, and implemented
b. Configuration changes are authorised by management. Configuration manage-
ment actions are recorded in sufficient detail so that the content and status of each
configuration item is known and previous versions can be recovered.
c. Relevant stakeholders have access to and knowledge of the configuration status
of the configuration items.
d. None of the above.
5. The recommendation “The use of encryption or an otherwise effective tool to prop-
erly protect personal identifiable information”are provided to support the security ob-
jectives
a. Risk assessments and supporting activities are systematically conducted.
b. Access to sensitive system resources is restricted and monitored.
c. User Access Control is sufficiently addressed.
d. None of the above
6. The recommendation “the establishment of an accurate functional description and
performance plan to clarify manager’s responsibility”are provided to support the secu-
rity objectives
a. Security control policies and procedures are documented, approved by
management and implemented.
b. Security management program is successfully established.
c. Security management structure has been established.
d. None of the above.
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C.1 Participant Consent Form: Acceptance of GST
This research proposes a new incident reporting approach, the Generic Security Tem-
plate, which we believe can enhance the existing process and the effectiveness in learn-
ing the lessons and preventing security incidents.
INFORMATION
The study will be conducted in less than one hour’s slot. The steps include: (1) filling-
out of a background questionnaire; (2) answer a few questions about current infor-
mation security management and incident learning in the host organisation; (3) study
a real information security incident using the Generic Security Template and provide
feedback.
BENIFITS
The benefit you get from this experiment might be (1) the study of a real world security
incident; (2) a few recommendations on how to prevent security incident; (3) familiari-
sation with a graphical incident reporting technique.
CONFIDENTIALITY
All information collected during this study, including the participant’s demographic in-
formation, and audio records will be kept strictly confidential; This data might be used
as part of research publications and reports in journals, conferences and workshops.
However, all reported data will be anonymised and all efforts will be undertaken to
prevent participants from being identified.
PARTICIPATION
Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you decide to participate, you may
withdraw at any time without penalty.
CONTACT
If you have questions about the study, please contact:
Miss Ying He, Email: yingh@dcs.gla.ac.uk
Prof Chris Johnson, Email: Christopher.Johnson@glasgow.ac.uk
School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow
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DECLARATION
I confirm that I have read and understand the information above. I agree to participate
in this study with the understanding that I may withdraw at any time.
Signed
Date
Contact Information
This study adheres to the BPS ethical guidelines, and has been approved by the FIMS
ethics committee of The University of Glasgow (CSE01243).
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C.2 Background Questionnaire
Basic Information
Job position (if applicable) Years of experience in this position
Highest level of degree Major subject
Gender ◻ Male ◻ Female
1. Experience with diagramming technique?◻ Goal Structuring Notations (GSN)◻ Entity-Relationship (ER)◻ Unified Modeling Language (UML)◻ Others, please specify
2. Have you read security incident report (e.g. official advert event report)?◻ Yes
On average, how often do you read them?
A. once a week B. once a month C. once a year D. others, please specify
When reading security incident reports I can understand them completely.
A. strongly disagree B. disagree C. moderate D. agree E. strongly agree◻ No
3. Have you been involved in security incident handling process?◻ Yes
Being part of incident handling increased my understanding of the incident.
A. strongly disagree B. disagree C. moderate D. agree E. strongly agree◻ No
4. Have you read security standards (such as GB/T22239, etc) in the organization?◻ Yes
I find security standards helpful in preventing security incidents.
A. strongly disagree B. disagree C. moderate D. agree E. strongly agree◻ No
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C.3 Tutorial - VA Data Leakage Incident 2007
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C.4 Interview Questions
Theme One: The general information security management context.
1. Describe the management support in terms of their support of security training, and
encouragement to the organization to learn about information security, or any activities
taken to strength the security management.
2. Describe the security culture in terms of how the organization value security,
whether the organization promote good security practice, whether their coworkers and
management are concerned with security, or any other activities done in the organiza-
tion to value security.
3. Describe the security awareness, in terms of the effectiveness of security training
program, stuffs sense of security, continuous training on information security.
4. Describe the security effectivenesses, in terms of whether the organization has ac-
complished important security objectives, whether the organisation regularly conducts
risk assessment and kept risks to a minimum, whether effective controls are take to
protect information security.
Theme Two: Security incident handling and response process.
1. Describe the security incident handling process.
2. Describe the process to learn from the security incident.
3. Describe the effectives in learning from the security incident.
4. Described how the learning of lessons is communicated into the improvements of
the security management.
5. Describe the effectiveness of the current methods to communicate the lessons
learned from the security incident.
Theme Three: The attitudes towards the GST
1. What are the strengths of the GST?
2. What are weaknesses of the GST?
3. What is your suggestion to improve the weaknesses?
4. What do you suggest to adjust the GST to meet the needs of your organization?
5. Do you have any other comments of the GST?
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C.5 Acceptability Questions
1. Using the tool would enhance the effectiveness to communicate lessons learnt from
the security incidents.
A. strongly disagree B. disagree C. moderate D. agree E. strongly agree
2. Using the tool would make it easier to communicate lessons learnt from the security
incidents.
A. strongly disagree B. disagree C. moderate D. agree E. strongly agree
3. I would find the tool useful in communicating lessons learnt from the security
incidents.
A. strongly disagree B. disagree C. moderate D. agree E. strongly agree
4. Learning to use the tool would be easy for me.
A. strongly disagree B. disagree C. moderate D. agree E. strongly agree
5. My interaction with the tool would be clear and understandable.
A. strongly disagree B. disagree C. moderate D. agree E. strongly agree
6. I would find the tool easy to use.
A. strongly disagree B. disagree C. moderate D. agree E. strongly agree
7. Given the resources, opportunities and knowledge it takes to use the tool, it would
be easy for me to use the tool.
A. strongly disagree B. disagree C. moderate D. agree E. strongly agree
8. Using the tool fits into my work style.
A. strongly disagree B. disagree C. moderate D. agree E. strongly agree
9. Assuming I have access to the tool, I intend to use it.
A. strongly disagree B. disagree C. moderate D. agree E. strongly agree
10. I am satisfied with the overall experience of the tool.
A. strongly disagree B. disagree C. moderate D. agree E. strongly agree
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C.6 Background questionnaire results
Table C.1: Participant’s background
No. Position Education Incidents
Experience
Gender Years of
Working
1 Nurse Bachelor Yes Female 3
2 Nurse Bachelor No Female 2
3 Nurse Bachelor Yes Female 5
4 Nurse High School No Female 3
5 Nurse High School No Female 4
6 Nurse High School No Female 5
7 Doctor Master No Male 8
8 Doctor Master Yes Male 8
9 Doctor Bachelor (Hon) No Male 4
10 Doctor Bachelor No Male 5
11 IT Manager Bachelor Yes Male 8
12 IT Staff Master Yes Female 4
13 IT Staff Bachelor (Hon) Yes Male 2
14 IT Staff Bachelor (Hon) Yes Male 3
15 IT Staff Bachelor Yes Male 2
Appendix D
The Empirical Experiment (Appendix
to Chapter 7)
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D.1 Instruction
 1  /  1 5  
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 I n t r o d u c t i o n  
T h e  G
e n e r i c  S e c u r i t y  T e m
p l a t e ,  i s  a  s t r u c t u r e d  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  l e s s o n s  l e a r n e d  f r o m
 t h e  s e c u r i t y  c a s e .  
I n  p a r t i c u l a r  i t  m
a p s  l e s s o n s  l e a r n e d  t o  s e c u r i t y  g u i d e l i n e s  u s i n g  t h e  c u s t o m
i s e d  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r i n g  
N
o t a t i o n s .  T h e  o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  e n h a n c e  t h e  s h a r i n g  o f  l e s s o n s  l e a r n e d  f r o m
 t h e  s e c u r i t y  i n c i d e n t .  T h i s  
i n s t r u c t i o n  p r o v i d e s  t h e  s t e p s  o n  h o w
 t o  c r e a t e  G
e n e r i c  S e c u r i t y  T e m
p l a t e  ( A
p p e n d i x  3 ) ,  f r o m
 t h e  
C
a s e  D
e s c r i p t i o n  ( A
p p e n d i x  1 )  a n d  a  P a s s w
o r d  S e c u r i t y  G
u i d a n c e  i n  A
p p e n d i x  2 .   
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 S t e p  1 :  P r e p a r e  t h e  G o a l  S t r u c t u r e  
G u i d a n c e  –  P r e p a r e  t h e  T o p  G o a l  
  
T h e  T o p  G
o a l  i s  t h e  c l a i m
 t h a t  t h e  w
h o l e  g o a l  s t r u c t u r e  i s  d e s i g n e d  t o  s u p p o r t .  I t  c l a i m
e d  a b o u t  t h e  
s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e  s y s t e m
 o r  a p p l i c a t i o n .     
  
I t  s h o u l d  b e  s t a t e d  i n  t h e  f o r m
a t  “ < s y s t e m
>  i s  a c c e p t a b l y  s e c u r e ”  o r  “ < a p p l i c a t i o n >  i s  a c c e p t a b l y  s e c u r e ” .   
  
T h e  C
a s e  D
e s c r i p t i o n  ( A
p p e n d i x  1 :  C
a s e  D
e s c r i p t i o n )  i n d i c a t e s  i t  i s  a b o u t  t h e  p a s s w
o r d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  c r e a t e  
a n d  f i l l  i n  t h e  G
o a l  N
o t a t i o n  ( d e p i c t e d  a s  s q u a r e s )  w
i t h  t h e  s t a t e m
e n t  “ P a s s w
o r d  i s  a c c e p t a b l y  s e c u r e ”  
E x a m
p l e  
     G u i d a n c e  – P r e p a r e  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  G o a l  S t r u c t u r e   
  
A
g a i n ,  e v e r y  G
o a l  i s  a  c l a i m
 m
a d e  t h a t  i t s  s u b - g o a l  s t r u c t u r e  i s  d e s i g n e d  t o  s u p p o r t .  
  
U
s e  t h e  s t r u c t u r e d  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  g u i d e l i n e  a s  t h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e  a n d  p l a c e  t h e m
 u n d e r  t h e  
T o p  G
o a l .  I n  t h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n ,  w
e  u s e  t h e  P a s s w
o r d  S e c u r i t y  G
u i d e l i n e  ( A
p p e n d i x  2 )  a s  t h e  G
o a l  
S t r u c t u r e .  
  
C
r e a t e  a n d  f i l l  i n  e a c h  G
o a l  N
o t a t i o n  w
i t h  a  s i n g l e  i t e m
 f r o m
 t h e  P a s s w
o r d  S e c u r i t y  G
u i d e l i n e  ( A
p p e n d i x  
2 ) .   
  
O
r g a n i s e  t h e  g o a l s  i n t o  t h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e  b y  c o n v e r t i n g  t h e  t e x t  i n t o  t r e e  s t r u c t u r e .   
  
U
s e  A
r r o w
 (            )  t o  l i n k  t h o s e  G
o a l s ,  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  s u p p o r t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .   
E x a m
p l e
 
        I n p u t  ( A
p p e n d i x  2 :  P a s s w
o r d  S e c u r i t y  G
u i d e l i n e )  
1 .  U
s e  m
u l t i p l e  p a s s w
o r d s   
1 . 1  U
s e  m
u l t i p l e  p a s s w
o r d s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  a c c o u n t ,  s y s t e m
s  
…
…
.  
3 .  U
s e  l o n g  p a s s w
o r d s  
3 . 1  K
e e p  p a s s w
o r d s  m
o r e  t h a n  e i g h t  c h a r a c t e r s   
…
…
 
I n p u t  ( A
p p e n d i x  1 :  C
a s e  D
e s c r i p t i o n )     
  A s  i s  i n f e r r e d  f r o m
 t h e  C
a s e  D
e s c r i p t i o n ,  t h e  T o p  
G
o a l  i s  “ P a s s w
o r d  i s  a c c e p t a b l y  s e c u r e ”       
 
E
x a m
p l e  O
u t p u t               
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F i g .  1 :  T h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e  
 
E x a m
p l e  O
u t p u t  
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 S t e p  2 :  P r e p a r e  t h e  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  
G u i d a n c e  –  P r e p a r e  t h e  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  
  
T h e  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  k n o w
l e d g e  o r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  g a i n e d  b y  e x p e r i e n c e .  I n  t h i s  
i n s t r u c t i o n ,  i t  r e f e r s  t o ,   
-  
S e c u r i t y  I s s u e s  ( i . e .  c a u s e s  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  i n c i d e n t s )  
-  
S e c u r i t y  R
e c o m
m
e n d a t i o n s  ( i . e .  r e c o m
m
e n d a t i o n s  i n t e n d e d  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  f u t u r e  i n c i d e n t  o f  a  s i m
i l a r  
k i n d )   
  
T h e y  a r e  p r o v i d e d  i n  t h e  f o r m
 o f  s t r u c t u r e d  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  < S e c u r i t y  I s s u e > :  < S e c u r i t y  R
e c o m
m
e n d a t i o n >  
  
F i l l  i n  e a c h  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  N
o t a t i o n  ( d e p i c t e d  a s  c i r c l e s )  w
i t h  a  s i n g l e  i t e m
 f r o m
 L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  
S e c t i o n  ( A
p p e n d i x  1 :  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d )  
E x a m
p l e  
              
F i g . 2 :  T h e  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  N
o t a t i o n s  
  I n p u t  ( A
p p e n d i x  1 :  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d )  
   E
x a m
p l e  O
u t p u t  
   
 
S e c u r i t y  I s s u e s  
S e c u r i t y  R
e c o m
m
e n d a t i o n s  
P a s s w
o r d  S h a r i n g  
S h o u l d  n o t  s h a r e  t h e  p a s s w
o r d  w
i t h  o t h e r s  
C
o m
p l e x  P a s s w
o r d  
S h o u l d  u s e  c o m
p l e x  p a s s w
o r d  w
i t h  c o m
b i n a t i o n  o f  l e t t e r s  a n d  n u m
b e r s  
M
u l t i p l e  P a s s w
o r d :  
S h o u l d  u s e  d i f f e r e n t  p a s s w
o r d  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  a c c o u n t  
P a s s w
o r d  R
e c o r d  
S h o u l d  k e e p  a  p a s s w
o r d  r e c o r d  a n d  e n s u r e  t h e  r e c o r d  i s  s e c u r e l y  p r o t e c t e d  
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 S t e p  
3 :  
M
a p  
t h e  
L e s s o n s  
L e a r n e d  
t o  
t h e  
G o a l  
S t r u c t u r e  
G u i d a n c e  – M
a p p i n g   
D
i f f e r e n t  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  S t e p  2  c o n t a i n s  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  d e t a i l s  a n d  c a n  b e  m
a p p e d  t o  
d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l  o f  t h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e .  T h i s  i s  a  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o c e s s  t h a t  y o u  h a v e  t o  d e c i d e  t h e  r e l a t i o n  
b e t w
e e n  t h e  G
o a l s  a n d  t h e  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d .  D
e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  w
i t h  t h e  g o a l s ,  t h o s e  l e s s o n s  
l e a r n e d  h a v e  b e e n  d i v i d e d  i n t o  f o u r  t y p e s .  B
e l o w
 a r e  t h e  r u l e s  t o  d e c i d e  t h e  m
a p p i n g  a n d  t h e  t y p e s  o f  t h e  
L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d ,   
D
e c i d e  t h e  M
a p p i n g  a n d  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  T y p e s  
S t a r t i n g  f r o m
 t h e  b o t t o m
- l e v e l  G
o a l s  i n  t h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e ,  
  
I f  a  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  i s  r e l a t e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  t o  a  b o t t o m
- l e v e l  G
o a l ,  i t  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  T y p e  I .  T h e n  t h i s  
L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  s h o u l d  b e  m
a p p e d  t o  t h i s  b o t t o m
- l e v e l  G
o a l .   
          
  
I f  a  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  m
o r e  t h a n  o n e  b o t t o m
- l e v e l  G
o a l s  i n  t h e  g o a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  i t  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  
T y p e  I I .  T h e n  t h i s  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  s h o u l d  b e  m
a p p e d  t o  t h e  n e a r e s t  g o a l  w
h e r e  t h o s e  t w
o  b o t t o m
- l e v e l  
G
o a l  s h a r e  t h e  s a m
e  P a r e n t  G
o a l .   
           
L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  
R
e l a t e d  G
o a l  
T y p e  
M
a p p i n g  
M
u l t i p l e  P a s s w
o r d :
S h o u l d  u s e  d i f f e r e n t  
p a s s w
o r d  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  
a c c o u n t
 
 
T y p e  I  
G
o a l  1 . 1  
1 . 1  U
s e  m
u l t i p l e  
p a s s w
o r d s  f o r  
d i f f e r e n t  a c c o u n t ,  
s y s t e m
s
 
L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  
R
e l a t e d  G
o a l  
T y p e  
M
a p p i n g  
P a s s w
o r d  R
e c o r d :
S h o u l d  k e e p  a  
p a s s w
o r d  r e c o r d  a n d  
e n s u r e  t h e  r e c o r d  i s  
s e c u r e l y  p r o t e c t e d
 
  
T y p e  I I  
( P a r e n t )  G
o a l  4  
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   
I f  a  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  n o n e  o f  t h e  b o t t o m
- l e v e l  G
o a l ,  g o  u p  t o  c h e c k  o t h e r  G
o a l s ,  c h e c k  a n d  
d e c i d e  w
h e t h e r  i t  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  a  h i g h e r  l e v e l  G
o a l  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e .  I f  y e s ,  i t  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  T y p e  I I I ,  t h i s  
L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  s h o u l d  b e  m
a p p e d  t o  t h i s  r e l a t e d  G
o a l .  
             
I f  a  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  n o n e  o f  t h e  G
o a l s  i n  t h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e ,  i t  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  T y p e  I V ,  t h e n  a  
n e w
 G
o a l  n a m
e d  “ ( S t a n d a r d  n o n - e x i s t e n t ) ”  s h o u l d  b e  c r e a t e d  t o  l i n k  t h i s  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  t o  t h e  T o p  
G
o a l .  
     
 L
i n k  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  t o  t h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e  
  
L i n k  t h o s e  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  t o  t h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  M
a p p i n g  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  a b o v e  t a b l e s  
  
U
s e  A
r r o w
 (            )  t o  l i n k  t h e m
,  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  s u p p o r t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
 
R
e f l e c t  t h e  L e s s o n s  L
e a r n e d  T y p e s   
  
R
e f l e c t  t h e  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  T y p e s  b y  f i l l i n g  t h e m
 i n  t h e  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  N
o t a t i o n s  ( r e f e r  t o  F i g .  3 )    
 C
l e a n  t h e  D
i a g r a m
s  
  
C
l e a n  t h e  d i a g r a m
 b y  d e l e t i n g  t h e  G
o a l s  t h a t  a r e  n o t  m
a p p e d  t o  a n y  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  ( r e f e r  t o  F i g .  3 )  a s  
t h e  f i n a l  d i a g r a m
 a i m
s  t o  r e f l e c t  o n l y  t h e  m
a p p e d  G
o a l s  a n d  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d .   
L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  
R
e l a t e d  G
o a l  
T y p e  
M
a p p i n g  
C
o m
p l e x  P a s s w
o r d :
S h o u l d  u s e  c o m
p l e x  
p a s s w
o r d  w
i t h  
c o m
b i n a t i o n  o f  l e t t e r s  
a n d  n u m
b e r s
 
  
T y p e  I I I  
G
o a l  2  
 
L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  
R
e l a t e d  G
o a l  
T y p e  
M
a p p i n g  
 
N
o n e  
T y p e  I V
 
C
r e a t e  
a  
n e w
 
g o a l  
n a m
e d   
“ ( S t a n d a r d  n o n - e x i s t e n t ) ”  a n d  
l i n k  b e t w
e e n  T o p  G
o a l  a n d  t h i s  
L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  
 ( R e f e r  t o  F i g .  3 )  
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F i g .  3 :  T h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e  w
i t h  n e w
l y  m
a p p e d  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  
 
 
E x a m
p l e  O
u t p u t  
 
 
 9  /  1 5  
 S t e p  4 :  E l a b o r a t e  S t r a t e g y  a n d  C o n t e x t  
G u i d a n c e  –  S t r a t e g y  
  
S t r a t e g y  i s  i n s e r t e d  b e t w
e e n  G
o a l s  t o  p r o v i d e  m
e t h o d s  u s e d  f o r  t h e  g o a l  d e c o m
p o s i t i o n .  
  
T h e  s t a t e m
e n t  i n  t h e  S t r a t e g y  N
o t a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  i n  t h e  f o r m
 “ A
r g u m
e n t  o v e r  < a p p r o a c h > ”   
  
I n  t h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n ,  w
e  h a v e  u s e d  t w
o  s t r a t e g i e s  t o  d e c o m
p o s e  t h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e .   
S t r a t e g y  1   
-  
W
e  h a v e  u s e d  P a s s w
o r d  S e c u r i t y  G
u i d e l i n e  ( A
p p e n d i x  2 )  a s  t h e  g o a l  d e c o m
p o s i t i o n  m
e t h o d .   
-  
F i l l  i n  t h e  S t r a t e g y  N
o t a t i o n  ( d e p i c t e d  a s  d i a m
o n d s )  w
i t h  “ A
r g u m
e n t  o v e r  P a s s w
o r d  S e c u r i t y  
G
u i d e l i n e ” .   
-  
I n s e r t  t h i s  S t r a t e g y  N
o t a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e  b e t w
e e n  t h e  T o p  G
o a l  a n d  t h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e  
c r e a t e d  f r o m
 t h e  s e c u r i t y  g u i d e l i n e s .   
-  
U
s e  A
r r o w
 (            )  t o  l i n k  t h e m
,  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  s u p p o r t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .     
S t r a t e g y  2  
-  
T h e  g o a l  d e c o m
p o s i t i o n  m
e t h o d  a l s o  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d  w
h i c h  a r e  n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  
s e c u r i t y  g u i d e l i n e .   
-  
F i l l  i n  t h e  S t r a t e g y  N
o t a t i o n  w
i t h  “ A
r g u m
e n t  o v e r  A
l l  M
i s s i n g  S e c u r i t y  R
e c o m
m
e n d a t i o n s ” .   
-  
I n s e r t  t h i s  S t r a t e g y  n o t a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e  b e t w
e e n  t h e  T o p  G
o a l  a n d  t h e  N
e w  G
o a l  c r e a t e d  
f o r  T y p e  I V
 L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d .  
-  
U
s e  A
r r o w
 (            )  t o  l i n k  t h e m
,  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  s u p p o r t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
E x a m
p l e  f o r  S t r a t e g y  
   
F i g .  4 :  T h e  S t r a t e g y  N
o t a t i o n  f o r  S t r a t e g y  1  
      
F i g .  5 :  T h e  S t r a t e g y  N
o t a t i o n  f o r  S t r a t e g y  2  
I n p u t  ( A
p p e n d i x  2 )   
 T h e  s e c u r i t y  g u i d a n c e  i s  t i t l e d  “ P a s s w
o r d  S e c u r i t y  
G
u i d e l i n e ”  
I n p u t  
F o r  t h e  T y p e  I V
 L e s s o n s  L e a r n e d ,  w
e  h a v e  c r e a t e d  
a  n e w
 S t r a t e g y  t o  d e c o m
p o s e  t h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e   
E x a m
p l e  O
u t p u t  
 
E x a m
p l e  O
u t p u t  
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 T h e  G e n e r i c  S e c u r i t y  T e m
p l a t e  w
i t h  S t r a t e g y  N
o t a t i o n  
                        
  
F i g .  6 :  T h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e  w
i t h  n e w
l y  a d d e d  S t r a t e g i e s  
 
E x a m
p l e  O
u t p u t  
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 G u i d a n c e  –  C o n t e x t  
  
C
o n t e x t  i s  u s e d  t o  p r e s e n t  s u p p l e m
e n t a r y  i n f o r m
a t i o n  s u c h  a s  c o n c e p t s  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  i n  t h e  c l a i m
/ s t r a t e g y .  
  
T h e  s t a t e m
e n t  i n  t h e  C o n t e x t  n o t a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  i n  t h e  f o r m
 o f  < N
o u n - P h r a s e >  
  
I n  t h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n ,  w
e  h a v e  u s e d  C o n t e x t  n o t a t i o n s  t o  e l a b o r a t e  t h e  G
o a l s  o r  S t r a t e g i e s .       
 C o n t e x t  
-  
T h e  C
a s e  D
e s c r i p t i o n  ( A
p p e n d i x  1 :  C
a s e  D
e s c r i p t i o n )  i n d i c a t e s  t h i s  i n c i d e n t  h a p p e n e d  t o  A
l e x .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  T o p  G
o a l  i s  e l a b o r a t e d  w
i t h  s u p p l e m
e n t a r y  i n f o r m
a t i o n  “ A
l e x ’ s  P a s s w
o r d ” .   
-  
F i l l  i n  t h e  C o n t e x t  N
o t a t i o n  w
i t h  “ A
l e x ’ s  P a s s w
o r d ” .   
-  
A
t t a c h  t h e  C o n t e x t  N
o t a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  T o p  G
o a l  “ A
l e x ’ s  P a s s w
o r d ” .  
-  
U
s e  H
o l l o w  A r r o w
 (          )  t o  l i n k  t h e m
,  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  “ i n  c o n t e x t  o f ” .  
 F i g .  4  h a s  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  a b o v e  c h a n g e s  
E x a m
p l e  f o r  C o n t e x t  
      
F i g .  7 :  T h e  C
o n t e x t  N
o t a t i o n  
  
 
E
x a m
p l e  I n p u t  
T h e  p a s s w
o r d  i s  e l a b o r a t e d  a s  “ A
l e x ’ s  P a s s w
o r d ”  
E x a m
p l e  O
u t p u t  
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 T h e  G e n e r i c  S e c u r i t y  T e m
p l a t e  w
i t h  C o n t e x t  N
o t a t i o n  
                       \     
F i g .  8 :  T h e  G
o a l  S t r u c t u r e  w
i t h  n e w
l y  a d d e d  C
o n t e x t s  
 
E x a m
p l e  O
u t p u t  
( T y p e  I V
)
P a s s w
o r d  S h a r i n g :  
S h o u l d  n o t  s h a r e  t h e  
p a s s w
o r d  w
i t h  o t h e r s
( T y p e  I )
C
o m
p l e x  P a s s w
o r d :
S h o u l d  u s e  c o m
p l e x  
p a s s w
o r d  w
i t h  
c o m
b i n a t i o n  o f  l e t t e r s  
a n d  n u m
b e r s
( T y p e  I )
M
u l t i p l e  P a s s w
o r d :
S h o u l d  u s e  d i f f e r e n t  
p a s s w
o r d  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  
a c c o u n t
( T y p e  I I )
P a s s w
o r d  R
e c o r d :
S h o u l d  k e e p  a  
p a s s w
o r d  r e c o r d  a n d  
e n s u r e  t h e  r e c o r d  i s  
s e c u r e l y  p r o t e c t e d
2 .  U
s e  c o m
p l e x  
p a s s w
o r d s
P a s s w
o r d  i s  a c c e p t a b l y  
S e c u r e  
1 .  U
s e  m
u l t i p l e  
p a s s w
o r d s
1 . 1  U
s e  m
u l t i p l e  
p a s s w
o r d s  f o r  
d i f f e r e n t  a c c o u n t ,  
s y s t e m
s
4 .  K
e e p  p a s s w
o r d s  
r e c o r d  
 ( S t a n d a r d  n o n - e x i s t e n t )
A
r g u m
e n t  o v e r  
P a s s w
o r d  S e c u r i t y  
G
u i d e l i n e
A
r g u m
e n t  o v e r  A
l l  
M
i s s i n g  S e c u r i t y  
R
e c o m
m
e n d a t i o n s
A
l e x ’ s  
P a s s w
o r d
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 A p p e n d i x  1 :  P a s s w
o r d  S e c u r i t y  C a s e   
C
a s e  D
e s c r i p t i o n  
A
l e x ’ s  c r e d i t  c a r d  s h o w
s  a b n o r m
a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  H
e  s u s p e c t s  t h e  p a s s w
o r d  w
a s  s t o l e n  b y  s o m
e o n e  
e l s e .  A
n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  t h i s  c a s e  f o u n d  t h a t  h i s  p a s s w
o r d  i s  t h e  s a m
e  a s  G
m
a i l  p a s s w
o r d  a n d  h a s  
b e e n  s h a r e d  w
i t h  h i s  f r i e n d s  b e f o r e .  H
i s  p a s s w
o r d  h a s  u s e d  d i g i t  n u m
b e r s  o n l y .  T h e  r e a s o n  h e  g i v e s  
f o r  u s i n g  s i m
i l a r  p a s s w
o r d  i s ,  h e  c o u l d  n o t  m
e m
o r i z e  t h e m
 i f  u s i n g  m
u l t i p l e  p a s s w
o r d s .     
L e s s o n s  L
e a r n e d  
S e c u r i t y  I s s u e s  
S e c u r i t y  R
e c o m
m
e n d a t i o n s  
P a s s w
o r d  S h a r i n g  
S h o u l d  n o t  s h a r e  t h e  p a s s w
o r d  w
i t h  o t h e r s  
C
o m
p l e x  P a s s w
o r d  
S h o u l d  u s e  c o m
p l e x  p a s s w
o r d  w
i t h  c o m
b i n a t i o n  o f  l e t t e r s  a n d  n u m
b e r s  
M
u l t i p l e  P a s s w
o r d :  
S h o u l d  u s e  d i f f e r e n t  p a s s w
o r d  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  a c c o u n t  
P a s s w
o r d  R
e c o r d  
S h o u l d  k e e p  a  p a s s w
o r d  r e c o r d  a n d  e n s u r e  t h e  r e c o r d  i s  s e c u r e l y  p r o t e c t e d  
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D.2 Participant Consent Form
INTRODUCTION
This research proposes a new incident reporting approach, the Generic Security Tem-
plate. It is a structured description of the lessons learned from the security incidents.
In particular it maps the lessons learned to the security standards or guidelines using
the graphical Goal Structuring Notations. The objective is to enhance the sharing of
the lessons learnt from the security incident.
STUDY PROCESS
The steps include: (1) study the creation of the Generic Security Template from the in-
struction; (2) create a Generic Security Template for a tiny case study about the credit
card disposing.
BENIFITS
This study aims to familiarize you with this new approach using easy to understand
case studies. The benefit you get from this experiment might be (1) a new technique
to describe security incidents (2) a few recommendations on how to securely destroy a
credit card.
CONFIDENTIALITY
All information collected during this study will be kept strictly confidential; This data
might be used as part of research publications and reports in journals, conferences and
workshops. However, all reported data will be anonymised and all efforts will be un-
dertaken to prevent participants from being identified.
PARTICIPATION
Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you decide to participate, you may
withdraw at any time without penalty.
CONTACT
If you have questions about the study, please contact:
Miss Ying He, Email: yingh@dcs.gla.ac.uk
Prof Chris Johnson, Email: Christopher.Johnson@glasgow.ac.uk
School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow
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DECLARATION
“I confirm that I have read and understand the information above. I agree to participate
in this study with the understanding that I may withdraw at any time.”
Signed
Date
Contact Information
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D.3 Experiment Task - A case on Credit Card Disposing
Task Instruction
(1) Read the instruction The Creation Steps of the Generic Security Template and learn
how to create the Generic Security Template.
(2) Follow the instruction and create the Generic Security Template, using the Credit
Card Disposing Case (Appendix 1) and a Credit Card Disposing Guideline (Appendix
2).
(3) Write down your answer in the provided answer sheet.
(4) Fill in a Questionnaire after this exercise.
(5) Please return your completed Concert Form, Answer Sheet and Questionnaire after
this study.
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D.3.1 Appendix 1: Credit Card Disposing Case
Case Description
Alex has a credit card which is due to expire; he has cut it off into two pieces and
through them away in the trash bin. His friend suggests making additional cuts be-
tween at least every four digits on the front of the card. He should also disable the
Magnetic Strip. Moreover, he should review the pieces and make sure that no signif-
icant amount of information can be retrieved from any one piece. Finally, Instead of
throwing them once, he should throw out half of it one week and the second half the
following week.
Lessons Learned
Table D.1: Credit Card Disposing
Security Issues Security Recommendations
Card Destroy Make additional cuts between at least every four dig-
its on the front of the card
Magnetic Strip Disable the Magnetic Strip.
Card Destroy Review the pieces and make sure that no significant
amount of information can be retrieved from any one
piece.
Card Disposal Throw out half of the cut pieces one week and the
second half the following week.
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D.3.2 Appendix 2: Credit Card Disposing Guidelines
Figure D.1: Credit Card Disposing Guidelines
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D.4 Answer Sheets
Answer Sheet 
 
Step 1: Prepare the Goal Structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Your Goal Structure (refer to Fig. 1 on Page 4 of the Instruction as an example answer) 
	  
Step 2: Prepare the Lessons Learned 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Your Lessons Learned (refer to Fig. 2 on Page 5 of the Instruction as an example answer) 
Step 3: Map the Lessons Learned to the Goal Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Your Lessons Learned Mapping (refer to Fig. 3 on Page 8 of the Instruction as an example 
answer)  
* The lessons learned do not necessarily have all four types. 
 
 
 Step 4: Elaborate Strategy and Context 
  
Your Strategy (refer to Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 on Page 9 of the Instruction as an example answer) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Your Context (refer to Fig. 7 on Page 11 of the Instruction as an example answer) 
 
Your Final Generic Security Template 
 
  Your final Generic Security Template (refer to Fig. 8 on Page 12 of the Instruction as an 
example answer) 
Final Check of Generic Security Template 
 
Check you Generic Security Template if it has satisfied the following criteria 
 
1. Check the main components 
It should include the Goal Structure, Lessons Learned, the Strategy, and the Context  
 
2. Check you have used the right Arrows/Hollow Arrows to present the relationships between 
different notations 
 
3. Check you have provided the Types (e.g. Type I, II ……) of the Lessons Learned in the 
Lessons Learned Notation in your final Generic Security Template  
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D.5 Post-Experiment Questionnaire
Section A: Background Information
1. Highest level of degree
2. Major subject
3. Gender ◻ Male ◻ Female
4. Have you taken information security related courses?◻ Yes ◻ No
5. Experience with diagramming technique?◻ Goal Structuring Notations (GSN)◻ Entity-Relationship (ER)◻ Unified Modeling Language (UML)◻ Others, please specify
Section B: Obstacles during the creation of the Generic Security Template
6. I have no difficulty in completing the Step 1 while creating the Generic Security
Template.
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
If there are difficulties, what are them and your suggestion to improve?
7. I have no difficulty in completing the Step 2 while creating the Generic Security
Template.
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
If there are difficulties, what are them and your suggestion to improve?
8. I have no difficulty in completing the Step 3 while creating the Generic Security
Template.
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
If there are difficulties, what are them and your suggestion to improve?
9. I have no difficulty in completing the Step 4 while creating the Generic Security
Template.
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
If there are difficulties, what are them and your suggestion to improve?
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10. Any other comments, please specify.
Section C: Task Load Index
Place an “X” along each scale at the point that best indicates your experience.
11. How mentally demanding was the task?
Low ◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻ High
12. How hurried or rushed was the pace of the task?
Low ◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻ High
13. How discouraged, stressed, and annoyed did you feel when doing the tasks?
Low ◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻ High
14. How successful do you feel in accomplishing the task?
Low ◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻ High
15. How hard did you have to work to complete the task?
Low ◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻◻ High
Section D: Usability Evaluation
16. Approximately, how much time you have used for completing this study, including
the study of instructions and the creation of the Generic Security Template.
minutes.
17. Learning to use the tool would be easy for me.
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
18. I can use it adorably if I am asked to use it again.
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
19. I am satisfied with the overall experience of the tool.
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
Appendix E
Industrial Evaluation (Appendix to
Chapter 8)
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E.1 Acceptance of Recommendations: Shenzhen Data
Leakage Incident 2008
Table E.1: Acceptance of Recommendations: Shenzhen Data Leakage Incident 2008
Category Learning Current Status and Decisions
Network Security Protect network secu-
rity according to the se-
curity standard
Current setting uses network physi-
cal isolation to ensure the network
security.(Implemented with cus-
tomisation.)
Sensitive Infor-
mation
Define the information
sensitive level
Definition of “sensitive informa-
tion” is not well understood by
the staff, e.g. some staffs define
it as medical record only. (Imple-
mentable) Action: The organisa-
tion should define the information
sensitive level.
Security Training Establish and execute
security training pro-
grams by following the
security standard.
Current training includes only an
entrance training program. (Im-
plementable.) Action: A system-
atic training program is planned to
establish by following the security
standards.
Security Policy Establish and enforce
security policy accord-
ing to the security stan-
dards
Security policy has been es-
tablished and enforced by fol-
lowing the Security Standards
(GB/T22239). (Implemented.)
Security Audit Establish and conduct
security audit plan ac-
cording to the security
standards
Currently there is no Security Au-
dit Plan. (Implementable.) Action:
A security audit plan is planned to
establish by following the security
standards
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E.2 Acceptance of Recommendations: VA Data Leak-
age Incident 2007
Table E.2: Acceptance of Recommendations: VA Data Leakage Incident 2007
Category Learning Current Status and Decisions
Management
Structure
Establish an accurate
functional description
and performance plan
to clarify the line au-
thority and reporting
relationship.
The organisation felt that their cur-
rent functional description and per-
formance plan were not accurate
and not documented. (Imple-
mentable). Action: Work on a doc-
umented functional description and
performance plan.
Position descrip-
tion
Re-evaluate and correct
position sensitivity lev-
els
“Position sensitivity level” had not
been formalized with the organisa-
tion. (Implementable with cus-
tomisation). Action: Define the
position sensitive level.
Risk Analysis Develop and issue
Government-wide risk
analysis criteria
Currently, XXX Central Hospi-
tal interacts with government wide
systems, including the Chinese na-
tional insurance system. However,
they felt that this recommendation
could only be implemented at gov-
ernment level, hence it was not a
subject they felt was in their area
of responsibility. (Implementation
unnecessary.
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Table E.2: (continued)
Category Learning Current Status and Decisions
Sensitive Infor-
mation
Use encryption, or
other effective tool,
to protect personally
identifiable information
stored on removable
storage.
The Chinese hospital forbids the
use of removable media hence this
recommendation is not immedi-
ately applicable. However, the
group could envisage a time when
this requirement might be relaxed.
If removable media were to be per-
mitted then this recommendation
would be an essential requirement
for future security. (Reserved for
future use).
Security Policy Ensure that data secu-
rity plans for research
projects comply with
information security
policies.
Currently, XXX Central Hospital
designed data security plans in
compliance with information secu-
rity policies. (Implemented).
Security Policy Ensure research involv-
ing human subjects,
compliant with in-
formation security
requirements;
Currently, XXX Central Hospital
conducting research involving hu-
man subjects in compliance with
”China Personal Information Pro-
tection Act”. (Implemented with
customisation).
Security Policy Discontinue storing
email on unauthorised
system.
The Chinese hospital forbids the
use of Emails hence this recommen-
dation is not immediately applica-
ble. However, the group could en-
visage a time when this requirement
might be relaxed. If Emails were to
be permitted then this recommenda-
tion would be an essential require-
ment for future security. (Reserved
for future use).
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Table E.2: (continued)
Category Learning Current Status and Decisions
Access Control Avoid the abuse pro-
grammer level access
granted for research
purposes
Currently, there are no issues re-
ported regarding wrongly assign-
ing the access control. (Im-
plementable with customisation).
Action: Implementable through de-
partment meeting to warn the secu-
rity engineers of the consequences
caused by wrongly granting access
control.
Administrative
Action
Take administrative ac-
tions against the peo-
ple involved in this in-
cident for their inappro-
priate actions according
to the “data protection
law”
They have taken administrative ac-
tions against the people involved
in this incident for their inap-
propriate actions according to the
“China Personal Information Pro-
tection Act” . (Implemented with
customisation). Action: Take ad-
ministrative actions against the peo-
ple involved in this incident for
their inappropriate actions accord-
ing to the ”China Personal Informa-
tion Protection Act”.
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E.3 Acceptance of Recommendations: VA Data Leak-
age Incident 2006
Table E.3: Acceptance of Recommendations: VA Data Leakage Incident 2006
Category Learning Current Status and Decisions
Sensitive Infor-
mation
Use encryption, or
other effective tool,
to protect personally
identifiable information
stored on removable
storage.
As is mentioned, the Chinese hos-
pital forbids the use of removable
media hence this recommendation
is not immediately applicable. This
recommendation is reserved for fu-
ture use. (Reserved for future
use).
Position Descrip-
tion
Define the position sen-
sitive level.
“Position sensitivity level” had not
been formalized with the organisa-
tion. (Implementable). Action:
Define the position sensitive level.
Security Training Provide linkage to all
applicable laws and
policy as part of the
security awareness
training.
The hospital does not provide ac-
cess to applicable laws and policy
as part of the security awareness
training. (Implementable). Ac-
tion: Provide access to applicable
laws and policy.
Incident Han-
dling
Enhance incident-
response program on
promptly identifica-
tion and thoroughly
investigation of the
incidents
Currently, the organisation has not
thoroughly investigated the secu-
rity incidents. (Implementable).
Action: Enhance incident-response
program on promptly identification
and thoroughly investigation of the
incidents.
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Table E.3: (continued)
Category Learning Current Status and Decisions
Administrative
Action
Take administrative ac-
tions against the peo-
ple involved in this in-
cident for their inappro-
priate actions according
to the “data protection
law”
They have taken administrative ac-
tions against the people involved
in this incident for their inap-
propriate actions according to the
“China Personal Information Pro-
tection Act” (Implemented with
customisation). Action: Take ad-
ministrative actions against the peo-
ple involved in this incident for
their inappropriate actions accord-
ing to the “China Personal Informa-
tion Protection Act”
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